brown case dowager lady Effingham appellant sir John napier and other  respondent saint may Mews dig seven see Seton on judgement that Edward a  infant be not bind by the decree of a court of equity but must have a  reasonable time after he come of age to show cause against it the report in p  wms be thus abridge in the margin upon a decree against a infant unless cause  within six month after he come to age the infant may answer make a defence and  examine witness anew see also fountain v Cain all p wms that where there be a  decree nisi causan against a infant on such infant come of age and before the  decree be make absolute he may put in a new answer Bennett v lee atk send for  and exception can be take to a infant answer Strudwick v Pargiter Bunh the  infant at his full age may as the right way be apply to the court and set  forth how he be grieve by the decree and may have leave to amend or alter his  answer or any part of it or put in a new one but if he do not do so it shall  be presume that he abide by it and so it shall be read against he pale yellow  Rep Eq p win viner vol p can after the determination of the former appeal in  this cause See title mortgage can videlicet on the that brown er p of July  Thomas Lord Effingham die have make his will and thereof appoint the now  appellant his widow executrix on the that of July the respondent sir John  Napier attain his age of and be serve with a subpoena to show cause against  the former decree but instead of set down the cause again for hear or show  cause against the decree he think fit when the six month be very near expire  to prefer a petition to the Lord chancellor king pray liberty to amend his  bill or exhibit a new one as also to amend his answer to the appellant cross  bill and that in order thereto the appellant may produce all the deed and  write in heir custody and power relate to the premise to the end that he may  inspect and take copy of such of they as he shall have occasion for on the  that of January this petition be hear before the Lord chancellor assist by the  master of the roll when his lordship be please to order that sir John Napier  shall be at liberty to amend his answer or put in a new answer to the  appellant cross bill and that he shall have time till the first day of the  then next term for that purpose but as to the amend his original bill his  lordship declare that there do not appear to be any precedent in the court for  amend a bill in any point wherein the same have be dismiss upon the merit but  it be order that sir John Napier shall be at brown liberty to rehear the cause  and to that end that the original cause shall stand over till after the time  give for amend his answer or put in a new answer to the cross bill be expire  and it be further order that the respondent sir John shall be at liberty to  see the deed write and exhibit which be make use of by the appellant at the  hear of the cause and to that end the appellant be to leave the same with her  clerk in court to be inspect by the say respondent or his agent from this  order the present appeal be bring and on behalf of the appellant it be insist  p York t reeves that the respondent sir John have first bring his original  bill to impeach the settlement of the that of July and the appellant have by  her answer to that bill insist that the deed be fair and deliberate execute  and not obtain by any fraud circumvention or surprise the proper and only head  of equity on which the respondent can hope for any relief against the deed be  full in issue in that cause and as the appellant cross bill be to establish  the deed and to have a legal estate in the premise therein comprise convey to  her and as both those cause have be hear together the respondent sir John  ought not now to be at liberty to put in any new answer or amend his former  one because it may occasion a examination of witness de to make new to the  same matter as be in issue in the original cause after publication have pass  in that cause and the same have be hear which be apprehend to be contrary to  the know and establish rule of the court of chancery and may be a mean of  introduce perjury that no precedent can be produce of leave be give to one who  be a infant at the time of put in his answer to a cross bill either to amend  that answer or put in a new one after he come of age and after both the  original and cross cause have be hear that this case differ from the case of a  original bill be bring against a infant and it be apprehend that the rule in  court of equity for infant to have a day to show can use against a decree do  not hold in case where trust be carry into execution against infant for in  such case it have not be the practice of court of equity to give a infant a  day to show cause that the declaration of the court in the order now appeal  from that there do not appear any precedent in the court for amend a bill in  any point wherein the same have be dismiss upon the merit may very proper be  use as a argument against the respondent sir John amend his answer or put in a  new answer to the appellant cross bill for if he be at liberty to do so and  thereby bring new matter in issue or make another defence in the cross cause  and then be permit to rehear both cause it may tend to reverse or vary the  decree already pronounce in the original cause and may be productive of the  same inconvenience as if he have liberty to amend the original bill that it be  apprehend the order of the house upon the former appeal can not proper be  carry any far than that the respondent sir John brown may when he come brown  er p of age be at liberty if he think fit to apply to the court of chancery to  have the cause reheard upon the plead and proof as they then stand for when  the house have absolute reverse that part of the original decree which relate  to what the appellant be entitle to by virtue of the settlement of July and  the inquiry direct concern the value of the land intend to be comprise in that  settlement it can not be mean that any far examination shall he have as to  those matter and therefore it be hope that the order complain of will be  reverse and that as the respondent sir John Napier have not show any cause  against the decree the same shall now be make absolute on the other side it be  contend c Talbot t Lutwyche that the order be warrant as well by the reason of  the case as by the constant and ancient practice of the court for that court  both of law and equity protect a infant from suffer by his inability to manage  or defend any suit in relation to his inheritance at law in all such suit the  parole shall demurrer and in many case where a infant be plaintiff the proceed  shall be stay until after he come of age and though court of equity allow of  proceed against a infant as far as a decree yet at the same time they always  allow a infant time after his come of age to show cause against such decree  which privilege will be vain and of no use unless he shall be allow a  opportunity of amend that defence which he be presume incapable of make proper  during his minority that the present case be still much strong because it  appear that through the neglect of the respondent former solicitor his cause  have be mismanage and several proceed take therein to his great prejudice that  the house have take the former decree to be defective in not give the  respondent time to show cause against it after his come of age do in great  justice supply that omission and give he time to show cause accord to the  course of the court and this course allow the respondent to put in a further  answer and amend his defence it can not be the intention of the house to  deprive he of the benefit of any defence which he can just make against the  appellant claim without which these cause will come to a learning upon a  imperfect defence make on behalf of the respondent when he himself by reason  of his infancy be not capable of make any defence and when his former  solicitor fail to make a proper one for he after hear counsel on this appeal  it be order and adjudge that the same shall be dismiss and the order therein  complain of affirmed The party afterward compromise all matter in difference  and their agreement for that purpose be on the that of August make a order of  the court of chancery register lib b p jour vol p