case Floyer versus lavington Eq can ab pl one for pound consideration grant a  rentcharge of pound ayear in fee upon condition that if the grantor during his  life shall give notice and pay in the pound by instalment videlicet pound at  the end of every six month and shall do this during his own lifetime the grant  to be void the mortgage be make about six year since when the legal interest  of money be per cent decree not redeemable in case of a mortgage no clause can  confine the equity of redemption to the lifetime of the mortgagor or to he and  the heir male or heir only of his body one grant a rentcharge in fee of pound  per annum upon condition that if the grantor at any time give notice of his  intention to pay in the consideration money be shall at any pound by  instalment videlicet pound at the end of every six month and shall pursuant to  such notice pay the say money and interest at n during his lifetime then the  grant to be void but there be no covenant in the deed from the grantor of the  rentcharge to pay the money and the rentcharge be much less than what the  interest of the money come to for the interest be at that time per cent the  conveyance be make above sixty year since and the grantee of the rentcharge  have convey it over after the grantors death Qure when the mortgagor die to a  purchaser to who he have give a collateral security for quiet enjoyment and  the purchaser have afterward make a marriage settlement of it and now upon a  bill bring by the heir of the grantor to redeem this rentcharge the only  question be whether it be redeemable peer William sir Joseph Jekyll for the  plaintiff the clause restrain the redemption to the life of the mortgagor be  of no force for a estate once redeemable can be render irredeemable by any  word or agreement make at the same time for as the borrower be common  necessitous this will put it in the power of the scrivener to make advantage  of such necessity and will let in oppression and foreclose the power and  jurisdiction of this court in Newcomb v Bonham vern but this decree be  afterward reverse vern the clause be that if the mortgagor at any time during  his life shall pay the money the mortgage shall be void and in that case there  be no covenant to pay any interest or principal and the circumstance there be  much strong than in the present case the conveyance be to a sister and  frequent declare known peer William er p tions make by the mortgagor that his  niece who be his brother daughter and have bring the bill to redeem shall not  inherit the estate however it be in that case admit by counsel on both side  and decree that a power of redemption can not be bar by any clause or  agreement make at the same time with the mortgage so in Charles can Howard v  Harris vern a equity of redemption be limit to the grantor and the heir male  of his body yet it be decree that the heir general of the grantor shall redeem  and it be there particular lie down as a rule that where the conveyance be but  a mortgage no word or clause shall prevail to bar the grantor his heir or peer  William assign from redeem otherwise the act of a scrivener will be too hard  for the power and jurisdiction of the court of chancery then as to the length  of time this case differ from the case of land where the profit and outgo be  uncertain the allow a stale redemption will probable put a difficulty upon the  mortgagee in his account but in the case of a rentcharge the revenue be  certain and the outgo if any certain also but what he chief rely upon be that  as the statute of limitation have in the case of land after twenty year  possession bar the plaintiff of his entry or ejectment so the court of equity  vide vent in imitation of that law will not allow the mortgagor to redeem the  mortgage after the mortgagee have be twenty year in possession and that the  same length of time shall bar a redemption in equity as bar a entry at law but  that at law in case of a rentcharge though that have not be pay or demand for  twenty year yet such duty be create by deed as all rentcharge must be no part  of the remedy be take away and he cite the case of Lord Widdrington v Jennings  in Lord harcourt time where the court take such a difference betwixt a  mortgage of a rentcharge and of land and in the former case after a very long  time I think eighty year allow of a redemption as to the objection that here  be no covenant for the payment of the principal or interest he say that be not  material the same not be necessary for the make of a mortgage nor yet  necessary that the right shall be mutual peer William videlicet for the  mortgagee to compel the payment as well as for the mortgagor to compel a  redemption since such conveyance as in the present case though without any  covenant or bind for the payment of the money will yet be plain a mortgage  vide atk and Howel v price post that when the grantee of the rentcharge do  after the death of the grantor sell the rentcharge and give a collateral  security for the quiet enjoyment of it against the heir of the first grantor  this manifest it to be the apprehension of the party themselves that it be a  redeemable estate and accept as such with a countersecurity against it and  that though a mortgage be make never so many year since yet if the mortgagor  and those claim under he have continue to pay interest the length of time be  in such case no objection to the right of redemption so if the mortgagee have  admit himself to have no title but under the mortgage very v Marston bro c c  Cox coop S c cite and see cook v arnham post Vol III now in this case the  rentcharge be the interest agree on by the party and the payment of the  rentcharge the payment of interest by which the objection of the length of  time be whole take off but Lord chancellor Cowper conceive the rentcharge to  be not redeemable at so great a distance of time and that this court have  heretofore go too far in permit redemptions it be material that at the time of  make the mortgage interest be at pound per cent and therefore the rentcharge  of peer William a year be so much less than the yearly interest of pound at  per cent which come to pound a year the payment of the rentcharge can not be  take to be the payment of the interest that here several circumstance concur  which though each of they single may not be of force to bar the redemption yet  all of they join together be strong enough to prevail over it that the  mortgagee seem to have allow a consideration for the purchase the equity of  redemption after the death of the mortgagor saint by take the rentcharge at  pound per annum peer William er p dly by agree to take his principal money by  instalment dly by leave it at the election only of the mortgagor whether he  will redeem or not and there can be no reason give why such a contingent right  of redemption may not upon fair and reasonable term be purchase that the  length of time where so great as in the present case be a good bar of  redemption of a rentcharge as well as of land that the alienation purchase and  settlement of this rentcharge after the death of the mortgagor be all without  any fraud be of weight as likewise that the mortgagor be not bind to pay the  money by any covenant that the purchase of this rentcharge do no way either  create or peer William admit of a right of redemption by take the security  against a redemption that be only a prudent caution make use of by the  purchaser which the seller be satisfy it will not hurt himself may advice he  to wherefore the court decree Reg lib a foe that the bill for a redemption  shall be dismiss with the usual cost it be only upon bill and answer but it be  think that the length of time be the chief objection to the redemption vide  Ord v smith Eq can ab pl jenner v Tracey and belch v Harvey post Vol III note  App to Sugd vend Mellor v lees atk Cholmondeley v Clinton mere I W S c in  which the effect of length of time a S a bar to a equitable title be elaborate  consider peer William de term S HILLARII