atkins case MINSHULL v MINSHULL February the that r l devise to r m old son of  his nephew r m and the first heir male of his body and the heir male of his  body and in default of such issue to the second son of the say r m and the  heir male of his body and their issue remainder over c these word the second  son of the say r m do not mean the second son of the devisee but John the  second son of the testator nephew r m Richard Leicester the testator uncle of  Randal Minshull who have Randal his old son John his second son and several  other child devise a house c in hc word videlicet I give and devise the house  c to Randal Minshull old son of my nephew Randal Minshull and the first heir  male of his body lawful beget and the heir male of his body and in default of  such issue I give c to the second son of the say Randal Minshull and the heir  male of his body and their issue remainder over c there be a provision make in  the will that to whosoever the estate shall come he shall pay on his entry on  he estate to each of his brother and sister pound up apiece and to John and  the several child of his nephew name they particular pound apiece likewise the  devise in the present case be of a reversion which do not take effect till  many year after the testator death Randal the first devisee die without issue  John enter and die have devise the premise to the defendant his young son in  prejudice of the plaintiff his old son atkins er p the bill be bring for a  account of the rend c and at the hear at the roll the question be whether in  the devise word to the second son of the say Randal Minshull the son of the  nephew Randal Minshull be mean or the son of the nephew old son for suppose  the latter the particular limitation in the will extend only to the issue of  Randal the devisee who be dead without issue the reversion on his death take  effect in possession in John as heir at law of the testator the disposition of  John by will be good but suppose the will to mean the son of Randal the nephew  that John be tenant in tail under the will and not have do any act to bar the  entail the plaintiff have a good title as be the old son of John the master of  the roll sir Joseph Jekyll decree in favour of the plaintiff on appeal to Lord  chancellor he direct a issue to try the matter of fact which of the two person  be mean by the testator and say it be a matter that lie proper in averment and  be determinable by circumstance prove the intention of the testator one way or  other the will be make in and the party not be able of either side to furnish  themselves with any evidence tend to clear up this point it be agree between  they to bring the matter on for the atkins opinion of the court upon the legal  construction of the word as they appear on the face of the will the attorney  general for the plaintiff insist that Randal the devisee be tenant in tail the  use he make thereof be by infer from thence that if the testator have make the  devisee tenant in tail a estate which in its nature include a limitation to  all the issue of the devisee he can never intend likewise to limit a remainder  by purchase to the second son of the devisee who can otherwise take as issue  in tail nor be it possible else that remainder can ever take place in  possession because it can only take effect on the death of the first devisee  without issue which suppose the remainder man then dead to prove that the  subsequent word of limitation videlicet the heir male of his body annex to the  precede limitation to the first heir male of his body will not control the  former word and make such first heir male take by purchase who will otherwise  take by limitation he cite the case of Goodright v pullen b r Geo stram S c ld  raym S c Eq ab pl S c Nicholas Lisle devise the premise to his wife for life  remainder to his kinsman Nicholas Lisle for the term of his natural life and  after his decease to the heir male of the body of the say Nicholas lawful to  be beget and his heir for ever but in case the say Nicholas die without such  heir male then he devise to his kinsman Edward Lisle for life and after his  decease to the heir male of his body lawful beget and his heir for ever and in  default of such heir male remainder over c it be hold there that Nicholas the  first devisee be tenant in tail Mr fazakerly of the same side to prove that  the word first heir male be proper word of limitation cite the case of dubber  v Trollop post S c cite post vol sir Thomas Trollop have five son devise the  manor of Caswick to his old son William for life and from and after his  decease to the first heir male of his body it be hold in that case by the  court of common plead that William be tenant in tail and on a writ of error  bring that judgement be affirm in b b m t Mr Chute e contra both the case cite  be distinguishable from the present in that of Goodright v pullen there be no  such word as first in that of dubber v Trollop no subsequent word of  limitation annex to the first Lord chancellor this case will depend on the  word of the will with regard to the person intend by the testator by the name  of Randal and the legal operation of the word make use of and a court never  construe a devise void unless it be so absolute dark that they can find out  the testator meaning the provision of the payment of the legacy by the person  to who the estate shall come to his brother and sister and to John c be as  have be insist on for the plaintiff a very strong expression of the intent of  the party for as here be a specification of the child it must mean the brother  and sister of Randal Minshull the old son of Randal Minshull the atkins nephew  and can never intend to mean every taker for suppose the word to mean the  second son of the devisee as there be plain a estate tail create prior to any  interest he can claim whether the word first heir male be construe word of  limitation or purchase a estate which may continue for a great number of year  in all probability without any failure of issue it will be a most absurd thing  to charge a person at so great a distance from the estate atkins er p with the  payment of money to person then in be who the testator can hardly suppose will  be live at the time of the title accrueing to such second son on the other  hand there be nothing extraordinary in charge Randal the first devisee or upon  a supposition of his death without issue in the life of John in charge John  with the payment of those sum which raise a very strong presumption that John  wasthe person intend to take under the limitation to the second son of Randal  it have be object against this construction that John will then be devisee of  the estate and entitle to the pound likewise which the testator can never  intend but the word must be take reddendo one one and John to have the pound  only in case of the first devisees right take effect in possession and the  determination of the precede estate then in be at the time of make the will it  be much more natural likewise that the testator when he be make a disposition  of his whole estate have a nephew who have two son shall settle it successive  on both the son than stop at the first without extend the entail or dispose of  the reversion whether the first devisee be tenant for life or in tail be a  question proper to be consider and the determination of that point will  certain give great light into this matter and clear the way towards the  construction of the will on the other point in the manner it have be insist on  I be of opinion the word of limitation superadd here to the precede word of  limitation will certain not of themselves make the first word of purchase but  the subsequent ought to be reject as redundant and superfluous in archer case    b a estate be limit to Robert archer the first taker express for life to  which great regard be always have in determine whether a estate for life or in  tail passes see fearne Rem the that edit see also wile v Lewis post dly in  that case it be to the next heir male of Robert only not heir as here nor will  the subsequent word of limitation affect the legal operation of the precede  word in any case of this kind unless the word heir be make use of in the  singular number or there be a express estate for life limit to the first taker  it be true in shelly case   b and c Anderson Ch just put this case if there be  a limitation to the use of a man for life and after his decease to the use of  his heir and of their heir female of their body in this case these word his  heir be word of purchase and not of limitation for then the subsequent word  and of their heir female of their body atkins will be void that appear to be a  case only put by Anderson and no resolution of that kind but beside there the  subsequent word vary essential the precede limitation and alter the course of  succession and enjoyment of the estate there be subsequent word of limitation  annex likewise to the devise to the second son which show the testator have no  intention they shall operate in destruction of the former word No stress at  all be to be lie on the word first there be many authority for that purpose  and the case of dubber v Trollop be a very strong one there the word heir too  be use not heir the word first mean only that they shall take in succession  accord to priority of birth and seniority of age and be unnecessary provide  for what the law itself do decree for the plaintiff decree that the premise be  devise in remainder to John Minshull the second son of Randal Minshull the  father which John be father of the now plaintiff Reg pound b b fol