Bridgman oh pink v LITCOTT the argument of counsel in this case isreported by  carter the case be adjudge car Apr hark ms No fol the roll state full entry of  the special verdict and that the judgement be against the defendant which be  contrary to the opinion of the chief justice a Intr mich car rot a be lessee  of land of the chancellor of saint Paul for the life of himself and of his two  son b and c grant all his estate therein to trustee to the use of himself for  life and after his decease to the use of Rebecca his wife for her life and  after her decease to the use of his son b and his heir the whole estate of a  be vest in himself by the first limitation and by the three limitation a use  be execute in b and his heir by way of spring use scintilla law hark ms No fol  Bridgman c j ejection strong by Vincent Pinker against John Litcott upon the  demise of Francis Litcott of the rectory of Yeling otherwise Elling message  acre of land acre of meadow and acre of pasture with the appurtenance in  Yeling otherwise Elling upon the general issue a special verdict be find  before I that Thomas turner chancellor of the cathedral church of saint Paul  London be seize of the say rectory of Yeling otherwise Elling unde tenement  infra scribe Bridgman oh er p cum to stretch out in who sup Pon c are and  tempore c to be parcel in his demesne as of fee in jure cancel of oneself  praeed and be so seize c August car by indenture c demise the say rectory and  tenement to Thomas Litcott the elder habend to he and his assign during the  natural life of the say Thomas Litcott the elder and of Thomas Litcott his son  and heir apparent and of Francis Litcott his second son and the life and life  of the long liver of they that August livery and seize be duly deliver to the  say Thomas Litcott the elder by virtue whereof he be seize in his demesne as  of freehold for the term of the life of the say Thomas Litcott the elder and  of the say Thomas and Francis the son and the long liver of they and be so  seize postea c September car the say Thomas Litcott the elder by in Bridgman  oh denture do grant assign and transfer to Thomas flexney John grub and John  Allison and the survivor of they and their executor and administrator and the  survivor of they the rectory and tenement aforesaid and all the estate of the  say sir Thomas Litcott the elder of and in the same habend to they and the  survivor of they and their executor administrator and assign and the survivor  of they for and during the life of the say Thomas the elder and Thomas and  Francis the son and the long liver of they to such use intent and purpose and  under such condition limitation and agreement as be after in the say indenture  limit and express and to no other use intent or purpose videlicet to the use  of the say Thomas Litcott the elder for his life and after his decease to the  use of Rebecca his wife and of her assign for and during the life of the say  Rebecca if the say Thomas and Francis the son shall so long live upon trust  confidence and condition that she and her assign out of the profit of the  premise shall maintain breed and educate all the child of the say Thomas  Litcott the elder with all necessary needful and useful for their occasion and  as the child of the say Thomas and Rebecca and shall allow and pay out of the  premise yearly to the say Thomas the son at the four feast c when the say  Thomas the son shall attain the age of twentyone year and also to the say  Francis and to Peter Litcott and John Litcott other son of the say Thomas the  elder apiece yearly in manner and form aforesaid when they shall attain their  age of twentyone year and after the death of the say Rebecca that the say  flexney grub and Allison and the survivor of they and the executor and  administrator of they and the survivor of they shall stand and be seize of the  premise to the use of the say Thomas Litcott the son his heir and assign for  and during the life of the say Thomas and Francis the son and the long liver  of they upon condition that the say Thomas Litcott the son shall become bind  by obligation with sufficient surety to the say flexney grub and Allison and  the survivor of they the executor and administrator of they and the survivor  of they to pay to the say Francis Peter and John the say several sum and  annuity yearly Bridgman oh as aforesaid and the jury further find livery and  seize duly give to Thomas flexney to the use of the say flexney grub and  Allison and their assign by virtue thereof and of the statute of use the say  Thomas Litcott the elder be seize of the premise as in his demesne as of  freehold for the term of his life remainder ind prout law demand and they find  the death of Thomas Litcott the elder so seize Dec and the survivorship and  entry of Rebecca do you and seize prout law demand and her death of Mars so  seize postea who et ante c of Mars flexney grub and Allison do enter and be  seize that Apr grub and Allison die and flexney do survive they and hold  himself in the premise and be thereof sole seize prout c that afterward and  ante c cognizant maii Thomas Litcott the son die that afterward the that of  may Thomas flexney by indenture do demise to the say Francis and Peter rectory  et property pillage habend one moiety to Francis and habend the other moiety  to Peter and their executor administrator and assign from the annunciation c  then last pass f or fortyone year if Francis shall so long live by virtue  whereof Francis enter and be possess prout c and make the lease to the  plaintiff prout c by virtue whereof the plaintiff enter and be possess and be  so possess the say John Litcott the defendant be the son and heir of the say  Thomas the son after the say twenty day of July do enter and eject the  plaintiff say utrum super totan means the defendant be guilty of the trespass  and ejectment ignorant c et si such the case in substance be but this Thomas  Litcott the elder be tenant for the life of himself and his two son Thomas and  Francis assign to flexney c to the use of himself for his life and after his  decease to the use of Rebecca his wife for Bridgman oh er p her life remainder  to the use of Thomas the son and his heir Thomas the father and after Rebecca  die the grantee enter Thomas the son die the defendant be his heir flexney the  survive grantee leas to the lessor of the plaintiff who make the ejectment  lease to the plaintiff the defendant be heir to Thomas the son enter upon he  so that the question be whether any estate be execute by Bridgman oh the  statute of h of use in Thomas the son or the defendant his heir for if it be  not execute then the estate in law after the death of Thomas the elder and  Rebecca his wife remainder in flexney and the other grantee under who estate  the plaintiff claim and I hold there be a good estate raise to Thomas the son  the right whereof descend to John the defendant his son and heir and his entry  be lawful judgement ought to be give for the defendant I shall rather open  than argue the case as be the clear way to resolve what may seem difficult  first then when the chancellor of Paul make a lease to Thomas Litcott the  elder for the life of himself and his two son he have but one entire estate  determinable upon the death of the survivor of they three and not several  estate and the plead clear that army pron  interrog  he be seize in his  demesne ut de book tenement pro boundary life Self thomae Litcott sen et to  say before thomae Litcott et Franc Litcott a son et vitae the dawn still  further live and therefore in the second place to consider a little the nature  of the estate conceive if Thomas the elder have grant the land to grantee for  the life of himself and not for the life of his two son also this have pass  the whole estate to the grantee or for the life of either of his son and not  for his own life this have also pass the whole estate and freehold to the  grantee not that the grantee have any large estate than for the life of the  beneficiary and vie for who life it be grant but the whole freehold pass  during that time it be but one estate of freehold and there be only a  contingency or possibility of Thomas the father or that beneficiary and vie  for who life it be grant die before the other that it shall come back again to  the grantor as if tenant for life grant the land by lease and release or other  conveyance which make no forfeiture to a for his life a have the whole estate  that be so far as that the grantor have no estate leave in he but if a die  there be such a possibility in the eye of the law that the tenant for life may  survive that by virtue thereof the tenant for life shall have the estate again  if a die before he but if tenant for life by conveyance which make no  forfeiture grant the land to a for his life remainder to b for the life of the  tenant for life this I think be a void remainder for when tenant for his own  life grant it to a for his life by possibility a may survive the estate and so  he have the whole estate and no remainder can be limit upon it but a Bridgman  oh have it for the whole estate but determinable by his own death and  therefore if he die live the tenant for life the tenant for life shall have it  again and the reason be the same with the common case of a executory devise of  a term if a man who have a term for year devise it to one for life remainder  to another it be not good as a remainder but be by will it be good as a  executory devise and it shall vest as a possibility but it be not grantable or  assignable as a remainder a case be cite at the bar by sergeant Maynard to be  adjudge Elizabeth husband and wife tenant for life remainder in fee to the  husband the husband make a lease for year and die the wife enter the lessee  for year have a possibility which he can grant over whether the law be so that  the lessee for year can grant it over after such a eviction may be  questionable but the reason of the case be good if it be but a possibility it  can be grant over so here if Thomas Litcott the elder have grant the land to a  for his own life remainder to b for the life of his son Thomas and Francis I  think it be mere a void remainder for by possibility the father for who life  it be grant to a may have outlive the two son and the estate be but one as I  say before for all the three life there remain after the grant to a for the  father life but a possibility of a estate to b after the father death which be  but a possibility and not a remainder can not be grant over I can cite  authority in point to prove this for it be but the latter end of queen  Elizabeth before it be resolve in ross case that such a estate for the life  Bridgman oh er p of the grantee and of two other be a large estate than for  his own life but that be resolve I think it be a necessary consequence that if  he grant it for his own life he have no remainder in he for the two other life  but only a possibility which can be grant over as at the commonlaw if land be  grant to one and the heir of his body the donor have a possibility of  reverterif the donee die without issue or his issue fail but before the  statute Westminster de gift the donor have neither a remainder nor a reversion  but these be create by construction upon that statute and that possibility of  reverter be not grantable over no more here be the possibility after the death  of Thomas Litcott the father and this may be enforce from the common case a  bishop or dean and chapter may make a lease to a for the life of Bridgman oh  himself and of b and c that be a good lease but if it be to a for his life  remainder to b for his life remainder to c for his life it be not good for the  waste of the first tenant for life will be dispunishable now if be the actual  actual be supply to a blank in the manuscript b tenant for three life of  himself b and c he may grant it to one for his own life remainder to another  for the life of b and c it will be in the same condition and mischief as if it  have be original grant to he for his life remainder over for the life of b and  c my Lora coke put many case where out of a estate for a man own life which be  but one freehold several freehold may be derive but all these case be where  the tenant for life the grantor have a reversion still in he or a grant be  make the word grant be make be supply to a blank in the manuscript c by the  reversioners consent or that new estate be partly derive or taste of the  reversion as if tenant for life leas to the reversioner for the life of the  reversioner this be neither forfeiture for be in the remainder be party nor be  it a surrender and some book say he have a reversion in he for to he his own  life be great than the other but if he have grant the land to estranger for  the stranger life it have be a forfeiture if there have be a livery and if it  pass by lease and release or other conveyance it will be of the same effect  the forfeiture only except as if there have be no livery it pass the whole  estate contingent for I take a difference where a man have a estate for his  own life and there be a conveyance of he and the reversioner either in grant  to the reversioner or to a stranger a estate for the life of the reversioner  or a stranger or a estate of freehold be derive partly out of the reversion  and partly out of his estate there perhaps a reversion may be say to be in the  tenant for life because the whole interest be not extract out of his estate  but where tenant for life grant the land to another for the life of the  grantee if it be by conveyance which make a forfeiture the old estate for life  be go and he have gain a new reversion in fee but if it be by lease and  release or the like the grantee have a estate for his own life determinable by  the death of the tenant for life the grantor but there be no reversion in the  grantor grantable over because as great and to some purpose a great estate be  grant to he out of his estate as it will bear and it be but a bare possibility  which he have of have the land again it be true if land be grant to a for life  remainder to b Bridgman oh for the life of a here be not mere a possibility of  a estate to b but b have a present remainder which he may actual grant over  during the life of a what be the reason the remainder be not extract out of  a s estate for life but out of the feesimple of the grantor he may have grant  the reversion for the life of a by another conveyance and that have be a  present possession of the reversion by the same reason he may grant it as a  remainder but in the case where a tenant for his own life grant the land to b  for his life two estate of freehold be to be one to b for his life another to  a for his life can be extract whole out of this estate of a for his own life  but yet b can have it long than it be limit to he and so be leaves a  possibility of a estate though not a actual estate to a if he survive he this  be the case at the commonlaw in the three place when this estate to Thomas  Litcott for the life of himself and two son be by he grant over to the use of  himself for life and after of his wife for life and after to the use of Thomas  the son and his heir we be to consider what operation the statute of use have  in Bridgman oh er p this case and whether it make any alteration from the case  I have already put upon a grant of such a estate at the commonlaw with  remainder over wherein there be no doubt but if Thomas Litcott the elder have  grant his estate which be for three life to flexney and the rest to the use f  himself or of a stranger general not limit the use to himself or to a stranger  particular for his life the use will have be as large as the estate and will  have execute a estate for the three life and upon a estate for one or more a  use may at this day arise as it may before the statute of use Com delamer and  bernarrs case and the case there cite again if Thomas Litcott grant the estate  for three life have limit the use only to himself for his own life or to a  stranger for life and have make no further disposition of the use and have die  the residue of the estate after the use determine will have go to the grantee  flexney and the rest that be resolve in castle and dodd case though where  tenant in fee make a conveyance and limit the use for life and speak not of  the residue it shall be to the use of himself because he have the ancient use  to he in fee yet when tenant for life or he who have a particular estate grant  his estate and limit the use for a particular time it shall not return to he  but be to the grantee or conuzee if it be by fine although the conveyance be  without consideration because he who have the particular estate be subject to  the ancient Bridgman oh rend and forfeiture which be a sufficient  consideration to convey the estate unto he when the estate be grant to flexney  and the rest for the three life to the use of Thomas Litcott the father for  his life and after to the use of Rebecca for her life and after to the use of  the son and his heir during the life the use that be limit extend to and be as  large as the whole estate and there be no use or estate at all to flexney and  the other trustee but by express word it be limit to those use therein express  and no other and therefore it differ from the other case where only the use be  limit in part and not during the whole estate in our case I do not conceive  that the estate be execute so as to pass the estate to flexney and the other  trustee to the use of Thomas for life and after to the use of Rebecca for life  and after to the use of Thomas the son and his heir during the residue of the  estate as by way of remainder as be argue on the defendant behalf and as it  will in case of the conveyance of a estate in feesimple to those use but the  stat h have incorporate the use and the possession I hold that the use now  shall vest as the estate at the commonlaw will so that when the grant be to  flexney and the rest to the use of Thomas Litcott the father for his life and  after to the other use this first use vest the whole estate for three life in  Thomas the father as such a grant at the commonlaw will have do and though  this limitation of the use during the three life be to Thomas the father but  for his life and after to Rebecca c yet I take it to be all one as if it have  be regrant by a commonlaw conveyance to Thomas for his life only he have the  whole estate back again in use but subject to a contingency and determinable  by his death if he die live either of the other beneficiary and vie and  nothing vest in Rebecca or Thomas the son I have give the reason of it before  by the commonlaw and the stat h make the estate and the use to be in the same  quality manner and condition and if any estate shall vest in Rebecca and  Thomas the son then there will be a estate of a church lease to Thomas the  elder for his life remainder to Rebecca for her life c which will be  dispunishable for waste and not agreeable to the lease warrant by the stat  Elizabeth but although nothing present vest in Rebecca or Thomas the son yet I  take it there be a great deal of differencewhere the estate for the three life  be grant over to the use of Thomas the father for his life without any further  limitation of use for there he leaves the possibility or contingency and  Bridgman oh benefit thereof to the grantee who if he die shall enjoy it to  their own use andwhere the use of the three life be limit to Thomas the father  for his life and after to Rebecca and Thomas the son during the whole estate  for now the whole estate without any intent of reserve a residue be pass out  of the grantee and the use to Rebecca if she survive Thomas the father and  after her decease the use to Thomas the son shall arise as the contingency do  arise videlicet to Rebecca if the two life outlive Thomas the father and to  Thomas the son and his heir if either of those two life outlive Thomas the  father and Rebecca Bridgman oh er p and it will be in reason the same with  chudleighs case where the case to our purpose be in effect but this a feoff be  make to the use of the purchaser for his life and after to the use of his  first son he then have none in tail and so to his second and other son  remainder to the use of Thomas in tail with remainder over it be there resolve  that the whole estate without any residuum be take out of the feoff and all  the present use as well precedent as subsequent to the contingency be execute  but when the contingency of the son birth happen if nothing happen to disturb  the estate in the mean time this case may perhaps be find worthy of attention  in the controversy on the doctrine of scintilla law see sander on use d Edward  Fearne c r that Edward Sugden on power d Edward it may not be improper to  suggest with reference to sir Orlando Bridgmans opinion that his lordship  assume the report of sir Edward coke of chudleighs case to be accurate see  Sugden on power p d the former seize and estate of the feoff be sufficient to  serve that future use which be there call a possibility to serve the future  use when it come in use and elsewhere call scintilla law this case may perhaps  be find worthy of attention in the controversy on the doctrine of scintilla  law see sander on use d Edward Fearne c r that Edward Sugden on power d Edward  it may not be improper to suggest with reference to sir Orlando Bridgmans  opinion that his lordship assume the report of sir Edward coke of chudleighs  case to be accurate see Sugden on power p d so here the whole estate by the  limitation of the use over be take out of flexney and the other grantee never  to return to they and so much of the use as serve to feed the estate in use of  the father for his life that be all of the estate determine by his death and  that he survive the other two beneficiary and vie be execute in he but when he  die that former seize and estate of flexney c be sufficient to serve the  contingent use to Rebecca and after bar death to serve also the future use to  Thomas the son and his heir for his be not a contingent use upon a contingent  use to Rebecca but after a contingent use as in chudleighs case the contingent  use to the second or three son be good though limit after the contingent use  to the first or second son and there be no question but a estate for life may  be grant to the use of Thomas Litcott the son and his heir and the heir shall  have it as a special occupant execute by the statute of use Bridgman oh so  that I hold that the whole estate be take out of flexney and the other grantee  to use that it be vest in Thomas the father and when be die the former seize  and estate of flexney to serve the use to Rebecca and when she also die that  former seize and estate be sufficient to feed and serve the use limit to  Thomas the son and his heir during the residue of the estate the case that  have be put that a use can arise out of a possibility or out of a use or can  not be supply by the editor f be large than the estate be good law but under  favour do not come home to our case for here all the use do arise out of the  estate which be grant to flexney c though they be not all raise at the same  time they do all arise as the contingency happen out of that estate for three  life which be grant to flexney c the estate out of which those contingent use  to Rebecca and Thomas the son be to arise be certain but the use to they be  uncertain but when those contingency happen that former estate of flexney and  the rest serve to raise they and this scintilla law or retrospect to the seize  which the feoff or grantee once have be that which preserve the contingent use  I know no authority that come home to our principal case castle and dodd case  be cite but that be but this A tenant for life grant his estate to b to the  use of b for the life of a and b but if b die live a that it shall remain to a  b the grantor die a still live c enter and leas to d and then die a still live  that which be adjudge there be that a have not any residue of the use in he  that a occupancy shall be of ail estate to use and that c have it as a  occupant after the death of b and that the lessee of c have it after his death  also as a occupant during the life of a that case come not home to our case  for there be not in that case a fall limitation of the use as large as the  estate videlicet during the life of a but during the joint life of a and b dly  there b the grantee out of who estate the use be to rise die so that there can  no use arise out of the estate of b when the estate out of which it be to  arise cease and therefore c there can not take either by way of remainder or  as a contingent estate but must take as a occupant by his entry or not at all  otherwise perhaps if it have be limit to b and his heir during the life of a  to the use of b and after of c but when b die the use be to arise out of the  seize of b Bridgman oh er p can be any long continue and the Bridgman oh  freehold be in abeyance till there be a occupant there can be no use though a  be live till there be a occupant and when there be au occupant he be a general  occupant can not be seize to the use of another estate raise by way of use as  to the use of a during the life of b may beget a occupancy if a die before b  but that occupant have no confidence or priority be not subject to a subpaena  as I conceive and shall not be seize to another use in our principal case  flexney the grantee be still live so that there be a person in be to who the  estate be make a use upon the contingency happen videlicet the death of old  Thomas and Rebecca in be to Thomas the son and his heir and Thomas and his  heir be person in be capable to take and the intent of the deed be apparent  that Thomas the son and his heir shall have the residuum of the estate after  the death of Thomas the father and Rebecca his mother and therefore though I  find no express authority in the case it be agreeable to the analogy and  reason of law in like case that Thomas and his heir shall have it I therefore  think that Thomas after his mother death may have enter that if his estate be  turn to a right by the entry and lease of flexney yet it be a right of entry  of which John his son and heir the defendant shall have advantage and so his  entry be lawful and judgement ought to be give for the defendant there be in  the special verdict two condition find annex to the estate in use limit to  Rebecca and Thomas the son but it not be find whether they be break or not and  John who claim under Thomas be defendant in this suit they can prejudice he in  this action