Bridgman oh pool v HASKEY Intr rot a lease be make to a and b for their life  and the life of the survivor of they and afterward to the executor and  administrator of the survivor of they for fortyone year a and b can grant this  term of fortyone year it appear that at commonlaw a possibility be not  assignable though it may be release in certain case but however there be many  determination by the court of chancery which prove that at this day  possibility of personal estate be assignable in equity Fearne c r that edit  see do v Tomlinson maul Selwyn and wright v wright Ves a ms No fol I do also  deliver this term the opinion of the court in the case between pool and Haskey  Bridgman oh er p the case be this a lease be make to Edward pool and Henry  pool for their life and the life of the survivor of they and afterward to the  executor and administrator of the survivor of they for fortyone year to be  account from the death of the survivor of they and from thence full to be  complete and end they grant the premise to another for their life and for the  term of fortyone year to be account from the death of the survivor of they and  we be of opinion that this grant by Edward pool and Henry pool of the term of  fortyone year limit to the executor and administrator of the survivor of they  be make before it be know which of they survive be a void grant see for this  my argument at large and the difference there put between a remainder for year  upon a contingent or other estate and a future interest grant to a stranger ms  No fol argument at large Bridgman c j John pool have bring a action of  trespass and ejectment against George Haskey of one message acre of land acre  of meadow and acre of pasture with the appurtenance in Cambridge upon the  demise of Ann pool April for five year from the that of march then last pass  upon not guilty plead there be a special verdict that sir germane pool be  seize of the land in the declaration and by indenture Julii Elizabeth de  Bridgman oh miss they to Edward pool and Henry pool for the term of their life  and the life of the long liver of they et postea executor et director super to  live the dawn speaker eduvardi pool et Henry pool pro forty et to make one  year computand a death super to live the dawn eduvardi pool et Henry pool et  from that source plenary PostCommunion et faciend without impetilione huge and  they find livery and seize give and the lessee enter and be seize and be so  seize by indenture December Elizabeth grant the premise to Edward pool the  elder his executor administrator and assign during the life of the say Edward  pool the young and Henry pool and for the term of fortyone year to be account  from the death of the survivor of they et from that source computand plenary  PostCommunion et faciend and that the estate of the say Edward pool the elder  afterward come to one John Curzon as his executor or assign the jury further  find that after and before the time wherein c videlicet Oct James the say John  Curzon Edward pool the young and Henry pool by indenture triparite do grant  assign and confirm to Thomas Milward the tenement aforesaid habend to he his  executor administrator and assign for the term of the life of the say Edward  pool and Henry pool and during the life of the survivor of they and afterward  to the executor and administrator of the survivor of they for and during the  full term of fortyone year to be account from the death of the survivor of  they and from thence full to be complete and end and they find the indenture  in haec word wherein there be a covenant upon payment of Oct for reconveyance  of all except a close call Stonebench and a letter of attorney to give livery  and seize and the jury further find livery and seize to be accord give and the  entry of Thomas Milward and a demise by he I may to the defendant George  Haskey for ten year from thenceforth who by virtue thereof enter and be  possess that Thomas Milward afterward pay to Edward pool the young in full  satisfaction for the purchase of the premise that Henry pool die Augusti  Bridgman oh and that September Edward pool die intestate and that September  administration of his good be duly grant by dr Twisden commissary general to  the bishop of Litchfield to whether pool his relict lessor to the plaintiff  that the say whether as his administratrix afterward do enter into the premise  and do demise pro ut in the declaration to the plaintiff who enter and be  Bridgman oh er p possess quousaue the defendant eject he pro ut the plaintiff  have complain send utrum super totan means the defendant be guilty or not  ignorant et si c upon this verdict the case in effect be this a lease be make  to Henry pool and Edward pool for their life and the life of the survivor of  they and afterward to the executor and administrator of the survivor of they  for fortyone year to be account from the death of the survivor of they and  from thence full complete and end they grant the premise to another for their  life and for the term of fortyone year to be account from the death of the  survivor of they and whether this be a good grant to convey the term for  fortyone year be the question for if it do not pass then the plaintiff be  lessee to the administratrix of Edward pool who survive have a good title and  I be of opinion that this grant to Edward pool of the term of fortyone year  limit to the executor and administrator of the survivor of they be make before  it be know which of they survive be a void grant and so judgement ought to be  give for the plaintiff I ground my opinion upon the rule of law no man can  grant or assign that to a stranger which he have not himself at the time of  the grant to grant or assign the law be so strict in this that it allow not a  man to grant a thing in action as a bind much less a right of action nor a  possibility to a stranger it be the six question resolve in Lampets case   b  one possess of a term for five thousand year devise it to John morris for life  remainder to Elizabeth his sister this executory interest can be grant to a  stranger during the life of John morris and yet it be a interest vest in her  and a possibility which necessary must happen for the law will not presume any  man life shall last five thousand year so if a man grant land before he have a  estate and after the right of the land descend or come unto he this shall not  bind he if there be no estoppel in the case and therefore in sir Marmaduke  Wivells case in my Lord Hobart fol Bridgman oh tenant in tail of a advowson  and his son join in a grant of the next avoidance the tenant in tail die this  shall not bind the son because he have nothing at the time of the grant in  possession or right nor actual possibility I shall not multiply case upon this  bead the learning be obvious but the reason be observable the law so much  abhor buy of title and right where there be not a actual estate as tend to  multiplication of suit and introduce of champerty and maintenance that it  provide that no possibility or contingency though necessary to happen no right  title or thing in action shall be grant to stranger though it may be release  to the terretenants now in our case when the lease be make to Edward and Henry  for life and afterward to the executor and administrator of the survivor of  they for fortyone year it be clear that the term of fortyone year vest in  neither of they at the time of the lease make because it be not know which of  they shall survive I deny not but if either of they have be dead that the  estate will have vest in the survivor notwithstanding the estate be limit to  his executor for in chattel the limit a estate to the executor where the party  himself have a estate precedent vest it in himself as in a inheritance where  it be limit to the heir it vest in the party himself and so the law be take  clear at this day the different opinion be in crammer case Elizabeth and in  Sparkess case cro as it appear c Com fol b if a lease be make to one for life  remainder to his executor for year it vest in himself but in this case both of  they can have the estate because it be limit to the executor of the survivor  and so to one only and who that one shall be non constat at the time of the  grant in Biggot and smith case croak in the exchequer and affirm in the  exchequer Chamber one make a feoff to the use of himself and his wife and the  heir of the survivor and after the husband alone make a feoff and adjudge this  feoff be good against the wife survive because the feesimple be in contingency  and in Lampets case fol a my Lord coke put the case out of the register land  be give to the baron and feme and to the heir of the body of the survivor this  estate tail be not execute and if they make a lease by indenture and observe  the circumstance of lease by tenant in tail require by the statute of h yet  the lease be not good for by reason of the uncertainty of the survivor the  estate be not vest the case be there put to be resolve Elizabeth in b r  Bridgman oh a lease be make to baron and feme for twentyone year Bridgman oh  er p remainder to the survivor of they for twentyone year and the husband  grant away the term this be a void grant for the uncertainty of the person for  although the husband may dispose of all chattel real which be the wife yet in  this case neither the husband nor the wife nad riens tamque survivor so be the  very word of the book which be our very case save that be of a baron and feme  and we be of two jointtenants but in crook report of whether Mayows case not  print among the other case because report by my Lord coke Popham chief justice  put that very case to be adjudge Elizabeth to be to two jointtenants for  twentyone year remainder to the survivor of they for twentyone year and in cro  fol in the case of spark it be again cite so by my Lord Popham so to be  adjudge upon a limitation to two jointtenants this be a authority in terminus  my brother keel endeavour to have avoid at the bar by say it be the same case  with that which my Lord coke put of baron and feme and allow it in that case  to be law because the feme have nothing and not be able in law to join the  husband alone can not grant away his wife possibility or future estate but two  jointtenants have a capacity to grant their possibility or future estate admit  they be but one case as my brother will have it yet this weaken not the  authority for it show these judge make no difference betwixt the case of baron  and feme and jointtenancy in this point but that the same reason hold in both  case that the grant be not good because neither of they have the estate but it  be uncertain who shall have it but dly I hold there be no difference in the  reason of law in the case between baron and feme and two jointtenants as to  this matter for in case of chattel I hold it regular true the baron may  dispose the interest of the feme be it a present interest or a future interest  or possibility as full as if the feme be sole have do it and that appear by  the principal case of Lampet a devise of a term for year be make to John  morris for life remainder to Elizabeth morris she have this possibility take  husband it be agree that her husband release to the devisee for life bar her  and discharge the possibility and yet it be but a possibility and in his wife  right but the true difference be between a conveyance by way of exoneration  and discharge to the terretenant or one that be concern in the land which the  law allow as it do the purchase of a bare right or title anti the grant or  assignment Bridgman oh of it to a stranger as our case S and therefore as in  Lampets case where a term be devise to one for life remainder to another a  release to the devisee for life be hold good so in Johnson and trumpet case  car b r it be adjudge t at a release or discharge to he in reversion be also  good for it enure by way of exoneration or discharge of the estate in both  case in Lampets case it be further agree if the devisee for life and the baron  as that case be or other person who have the executory interest have join in a  grant to a stranger it have be a good grant but the reason be apparent the  whole estate in law move from the devisee for life and so must have be plead  the executory interest pass only by way of discharge and exoneration and it  wrought only as to the confirmation oh the estate pass by the first devisee  and so it be express say in the book that it be the grant of he that have the  term and the release or confirmation of the other and upon this ground of pass  a interest by way of exoneration and discharge it may have be of more doubt in  our principal case if Edward and harry pool have join in a release discharge  surrender or rather defeasance of this contingent estate for fortyone year to  he in the reversion whether it have not be good I say it have be a great doubt  I do not say it have be good for it much differ from Lampets and those other  case there put there be a actual possibility vest which will descend to a  executor though the person who have the possibility have die but it be not our  present case and I shall not now deliver any opinion on it but in our  principal case it be a grant to a stranger it be against the reason of law as  well as against the authority beforementioned that it shall be good there be  no estoppel because the whole truth appear upon the indenture themselves if  the assignee of Edward and harry pool have bring a ejection strong upon the  assignment upon who lease shall he have declare if he have declare upon a  lease by both that have not be true for it be not grant to both and so not  Bridgman oh er p good accord to the reason of Treports case   and he can  declare upon the lease of one because he know not which one that be my brother  keel will have this term for fortyone year not to be a remainder but a future  interest and object there be no contingency in the estate for it be certain  there must be a survivor and it be certain the fortyone year must commence  after the death of the survivor and so there be only a contingency in the  person and not in the estate all Bridgman oh person quoad interest incur it  may be assign over and be urge Littleton case Litt sect that every land of  feesimple may be charge in fee by one way or other and therefore though in the  case of a parson the fee be in abeyance yet the parson patron and ordinary be  all the person quoad interest their grant be good for none shall have  prejudice but they their heir and successor and so here the grant be good  because all the person who be concern join in it whether this term for  fortyone year to the executor of the survivor after the death of Edward and  Henry be a bare future interest or a remainder will not be much material to  our case neither be there much difference between a mere future interest for  year and a remainder for year it be a case of a chattel for a remainder for  year have not that dependency upon the precedent particular estate as a  remainder of freehold have but though the particular estate be go yet the  remainder be once raise it may subsist without the particular estate there be  no inconvenience by abeyance a suspension of the freehold as the case will be  if a remainder of the frank tenement be in abeyance or suspension but whether  it be a remainder or future interest and not a remainder yet it be not a  present title to a future interest or remainder as where land be limit to a b  for twentyone year after the death of I S a b have a present right to a future  interest but in this case of limitation of the term to the executor of the  survivor it be a contingent interest not vest till the contingency happen and  so till then not to be grant but I hold in our case it be a contingent  remainder for year and that there may be to some purpose a matreial difference  between a bare future interest not depend upon such a particular estate and a  remainder and therefore in our case if land be give to two for their life  remainder after their death to their executor or administrator for fortyone  year I hold if they surrender or otherwise determine their estate for life the  fortyone year begin present because it be a remainder immediate depend upon  the other estate which be determine and though it be limit to begin after  their death and they be not yet dead yet that limitation be but expulsion out  the dawn who tacit sew up for it will natural have begin after their death if  it have not be express and so it be if they have grant away their term for  fortyone year Bridgman oh and after surrender their estate for life or destroy  it by fine the grantee may have enter present and it alter not the case that  the fortyone year be limit to be compute from the death of the survivor for  the law will have supply those word without that limitation the time of the  commencement of the fortyone year of its own nature be to be account from the  death of the survivor and if it commence soon it be not the natural but  accidental time of commencement of it but now if a lease for life be make to  two and then by another deed a lease be make to a stranger for fortyone year  to begin after their death which be a bare future interest although they so  surrender or forfeit their estate yet their future interest as I conceive  shall not commence till after their death because it be not a remainder depend  upon the former estate but the limitation for the commencement of it be  collateral and therefore as to the distinction that be put that here be a  contingency in the person and not in the estate I be of opinion though I do  not help myself upon that point that in our principal case here be a  contingency in the estate for the estate for life may determine before the  term for fortyone year vest as if Edward and Henry shall surrender to the  lessor or both levy a fine sur conusance come Ceo c which be a forfeiture  their estate be determine before the fortyone year vest in either and so  before it ever rise and the law look upon a far more remote possibility than  that as we may see in sir Hugh Cholmley case if land be give to a for his life  remainder to another for the life of a the law look upon this remainder as  good for the possibility of determination of the other estate by forfeiture  and I conceive it be a good rule in law that Bridgman oh er p where a estate  for year be limit or future interest and when it shall begin there be none to  take it that it shall be void as if land be limit to I S for life the  remainder to the first son of I d for fortyone year and I S die or his estate  determine before I d have a son this term shall never rise because there be  none to take it when the estate do determine so in our case if Edward and  Henry determine the estate limit to they for their life by surrender or  forfeiture the estate for fortyone year to the executor of the survivor of  they be to take place upon the determination of their estate for life and none  be then to take it for it can vest joint in both it must therefore be void but  whether there be any contingency in the estate or not the uncertainty of the  person as I say before at the time of the grant make be sufficient to make the  grant by Edward and Bridgman oh Henry of the term of fortyone year which  neither of they then have to be void for as for Littleton case the reason give  by he why a rend give by a parson patron and ordinary be good be because those  who have the interest join in the grant they have all a present interest none  have any future interest and the same law be of a alienation of the land but  put the case that the patron be but tenant for life of the advowson with the  remainder to the right heir of I S the join of the patron with the parson and  ordinary will not make the grant good because all the interest be not in they  and the difference be well take c c a where the right of feesimple be  perpetual by judgement of law in abeyance without any expectation to come in  be there he that have the qualify estate to run together his who in jure to  seek again may charge or alien it but when the feesimple be in abeyance and by  possibility may every hour come in be as if a lease for life be make the  remainder to the right heir of I S the feesimple can be charge till I S be  dead and so be Littleton to be understood viz that either it may be charge in  present time or in going to be these be the word of my Lord coke and in reason  come full bear to our case Edward and harry pool all the time of this grant  have no estate in this term grant and so all person quoad interressebant do  not join ndly the estate be in abeyance or contingency and by possibility may  every hour come in be and can not therefore be convey before so that upon the  whole matter the grant be void as be make before Edward and Henry have any  thing in the term for fortyone year Edward after survive it first vest in he  consequent it be in his administratrix the lessor of the plaintiff and  therefore that judgement ought to be give for the plaintiff