chalk and Peter case chalk bring a replevin against Peter the defendant do  avow the take as bailiff of sir Irrancis Barrington in sixteen acre of wood in  Hatfield chase and show that a arbitrament be make by the Lord Burghley late  Lord treasurer betwixt the Lord rich and the ancestor of sir Francis by which  it be award that the say ancestor of the say sir Francis Barrington and his  heir shall have the herbage of a certain numher of acre within the say chase  and also that he shall have to he and his heir the tree and bush of the say  numher of acre within the say chase and that he may fall and cut sixteen acre  every year of the say acre and that he shall enclose they accord to the law  and statute of the realm and that assurance be make by the Lord rich  accordingly and that the same be confirm by a special Act of parliament with a  save of the right and interest of all stranger and say that sir Francis  Barrington do enclose and cut down sixteen acre and do enclose the same and  there take the defendant cattle damage feasants upon which the defendant do  demurrer in law the question in the case be if by the statute of e cap or the  statute of h cap which give authority to make enclosure of wood the commoner  shall he exclude HarrisSerjeant I conceive that the commoner shall he exclude  by the statute of e cap which give authority to enclose and exclude all hest  and therefore the commoner shall Godbolt he exclude but it will he object that  the statute be that the owner of the ground may enclose but sir Francis  Barrington be not owner for the Lord rich be the owner of the ground say that  sir Francis Barrington be the owner for he have the herbage and the tree so as  he have all the profit and he who have the profit shall he say to have the  land it self and he vouch paramour and Yardleys case in blow Com dyer and h  and e also the statute be in the disjunctive videlicet the owner or the vendee  and although he he not owner of the soil yet he be vendee of the tree second  it will he object that the same be not a general law of which the judge be to  take notice and therefore he ought to plead it I hold it to be general enough  of which you be to take knowledge although it he not plead and he cite holland  case three it will he object that by such general law the particular interest  of a private man shall not he destroy to that I say that such general statute  will include such particular interest and therefore the case betwixt sir foulk  grevill and Stapleton be adjudge that where Willoughby Lord brook have land to  he by Act of parliament with authority to make lease for one life and no more  by the statute of h of lease that authority be enlarge and he may make lease  for three life Haughtan sergeant although he he owner of the profit he be not  owner of the soil and there be a difference betwixt the same and the soil and  the statute speak of tree grow in his own soil foster justice the arbitrament  the assurance and the especial Act of parliament be notbing to the purpose in  this case and to plead they be more then be needful for by the arbitrament and  the assurance the commoner be a three person can be bind in which he be not a  party and by the special Act of parliament he shall not he bind because the  Act be against the Lord rich and his heir so as a stranger shall not he bind  by the Act and therefore upon the statute of Elizabeth cap of patent the case  be that the queen make a lease for year which be void for not recite of a  former lease and afterward she grant the inheritance unto another and then  come the statute of Elizabeth which confirm all patent against her her heir  and successor by that statute the grantee in fee be not bind but he may avoid  the lease for year for the statute be against the queen and her successor and  that case be adjudge but our case be without doubt as to that point for the  right and interest of estranger be save by the Act then all rest upon the  statute of e and I conceive that the same be a special Act and ought to be  plead for it be not general of all wood but only of wood in forest and chase  but admit it to be a general Act yet I conceive that it be not the meaning of  it Godbolt er p to exclude a commoner and that appear full by the late word of  the statute Godbolt videlicet without licence of c which exclude only the  owner of the forest and it be not the meaning that he may enclose without the  leave of the commoner one thing have trouble I in the statute because it be  say that before that time he can not enclose more then for year so as before  that statute he may enclose for year as it seem without licence and now by the  statute for year also for another cause I conceive that the defendant shall  not take advantage of the statute as he have plead for he have plead that he  do enclose and cut whereas the statute say that he shall enclose after the cut  so as I hold clear that he have not pursue the authority of the stat for upon  the saint of h which be pen contrary to this stat sure that the owner of the  wood shall make enclosure and division for the commoner and then he be to cut  I hold clear that after the fall he can make any enclosure also admit that by  the stat the commoner shall he exclude I hold that by the stat of h that the  stat be repeal d in that point for the stat of h be that no man shall fall  wood wherein commoner have interest by prescription until he have divide the  four part so that the authority if any be be restrain by that stat if he he a  commoner by prescription as he be in our case but if it have be a common by  grant it have not be within the clause of restraint and law m earlier times  opposite direction abrogate especial the stat be in the negative as it be here  for by a negative statute the commonlaw shall he restrain otherwise if the  stat be in the affirmative for these reason I conclude that the plaintiff  ought to have judgement Warburton justice contrary all the matter rest upon  the statute of e first I hold that the same be a general Act although it he  particular in some thing so you may say of all statute which be particular in  some one point or other I hold also that the stat of e be not repeal in this  point by the stat of h because they be make to several purpose the one be for  forest and chase the other only for other particular wood and I hold that the  commoner shall he exclude for otherwise the stat shall he void and contrary  videlicet to give power to one to enclose and exclude all hest and yet to  permit another to put in his cattle and by the word of the statute which  exclude all hest and cattle the deer shall not he exclude or intend for they  shall not he say hest or cattle as in e one who chase a cow in a park shall he  say within the statute de malefactor in to act sparingly and then if the  authority of enclosure he not to exclude the deer it shall he to exclude the  cattle of the commoner and other the like stranger or otherwise it shall he to  no purpose as to that which have be say that there be not a person who may  enclose by the statute the statute be that the owner shall enclose or he to  who the wood shall he sell so that although that he he not owner yet he be to  have the tree and the profit and the statute do intend that he may enclose who  ought to have the profit and although the sale he not for money Godbolt yet  such a person may he say vendee well enough wherefore I conclude that  judgement ought to be for the defendant waln e slay justice I hold that he  have not authority by the statute to enclose for the statute be when any man  fels tree in his proper soil so that he not be owner of the ground he be not  within the statute and that be the effect of his argument and as to the other  point he do not speak at all cook chief justice I hold that the plaintive  ought to have judgement all the matter do consist upon the statute of e hich  be to he consider and first be to he consider what be the commonlaw before  that statute and that be that one who have a wood within a forest may fall it  as it appear by the statute de Forresta and the statute of I e by licence and  also he may enclose it for three year as it appear by the statute of e but the  enclosure be to he cum par? o fossatto haia bassa as it appear by the register  in the writ of ad quod damnum so as before that statute there be a enclosure  but the law be clear that before that statute by the enclosure the commoner  shall not he exclude then we be to consider of the statute and first of the  person to who the statute do extend and that appear by the preamble to he  betwixt the king and other owner of forest and chase and the owner of the soil  so as a commoner be not any person within the meaning of the statute and for  the b d of the statute you ought to that intend that the sentence be continue  and not p rfected until the end of the statute Godbolt er p and the word  without licence c prove that no person be mean to he bind by the statute but  the owner of the forest and chase and not the commoner like the case in dyer  and although you will expound the word of the body of the statute general yet  they shall he take accord to the intent of the preamble and therefore the case  of h of the prior d castleacre although it he not adjudge in the book yet  judgement be enter upon the roll which case be pasch h rot by which case it  appear that although that a statute he make which give land to the king yet by  that statute the annuity of a stranger shall not he extinguish and thecase  which have be put by justice foster upon the statute of Elizabeth be the case  of boswel for the parsonage of Bridgwater that although that one who have a  lease for year of the king which be void for misrecitall may by the say  statute hold it against the king yet the patentee in fee shall not he  prejudice by the say statute so I conclude that the commoner be not a person  within this statute of e second it be to he consider if a wood in which any  one have common he within the statute and I hold it be not but only several  wood for as I have say the wood which before the statute may he enclose for  three year be only a several wood Godbolt and not such a wood in which any one  have common and the statute of e do extend only to such wood which may he fall  and enclose for three year and I conceive contrary to my brother Warburton  that the deer of the forest shall well enough he say to he hest and cattle and  whereas by the commonlaw before this statute the enclosure be onel that to he  as I have say cum little ditch haia bassa by which the deer be not exclude now  by this statute I hold that they may make great hedge to exclude as well the  deer as other hest and I agree with justice fc to that if he will take  advantage of the statute that he ought to have plead that first he fall and  afterward enclose and contra upm the statute of h scik that he ought first to  divide and afterward to fall c and also I a greewith he that in that point the  statute of h be contrary do repeal the statute of e if by that statute the  commoner shall he exclude but I be of opinion with my brother Warburton clear  that he be a vendee of the tree and so within the statute for it be not  necessary that in the grant there he the word sellj or that money he give nor  that it he a contract for a time only and not to have continuance as it be in  our case but he who have the tree to he and and his heir shall he say to be a  vendee well enough as to the other matter which have be move whether the  statute of e he a generali law or pot I hold clear that we be to take  knowledge of it although it he not plead because it concern the king for it be  make for the king forest and of all the act make hetween the king and his  subject we ought to take knowledge for so be Slowels case and also it be  adjudge that we ought to take knowledge of the Act concern the creation of the  prince because it concern the king and cook in his argument say that if there  have not be a special provision for the commoner in the statute of h the  commoner have not be exclude by that statute and afterward judgement be enter  for the plaintiff