Bridgman oh grange v tiving argue and adjudge Apr car hark ms No fol this case  do not appear to have be before report in the manuscript fol b be a reference  for the record of the case to sir orlando book of report a hill et car iidi  rot power to revoke the use of a settlement reserve to the settlor or any of  the heir of his body well execute by the heir of his body be a feme covert and  a infant because it be for her benefit and consistent with the intention of  the settlement hark ms No fol Ebor hill car c eject strong by Christopher  grange against Fernando tiving of acre of land acre of meadow acre of pasture  in Egbar of the demise of William palmer and mary his wife upon a special  verdict the case the case be but this Bryant Stapleton by indenture covenant  to stand seize to the use of himself for life and after to the use of his wife  and her heir provide that it shall be lawful for he during his life or to any  of the heir of his body by his or their last will in write or by any other  write under his or their hand and seal to revoke alter or change all or any of  the use in the indenture and make void the say indenture and to limit and  declare any other use thereof at his and their will and pleasure Bryan  Stapleton die have issue only a daughter mary who marry with William palmer  and after at the age of nineteen year by indenture under her hand and seal but  express to be with her husband consent revoke the use and limit the use to  herself and her heir and the plaintiff title be by lease from her and her  husband this case though it have be branch out into several point yet I think  it rest upon one single question that be whether the coverture or infancy of  mary who be heir of the body of Bryan Stapleton do binder her from execute the  power of revocation reserve upon the deed of use to he or any of the heir of  his body by write under his or their hand and seal Bridgman oh it can be deny  but regular by law coverture or infancy debar the party which be under the  disability from make any deed or write to dispose of any estate or interest  Littleton sect saith Before the age of twentyone year if a infant make any  grant obligation deed or other write all serve for nothing and may he avoid  and so it be of a feme covert for a feme covert by presumption of law have not  the free use of her will and a infant have not free use of reason and both  will and understanding be require to a legal act and this rule of the  commonlaw as be ground upon common reason hold also in exposition of statute  if a statute have general word as the statute of h of will that all person may  devise or may give to charitable use or that all grant make to king c shall be  good these general word shall not enable a infant or feme covert hob and the  same reason will hold also in the exposition of deed quod generally dictum  generally be to come to know regular general word as here the word be heir of  the body of Bryan Stapleton not determine to a particular person heir of the  body who age or qualification be know shall have a general construction and if  such a heir be a infant or feme covert these general word shall not enable he  to dispose of a estate or interest in require understanding and free will  which the law presume they have not and therefore if a conveyance be to the  use of I S and the heir of his body with power for he or the heir of his body  to make Bridgman oh lease the heir of his body be a feme covert without her  husband the doctrine that a marry woman may execute every kind of power  without the concurrence of her husband Sugden on power d ed seem to require  some qualification where the husband have a interest and the power be general  as in the case mention in the text it do not appear to have be decide by any  subsequent authority that the wife sole act will bind that interest against  his consent unless the donor intention to that effect can be infer it seem  also to be essential to consider the effect of the execution of the power on  the wife own interest the case on the point may require further examination in  Daniel v Uplee latch and W Jones Gibbons v Moulton finch Bayley v Warburton  Com and Godolphin v Godolphin Ves the power seem to be simple collateral or  bare authority or the husband have no interest in Churchill v Dibben and  wright v Lord Cadogan Eden the power be special word and Barnet v Mann Ves  rely on Roscommon v fowke b p c which be a case of a special power in Harris v  Graham Ro ab travel v travel cite Ves and report by the name of Sclator v  travel viner Bayley v Warburton Com rich v Beaumont b p c and Tomlinson v  Dighton the consent of the husband be give Lord Antrim v duke of Buckingham be  so various and so lose notice Ch can side salk freeman ab Eq common Rep hark  ms No fol that it be difficult to conclude upon what principle the decision  against the lease be ground it do not appear to have be argue accord to the  suggestion of the chief baron and the report which state that the power be  reserve to be execute by the duchess of Buckingham be sole seem to be  incorrect those word will probable have prevent dispute except in favour of  the assert creditor but they be not to be find in the register book the case  be of reversionary land in which the husband have no interest and it do not  affect the present question nor do evidence appear to have be read of creditor  be concern so that it only decide that a general power reserve to a woman of  her own land but not in contemplation of marriage can be exercise as against  the remainderman even with the concurrence of her aftertaken husband the power  must be consider a power in gross in the event which happen but if the duchess  have live to acquire the actual possession of the land it seem that it will  have be a power appendant the case therefore may be consider a authority  against the doctrine say to be now settle as to the act of a feme covert donee  of such power be valid see the case from the register book of the court of  chancery in appendix g it be submit that subsequent decision have not  contradict this inference and that the position in the treatise allude to  Sugden on power c S be lie down too wide it seem to be material to consider  whether the donor of the power intend the wife to exercise it notwithstanding  coverture and in that respect the fact of the marriage be have or contemplate  at the time of the donation be perhaps indicia of intention if no such  intention can be show the consent of the husband or other party respective  interest either express or imply seem to be essential to the due execution of  power when not mere authority or simple collateral b or infant Bridgman oh er  p can make such a lease while the disability continue for the general word  heir of his body shall not be construe to alter the rule or reason of the law  but must be understand of such a heir of his body who have by law reason and  will to do such a act but now in case of a bare power or authority where a  infant or feme covert be use but as a instrument or conduit pipe by another  who have no such disability though upon the act a alteration or transfer of a  estate do follow yet the law look upon he from who that power or authority be  derive not upon the weakness of the person act by it and therefore a infant  may as a attorney give livery upon a feoff so may a feme covert though it be  to her own husband Bridgman oh so if beneficiary and use before the statute  desire that his executor shall sell his land a feme covert or infant executor  so he be of age to be executor may sell his land and if be devise his wife  shall sell his land though she after take a husband and so have alter her  condition she may sell the land and she may sell it to her husband for in  these case the wife or infant be but instrument the estate move Bridgman oh er  p from he and it shall be say the act of the devisor or he who give this  authority h e who in vita c c a and this be the true ground of the judgement  in Daniel and Ubbes case latch there be a devise to his wife to dispose at her  pleasure and to give it one of her son which she please she marry again and  after take another husband and then convey it to a young son the judge differ  whether she have only a interest for life and a authority to give it to one of  her son in fee or a interest in fee with a condition if she do alien she shall  alien to one of her son which she please but they do all agree that this  conveyance by her though under coverture to her young son be good for if it be  a power the coverture do not disable it and if it be a condition it be a  condition annex and depend upon her power to alien for she be not compellable  to alien and in neither of the case be her coverture by law a impediment to  her but this case of Daniel and ubby though much press as full in the case yet  come not home to our case in question for the feme covert who make the  conveyance have therein a bare authority her son be whole in by the devise of  the father not by any estate derive froth her for her own estate and interest  cease when she execute her power and dispose it to her son and the power be a  power raise from the will of the devisor for by the equity of the statute of  will though not by the express word such a power may be create and it be a  devise of the testator himself within that statute and mich Elizabeth C B  townsend against walley a devise of a power or authority to sell be adjudge  within the equity of the statute of will and it be agree to be good in our  book c c a and I Cr Howel and barn case that a devise of a power or authority  be good and molineux case cro hold it to be a good devise of the land itself  within the letter of the statute of will for where the executor who have power  to sell sell the land the vendee be in by the devisor and it be in law a  devise of the Bridgman oh land to the vendee but in our case the power be  raise by the statute of use and if it be reserve upon a feoff or other  conveyance which work by transmutation of possession the power will have its  efficacy and vigour from the estate of the feoff which the feoff have  antecedent to his feoff to use and therefore if Daniel and Ubbes case have be  not by a devise but by a feoff to the use of himself for life and after to the  use of his wife for life or immediate to the use of a feme sole for life with  power for her to dispose of the fee if she take a husband whether she may  during the coverture dispose of the estate deserve consideration  notwithstanding the resolution in that case and as to the other case put where  beneficiary and use devise that another shall sell the land the use then be a  thing sever from the land and it be a bare and naked power and therefore the  feoff or release of he who have such a power to sell land do not extinguish or  destroy it neither do the infancy or coverture of the person to who that power  be devise obstruct the sale and the reason of law be the same if the devise  have be that be or his heir may sell the infancy or coverture of the heir  shall not have hinder the sale in such case and so I conceive at this day if a  man devise that I S a mere stranger or his heir shall sell the land this be a  mere power to which the equity of the statute of will enable he the feoff or  release of S or the minority of his heir it be a pure collateral naked power  shall not binder the sale I   Albany case h   Litt but in our case this power  of revocation and declaration of new use arise upon a conveyance to use by  virtue of the statute of use be of another nature than those case of naked  authority or power before put upon devise and will and therefore require a  distinct consideration the statute of h have incorporate use into possession  give birth to these power of revocation declaration of new use grant estate by  tenant for life or other particular tenant for other life or other great  estate than they have themselves limit of jointure grant of rend in fee or for  other great estate other than grantors themselves have and the like by the  commonlaw such power can not be grant and if I make a commonlaw conveyance at  this day as for instance a feoff to a and his heir to the use of he and his  heir or a lease for one thousand year which needs not any limita Bridgman oh  er p Bridgman oh cion of use with a proviso that it shall be lawful for I to  revoke at my will and pleasure or that I may limit a jointure make lease c  they be void power for they can arise out of the commonlaw estate but must  arise by the influx and cooperation of the statute of use upon a estate and  therefore power the original manuscript be and therefore be novum compositum  to which Mr Hargrave remark some word seem to be omit here perhaps it be the  word power c be novum compositum they be of a mix nature something they  partake of the nature of the legal estate of the land something of the nature  of a use in some thing they must have construction as case at commonlaw and in  other thing the construction must be accord to equity and the court of  chancery whence they be by the stat h transplant and this not by any express  word of this statute but by necessity of reason as after that the feesimple  conditional be by the statute de gift turn into estate tail it breed a great  many consequential alteration in those estate concern escheat forfeiture for  felony or treason discontinuances warranties lease c all which as you may see  notable in the case of fine   b be resolve accord to the reason of law in like  case sometime resemble the case of baron and feme sometime of a bishop or dean  and chapter or abbot and convent sometime differ from all of they not take any  one alone for the pattern and so the power raise upon the statute of use as  well as estate raise by that statute have be expound accord for instance only  in the power in our principal case a power of revocation be to some purpose  construe as a condition for it reduce a estate back to he to who it be first  limit but to some purpose it be construe as a limitation for I may revoke part  at one time part at another and if it be accompany with a power to declare new  use as most common such power be it vary more from the nature of a condition  for it revests not the estate to the party from who it move as a condition do  but vest it in other and if it do return to he who revoke it yet it return to  he in another manner he be not in of the old estate as in case of a condition  but he may be as the case require in of the old use and yet whereas the  statute h c give to the king as much benefit by attainder of treason as well  of use and right entry and condition c as if it have be do by parliament  within the word condition a power of revocation upon a covenant or feoff to  use be comprehend Bridgman oh and it shall be forfeit to the king as it be  agree in sir Francis Englefields case and the duke of Norfolk case there cite  so that we see which be all I urge this for that the construction of case upon  these power be not tie to any one pattern either whole to follow the reason of  estate at commonlaw nor yet whole to follow the reason or law of use as it be  before the stat h and among power themselves raise by the statute of use some  power shall be construe as naked authority other as savour of a interest some  wherein personal disability shall hinder the execution of they some wherein  they shall not all which have by the sage of the law be construe as the case  have occur as in the like case upon the statute de gift accord to the analogy  of the reason of the commonlaw with the consideration have to the alteration  make in the commonlaw itself and the reason of it by the say statute of use it  be necessary therefore for the resolution of this case not yet as I think  resolve in any court of law to consider the nature of this proviso here be a  covenant by indenture by Bryan Stapleton to stand seize to the use of himself  for life and after to the use of Margaret his wife and her heir provide that  it shall be lawful for he at any time during his life or to any of the heir of  his body by his or their last will in write write in his or their lifetime or  by any other write under his or their hand and seal to revoke alter change or  determine all or any the use or use in the say deed mention and to make void  the say deed and to appoint limit and declare any other use or use thereof at  his or their will and pleasure I conceive this proviso purport in it several  power the first a power of revocation videlicet to revoke the use limit by the  deed to himself and mary his wife and the word revoke alter change or  determine seem to be all synonymous in this Bridgman oh er p place for if the  use be revoke they be alter change and determine a alteration by limit new use  be not intend within this part of the proviso for it be express within the  other power which be a power of declare new use videlicet to appoint limit or  declare other use at his or their will or pleasure there be a three power that  be to make void the deed but if that be take literal I hold it clear void for  a man may make a deed void by a condition to it to defeat it as a Bridgman oh  commonlaw defeasance of it but a power to make void the deed can reach to this  indenture which be execute but to use upon the indenture and therefore either  those word to make void the deed must be understand of make void the use of  the deed and so it be synonymous with the rest or else it be quoad hoc a void  proviso for the other two power videlicet to revoke and declare new use they  be clear two distinct power though one act in declare new use alone may in  some case serve for both and for the nature of they they be in this proviso  both personal act appropriate to the person of the covenantor or his heir they  can be do by another if it be to pay money to tender a ring or the like these  maybe do by another by their authority and therefore be forfeitable within the  statute of h but to revoke or declare new use by write under his or their band  and seal require a personal act the handwriting of he or his heir in the duke  of Norfolk case   it be a proviso if he shall be mind to alter and revoke the  use and shall signify his mind in write under band and seal there be two thing  inseparable from his person his intent and the signify it under his hand and  seal and therefore be not forfeit but in more be report of Englefields case it  be take for grant that the require the write to be under his hand and seal  only make it inseparable from the person and not forfeitable as well as the  other the be mind and signify his mind second I hold both these power of  revoke and declare new use savour and taste of the estate of the land and be  not whole collateral as be object at the bar a bare collateral power be like  to air authority at the commonlaw if a make a conveyance to use with power to  b to revoke who have nothing to do with the land as owner nor have any thing  in it by the limitation of the use this power be collateral or what be  sometime term more strict simple collateral   Litt a Sugden on power chap I S  and see in the same treatise chap I S as to the extinguishment of the  different kind of power c to the estate in the land and b whether infant or  feme covert may revoke as I conceive and if be be of full age and make a feoff  or release this feoff or release will not disable he from revoke as Popham  chief justice hold in dig case and the same reason be upon a disability in law  by reason of infancy or coverture and I think the law be the same if it be a  power collateral to b or his heir who have nothing to do with the land to  revoke by write under Bridgman oh his or their band the heir though he have be  a seize and make a feoff or have release or though be be a infant may revoke  because it be a bare power to be execute by the heir not result from a  interest in he or his ancestor or tend to prejudice he in interest and this I  think be warrant by the case cite before of Daniel and ubby and h c and   c  but now in our case the power taste or savour so much of the land that Bryan  Stapleton from who the estate first move clear may have release or by fine or  feoff extinguish this power as it be resolve in Albany case and agree in dig  case if a man convey land to the use of another and his heir with power of  revocation reserve no estate to himself he may release or extinguish this  power because the land move from he and though in our case the heir of Bryan  Stapleton never have any estate in the land yet this power be derive to her as  heir to her father who have the estate and limit the use and reserve this  power and whosoever claim by a new limitation must claim under he who create  the power and if it be not a collateral power as to the father who reserve it  it shall not be to the heir to who it descend beside it be not a mere  collateral power in respect of the heir for the consequence of this revocation  be the reduce of the estate to herself and the word of c c a be emphatical if  he that have such a power of revocation have no Bridgman oh er p present  interest in the land nor by the ceasor of the estate shall have nothing then  his feoff or fine c be no extinguishment of his power because it be mere  collateral to the land which full imply that when the person who revoke gain  by the ceasor of the estate revoke it be not a mere collateral power but  extinguishable by feoff or release which be our case for by the ceasor of the  former use mary will or may if she please have the land in the last place we  be to consider that all power that taste of the land and be not collateral be  not of the like quality some draw more from the estate and interest of the  land than other if a conveyance be make to the use of I S for life with power  to make lease for three life render the old rend c if be accord to his power  make a lease for three life this issue not only out of his power but in some  sort out of his estate and therefore if he have grant a rend charge or  acknowledge a statute precedent to his lease for three life it shall have  stand good at least dare his life Bridgman oh which it shall not if it have be  raise out of his power only for then it have relate to the time of the  conveyance which be paramount to that encumbrance and therefore in such a case  a defect of age or coverture may be considerable f dale v sacheverell original  reference the same case be in latch see Com Rep reference by Mr Hargrave if a  man make a feoff to the immediate use of I S for his life who be then nineteen  or twenty year old and so of age of discretion or to the use of Alice style  who be then a feme covert with power to make lease for three life c I will not  determine whether a lease accord to that power execute by that infant or feme  covert be good or not for without all doubt it may have be so limit by express  word of the power that he may make such lease whether he or she be within age  or of full age or covert or sole and then it have clear be good for if he who  be owner of the estate have no disability upon he he may make use of any hand  how weak soever to reach out that estate but the question will be in that case  whether he who make that conveyance by name the person who he then know to be  a infant or marry and give a immediate estate and a indefinite power to make  lease without restitution in point of time do not intend that notwithstanding  that incapacity the infant or feme covert shall make such lease and so may  implicit intend what we may have express that they shall be good lease whether  make under that disability or not this opinion be contrary to the conclusion  lie down in the modern treatises See Sugden on power d edit Ropears law of  husband and wife vol two p Powell on power but see note b above p f but I be  of opinion that if that infant to who such a general power of make lease be  give be a feme sole and she take a husband and then make a lease that lease  now during her coverture be avoidable for general word shall not solve that  incapacity which she fall under after the power raise and if I make a  conveyance to the use of myself for life remainder to my first son to be beget  with such a power of make lease to myself and after to my son when be come to  be in possession if I die my son at the age of twenty year yet I hold that he  can execute this power of lease till be come to twentyone and the reason be  the same for the construction of the word of this power as it be for the like  construction of act of parliament as the statute of will that all person at  their will and pleasure may devise and of confirmation that all grant to the  king shall be good Bridgman oh general word shall not extend to devise or  grant by infant or femes covert for by the presumption of law they be not fit  to dispose of estate or to have power to dispose they to their own prejudice  and the word be not so express but that they may admit that interpretation and  therefore in those act that concern the disposition of a estate or interest  the reason of the law turn in case of infancy or coverture upon the point of  prejudice or not prejudice unto their interest a infant though he can grant  the next avoidance yet he may present to the bishop for that presentation  ought to be without money a infant can surrender a lease yet if he take a new  lease for a great interest it be good till avoid by he if for the same term  and no more it be void because it be without increase of Bridgman oh er p term  or decrease of rend and his act be mere void where there be not apparent  benefit or semble of a benefit for with cause stone and Newmans case be  adjudge that a infant may submit to a arbitrament it be but voidable cro   but  S p do not appear in march p Branston c j be state to have say that whereas by  stone v knight latch it appear that the award shall be voidable at the  election of the infant he hold that the submission ought to be either absolute  good or absolute void the aid of a award be to compose controversy but Gill v  Russel freeman be cite as a authority that a infant may be a party to a  submission Caldwell on arbitration the name of stone and Newman in the margin  be in a early handwriting but the reference to croak report be Mr umfrevilles  and in that report the point be not mention g so if seize be to the use of a  feme she take nothing till agreement but if a estate be make to her or to her  use it be in her without the agreement of the husband till be disagree so in  case of a condition if a man make a feoff proviso if he or his heir pay ten  pound or tender a ring his heir though a infant or feme covert may pay the  money or tender the ring it may be object that these be not personal act as  here to subscribe with his own band c but may be do by another suppose then  the condition be if be or his heir in person tender ten pound or a ring then  to be void this be a inseparable personal act yet I doubt not but the heir  within age or feme covert may in person tender the money or the ring and so  avoid the estate for though it divest the estate out of another yet there can  in presumption of law be any prejudice to the infant or feme covert there be a  face or semblance Bridgman oh of a benefit and therefore the law in such case  answer and supply what in the other case of pass a interest from they be  presume to be want videlicet reason in the infant and free will in the wife  for every person must be presume to do and consent to that which be for their  own good if they have the free use of their reason and will  and the reason  why in any case of power infancy or coverture binder the execution of they be  not in respect of the person who estate be to be revoke but of the prejudice  to the person revoke and where there be no such prejudice the reason be the  same where there be as where there be not any such disability I have make my  gate big than my city but upon the ground that I have lie I shall distinct  consider the two power first the power of revocation and after that of  declaration of new use first I do conceive that mary be of age of discretion  though a feme covert and a infant may execute this power of revocation of the  old use first for that it be apparent and necessary in the eye of the law for  her advantage to revoke the former use for by such revocation the estate  settle in herself as heir and it be a prejudice to her not to be able to  revoke so the reason of the commonlaw respect the prejudice or advantage of  infant or femes covert in matter of interest extend to our case second as I  say before power of revocation have the great resemblance to condition suppose  a feoff have be make to Bryan Stapleton upon condition that if Bryan Stapleton  or the heir of his body shall put his and their band and seal to and deliver a  write purport a revocation thereof then the feoff shall be void I think it  have be a good condition this have be heretofore question by some but the  difference isa feoff upon condition if be shall revoke it then to be void be a  void condition but if the condition be circumstantiated as if a deed purport a  revocation if he subscribe it with his own hand or seal it with his seal or  deliver it in the presence of three witness or the like it be conceive to be a  good condition or if I make a conveyance at the commonlaw provide if I tender  a ring to be void this be a good condition what reason be there if I may limit  it to be void upon tender of a ring I may not limit it to be void upon  delivery of a deed the delivery of a ring may have a proper or natural effect  by transfer the property of it and a improper or legal effect the make void a  estate upon the condition of delivery of it and so may a deed a proper effect  for it to be a deed by delivery and a improper effect as if it be deliver in  name of livery and seize Bridgman oh er p it give a pos Bridgman oh session  and seize and it may have a like effect first to be a good deed and second to  signify the performance of a condition and I think such a condition upon a  feoff or other commonlaw conveyance that if he or the heir of his body sign  and seal and deliver such a write then the feoff shall be void may be perform  by the heir of his body notwithstanding the infancy or coverture of the heir  of the body for though the sign seal and delivery be act individual and  inseparable from the person yet they be but external corporeal and mechanic  act there be nothing require but the thing do nothing in the performance of  the condition that of itself require any other concurrence of judgement but  such as be requisite to natural efficiency of the act as in the case if the  condition be if he in person tender a ring though the act be personal yet  nothing more of skill or understanding be require to it than what be necessary  to the effect that act that be the tender of the ring and the same reason hold  in this case of the power if it have be pen as Englefields case if because the  proof of his nephew be not yet see and that therefore it shall seem to the  uncle or the heir of his body that the nephew be prodigal that then it shall  he lawful to revoke there be a act of judgement require and a infant can not  revoke as I think in that case in Englefields case latch these word be insert  but it be only in a flourish preamble because his nephew be a infant may prove  prodigal or give to vice it therefore provide if he tender a ring the use  shall be void and so the power reach only to the act the tender of a ring not  the intent of the tender it but if they have be insert after the proviso in  Hardwyn and warner case Tr car c b palmer it be hold by some judge the  condition have not be give to the ring in the duke of Norfolk case the power  run if he shall be mind to alter and revoke the use and shall signify his mind  by write c but here the word have neither preamble nor introduction but  provide that it shall be lawful for he or the heir of his body by write c to  revoke which vary little from the expression of a condition as provide it  shall be lawful by tender of a ring in person to revoke and provide if he  tender a ring in person it shall be void so that nothing in the deed itself  appear why we shall make any far construction of this power of revocation  Bridgman oh otherwise than as we will of a condition in like case as the  infant or feme covert be not disable to perform the one so neither to perform  the other my last and three reason why she may revoke be from the deed itself  and the intent of Bryan Stapleton appear in it the word be that he or any of  the heir of his body may revoke all or any the use and his general intent upon  it be to give it to his wife and her heir if he have no child but if he have  that the heir of his body may take it away from her but if a infant or feme  covert heir of the body can revoke then the word and intent be not perform  that any heir of his body may revoke probable no heir of the body may revoke  for the heir of the body may for several succession be a daughter and those  daughter be marry as more common than otherwise woman be marry before  twentyone then notwithstanding this power a stranger as in our case shall hold  the land and so she that be a infant shall prejudice herself irrecoverable by  a act by her during her infancy or her marriage and that a lawful and  commendable act and in some case as in case of wardship if she be in ware a  kind of compulsatory act the like may be the mischief if the heir of the body  be a son if he can revoke during his minority perhaps he can never revoke for  he may die during his minority and leave a son or daughter behind this be not  to make such favourable construction of power of revocation as ought to be  make where a man reserve a power to himself from who the estate move or to his  heir to who it shall have come beside this power be not reserve to any  particular person by name pitch upon for any particular trust or confidence  but to the heir of his body who be not know to he what they shall be or to any  of they but demonstrate that his particular care be for the heir of his body  that though he love his wife well yet he prefer they in affection as to the  have the estate before her and so ought to be liberal construe as to the other  power of declare new use whether mary the infant or feme covert can declare  new use by virtue of this power I conceive it be not absolute Bridgman oh er p  necessary for I to deliver any opinion in it for if she may revoke the now use  it be sufficient the law will raise up the old use and vest the estate in her  and it be clear though these power of revoke and declare be both in one  proviso yet he who have both the power may use the one and not the other the  word be it shall be lawful it give a liberty but it be not striking together  Bridgman oh tory and entire as a condition he may execute the power of  revocation by one deed and the power of declare new use by another deed and  that prove he may execute one at one time and the other at another time and it  follow upon it in reason he may use the power of revocation and not execute  the other but yet for my own opinion upon the ground which I have lie I do  hold that mary though she may revoke the use to her mother yet can limit any  use to her husband or any other strong during her minority for that be  apparent to her prejudice and the wrong of her interest and so against the  reason and construction of law in like case and upon the same reason I think  if she declare the use to herself and the heir of her body it be a void  declaration for it be to her prejudice to have a fetter estate and not  perpetual when she may have have it free and unlimited and if she declare the  use to herself and her heir as in our case it be no more than the law will  have imply upon the bare power of revocation and therefore she shall be say to  be in by virtue of the old use and not a new declaration there have be a  objection make against execute either of these power during the minority or  coverture of mary videlicet that Bryan Stapleton reserve the power to revoke  by his last will and testament or other write he do not intend any shall  revoke but those who can make a last will but this be to turn or into and  without any cause for it I may turn the argument upon the objector a infant of  seventeen may make a testament so may a feme covert executrix and be intend  those who may make a testament may revoke and therefore a infant of seventeen  may revoke both the argument be of like forceneither of they conclude and  another objection be make that this revocation though it be say to be by the  consent of the husband yet he be no party to it and she can do nothing without  her husband consent and the allege in the write that her husband consent be  not sufficient I answer if the husband consent be requisite the allege it in  her write be not sufficient but that point be rule in Daniel and Ubbes case  that the conveyance by the wife alone without her husband be good and if the  husband consent be also to it as it make not the case the better so it make it  nothing the worse upon what have be say it appear that this revocation by mary  arise out of her father conveyance she be but a instrument in it the act  indeed be personal and inseparable to Bridgman oh be do by herself but her  personal defect by coverture or infancy can suspend the do of it so that upon  the whole I hold this power of revocation be well execute and so that mary and  her husband lessors of the plaintiff have a good title when the ejectment  lease be make and so the plaintiff ought to have judgement