a brief report of the opinion of the justice of the king bench in a case upon  the statute of dissolution of abbey h cap argue in the term of saint Michael  in the first and second year of the reign of king Philip and queen mary  between richard fulmerston plaintiff and simeon steward defendant in a action  of trespass bring in the county of Suffolk and the record be to be see among  the record of easter term Edward rot ultimo mich pound p m where plead of  seize in a college without say injure college and f part of a statute and of  the enrolment of a deed to the king without show the manner thereof and of  seize in the king as in right of his crown by the statute of h cap shall be  good and where a lease make within a year next before the statute of h to one  who have another lease at the time of the make of it be good and for what time  S c dyer pl the plaintiff declare of his close break at Elveden in the say  county in the three year of the reign of king Edward the six the defendant say  that the place where c be acre of pasture in Elveden parcel of the manor of  Elveden which Plowden er p manor George Wyndham master of the college of  Rushworth in the county of Norfolk and his fellow the that day of December in  the that year of king Henry the eight by their deed lease to the defendant to  have from the invention of the cross then last pass for year then next to come  and by virtue hereof be justify and give colour to the plaintiff the plaintiff  by the replication say that a long time before the say lease c one John Purpet  then master of the say college and his fellow be seize of the say manor  whereof the acre be and at the same time when c and for time immemorial be  parcel in their demesne as of fee who in the eleven year of the reign of king  Henry the eight lease to Edward Besteny the same manor whereof c by the name  of their manor of Elveden and of all their land c appertain to the say manor  together with the land and pasture at Deadmansgrave except the tenement late  Largients to have from the invention of the cross in the year of our Lord  until the end of year then next coin and show further that the say Besteny in  h grant over his estate to the defendant and afterward the say Purpet die and  the say Wyndham be choose master c and he and his fellow make the lease to the  defendant in the same manner as in the bar be allege the same defendant then  be possess of the other term and allege further that part of the Act of  parliament make in h which give the college and house of religion then stand  and which shall afterward come to the king hand to he in the same estate and  condition as they then be and allege also that part of the Act which make  lease then make of the possession of college and other house which shall  afterward come to the king to be void if another lease for year at the make  thereof be in be and then not determine c and show also that the say Wyndham  and his fellow surrender the college to king Henry the eight in the d year of  his reign by deed enrol in the chancery by virtue of which grant and Act the  king be seize of the say manor whereof c in his demesne as of fee in right of  his crown and the same king be so seize grant the say manor whereof c to the  earl of Surrey in fee who convey it to the plaintiff in fee by virtue whereof  he enter and be seize until the defendant do the trespass c and further be  aver that the first lease be in be at the time when the second lease be make  and that the second lease be void by the statute the defendant by the  rejoinder show the proviso and ordinance in the statute videlicet where a  lease for year be make to one who then hold the same tenement to farm for a  term of year then not expire that then the same person shall have they for  twentyone year only from the time of the make of the lease c so that the  ancient rend be thereupon reserve and so that the same lease or lease do not  exceed twentyone year and say further that by virtue of the say proviso and  Act the say lease by he plead in bar be good sufficient and available in he  for twenty one year at least from the time of the make of it which twentyone  year be not then pass and upon this rejoinder the plaintiff demurrer in law  and it be argue this term by many apprentice and by all the sergeant at the  bar and diverse exception be take to the replication and to the rejoinder and  it be argue that the replication be not good because it be there say that a  long time before the make of the lease mention in the bar one John Purpet then  master of the say college and his fellow be seize of the say manor whereof c  in their demesne as of fee and it be not say in right of the college and it  may be that they be seize in fee in their own proper capacity for the master  and fellow of a college have two capacity videlicet to they and their heir and  to they and their successor for they be a body not consist of dead person as  friar monk or nun but consist of such person as have each by himself capacity  to take to he and his heir and then the replication shall be take most strong  against he that plead it and that be the plaintiff and so it shall be take  that the master and his fellow be seize to they and to their heir but if it  have be plead that a abbot or prior be seize in fee this have but one  intendment videlicet in right of the house for a abbot or prior have but one  capacity and that be to the use and in right of the house and they have not  capacity to they and their heir and therefore it shall be good without show  how they be seize and it shall be take in jure house but master and fellow and  dean and chapter and such like have two capacity as be say before and  therefore it ought to be express in what right they be seize Plowden er p or  else it shall be take most strong against he that plead it and that shall be  to they and their heir and if it shall be so take the sequel of the matter  make against the plaintiff for which reason the replication be not good and as  to this exception all the court hold that the exception be not good for the  justice say when it be plead that John Purpet master of the college and his  fellow be seize in fee this have but one intendment and that be in right a die  pl heath Max Kitch vin Abr title seize king pl see keb a of b t h bro feoffm  all use b n c die pl roll r Leon Popham jenk pl vern Bac read on stat of use  law of use vin Abr title use c pl post b for a corporation can be intend to be  seize to any other Plowden use but if he bad recite their several name and  have call they master and fellow then it may be intend that they be seize to  they and to their heir but when the proper name of the master be not recite  but he call he master and say also his fellow this be the usual recital of a  corporation and then when he say the corporation be seize non can intend that  those who compose the corporation be seize in their own proper capacity for  thence it will follow that the corporation be not seize where he have allege  in fact that the corporation be seize but if it be plead that I S dean of such  a place or parson of such a church or prebendary of such a prebend be seize in  fee this have two intendment videlicet it may be in his own proper capacity  for when they purchase to their own proper use they be often name by such name  or it may be that they be seize as dean parson or prebendary but it can be so  intend in the case of a corporation for they shall be intend seize in that  capacity by which they be name a ass pl Fitzherbert counterplea de vouch bro m  Edward pl a and it be say if the husband and wife be vouch it be a good  counterplea to say that the wife or her ancestor never have any thing whereof  they may make a feoff c for it shall be intend that they be vouch in right of  the wife and it be also say that a corporation can be seize to another use and  all the justice agree that the say exception be of no weight and they disallow  it another exception be take to the replication videlicet that the plaintiff  by the replication have show the lease make in h of the manor c ut above  except the tenement late Largients and have not aver that the acre of pasture  be not parcel of the exception and if they be parcel of the exception then  they do not pass by the same lease make in h and if they do not pass by that  lease then they do not pass from Besteny to the defendant and from thence it  follow that the defendant be not possess of the acre at the time of the new  lease take in h and if he be not possess of the acre at the time of the new  lease then the new lease be good for the plaintiff intend to avoid the new  lease by the statute because at the time of the make of it the defendant have  a former lease in the same thing and if he have not then the lease allege in  bar be not answer nor avoid and therefore it belong to the plaintiff to convey  to the defendant a former lease in the same thing whereof he be possess at the  time of take the new lease and if it shall be take parcel of the exception  then it do not pass by the first lease and it shall be intend parcel of the  exception inasmuch as the contrary be not show b m Edward pl Fitzherbert  pardon bro charter de c plead p h pl more pl die pl and Leon Leon stat Tri vol  foe hawk p c post b as in Edward where there be a general pardon grant to all  except those who be adherent to m and his son there it be agree by the justice  that he who will plead a general pardon ought to surmise in his plea that he  be not adherent to m for there it be say that be ought to prove himself such a  person as may enjoy the benefit of the pardon so here where there be a lease  with a exception and the plaintiff will take advantage of the lease in convey  it to thedefendant and thereby to avoid the new lease he ought to show that be  be full able to do it which he be not if he do not show that the acre be  Plowden er p not parcel of the tenement late Largients c see ante a and the  book there cite c for plead and especial replication shall be take most strong  against he that plead they and therefore the acre shall be take parcel of the  exception inasmuch as the contrary be not aver to this exception it be answer  at the bar by gawdy sergeant and other that the exception in the lease may not  be take to extend to the say acre because by the bar it be allege that the  acre be and at the time of the trespass suppose be parcel of the say manor and  this be confess by the replication and further it be confess that they have  always be parcel of the say manor and then the exception do not go to restrain  the lease of any part of it for that come under the per nomen for it be say  that they lease the manor whereof c per nomen of their manor of c and of all  their land c except the tenement late Largients so that it be aver that the  whole manor whereof c be lease by the per nomen with the exception c wherefore  the exception be parcel of the per nomen and not of the thing aver to be  demise and it be say that the court if it be not express show to the contrary  ought to take it so because it be a common learning d   b   a   a   Litt a a  winch c post ante I d that every grant demise or lease shall be take most  strong against he that make it and shall be construe to pass the most to the  grantee or lessee and here if the court ought to take the exception to extend  to the acre then it will follow from thence that they will take the lease  recite most strong against the lessee inasmuch as less will pass to he and  therefore it be say that the court ought to adjudge of the recital now in take  it most strong against the lessor as they ought to do with regard to the first  demise and so the court ought to take it that the acre pass and that they be  not parcel of the exception and therefore the replication be good enough  notwithstanding this exception and the acre be well enough convey to the  defendant from the first lessee also it be answer that this exception be not  effectual for another cause for if the exception extend to the acre then the  acre during the lease be sever from the manor and not parcel of it for the  acre be in possession can be parcel of that which be a reversion e   I b   b  cro e   light b die pl jenk pl big on recov post per Bromley CJ vin Abr title  manor Q pl e as if one make a lease for life of a manor except acre of it  these acre may not be parcel of the reversion for if the reversion of the  manor be grant the acre in possession shall not pass for they be not parcel of  the manor but be sever for the time f see vin Abr title manor c pl post f but  if a lease be make of acre parcel of a manor yet the reversion of they be  parcel of the manor g   Litt a   b   b big on recov g for a reversion may be  parcel of a thing in possession or appendant to a thing in possession but  possession may not be parcel of or appendant to a reversion and so be the  diversity which it be say appear in the quare Plowden hinder bring by the king  against the abbess of Zion in a t h a per Prisot bro comprise grant a h and if  the acre be by the exception dismember for the time from the manor by the  lease make in I h then they may not pass by the lease make in h for the first  lease have then continuance and therefore the acre be disjoin from the manor  which may not pass by the lease of the manor and so the replication destroy  the lease contain in the bar wherefore the exception if it extend to the acre  make for the plaintiff and against the defendant and so the objection against  the replication be of no weight and it be argue by diverse of the justice that  the exception although it come under the per nomen go to the thing before  demise and restrain the demise in part for the per nomen be but demonstrative  although they be the word of the first demise and if the exception in the per  nomen will not suffer all the thing specify in the per nomen before to pass  but restrain part thereof then it can be aver that more pass than the per  nomen with the exception than the exception will permit Plowden er p and so  since the exception be before the habendum it be now to be argue as if it be  upon the word of the first demise only and the case be such then since it  stand indifferent whether the acre be parcel of the tenement late Largients or  not it shall be take most strong against he that plead it and that shall be  that the acre be parcel of the exception b I finch finch noise Max b as if a  man be bind to pay I S pound before the Feast of our lord Nativity it be no  plea to say that he have pay it but be ought to show when or else it shall be  intend that he pay it after the feast and before the suit so in a dumb to be  infra tatem if the tenant plead release of the demandant it be no plea if be  do not say that the release be make by he be of full age for else his plea  shall be take most strong against he that plead it and that be that it be make  by he within age so here it shall be take most strong against he that plead it  and that be that the acre where the trespass be suppose to be do be parcel of  the exception and afterward all the justice agree that the acre shall be take  part of the exception but as to the consequence arise thereupon they do not  agree in the same opinion c die pl c for Portman justice say notwithstanding  the acre be except out of the former lease yet they shall pass well enough by  the second lease videlicet the lease plead in bar for the acre except during  the term only be not dismember nor disjoin from the manor but remain parcel of  the manor afterward for if one have a right of action for the manor and sue  his writ he shall not make any exception hereof in his precipe for it be  always parcel of the freehold and so if the lord of a manor have the wardship  of a tenant who hold of a manor now the chattle which he have in the land  suspend the possession of the signiory yet the signiory remain parcel of the  manor notwithstanding the possession be suspend and shall pass by a feoff of  the manor and so the exception which be but for a term do not make it to be no  parcel of the manor but it may be parcel of the manor which be in reversion as  if a lease be make for life of a acre parcel of a manor yet the reversion  thereof remain parcel of a manor so contra this exception which be in  possession may be parcel of the manor in reversion and then by the second  lease videlicet by the make of the lease plead in bar that which be except in  the first lease passes as parcel of the manor from whence it consequent follow  that the statute do not avoid the lease of the acre make in h because the acre  be do in the hand of the defendant at the time of take the new lease and so  upon the matter of the exception in the lease it appear that the bar be not  answer by the replication and therefore the plaintiff shall be bar but Bromley  chief justice be of a contrary opinion for be say the exception and the  consequent arise from it make for the plaintiff for the acre be except out of  the first lease make in h may not pass to the defendant by the second lease  for the exception make they to be no parcel of the manor for the time the  first lease endure and therefore he say the diversity in the say case cite in  h be good law for there it be put d same diversity   Litt b cro e big on recov  d that if a man make a lease for life or year of a acre parcel of a manor yet  the reversion continue parcel of the manor so that a fine of the manor shall  make the reversion to pass for the whole estate of the acre be parcel of the  manor before and although the freehold I S sever yet the feesimple remain  parcel of the manor e die pl e but if a man lease his manor for life or year  except his villain now they be in gross and not regardant f c Litt a big on  recov f for nothing that be in possession may be parcel appendant or regardant  of or to a reversion for it be repugnant in itself for if a man make a lease  of a manor for life except the service I S who hold of the manor now the  service nor any part of the estate therein be not parcel of the reversion  during the lease for if a man have cause to have a writ of right against I S  for the land which before that be hold of the manor he shall not maintain it  in the court of the manor during the say lease Plowden er p because during  that time the land be not hold of the lord as of the manor but as of a  signiory in gross so in the principal case by the exception the acre be become  in gross and not parcel of the manor and then when the last lease of the manor  which be plead in bar be make the acre do not pass by the lease of the manor  because they be not parcel of the manor and so the matter of the replication  answer the bar for the effect of the bar be that the acre be parcel of the  manor lease and by the replication it be show that then they be not parcel of  the manor and consequent be not lease and so the matter of the replication be  a traverse to the bar but it be only g I Leon g argentine and not full answer  without a traverse in deed as if a man plead in bar of a acre a feoff make by  I S of the manor whereof the acre be parcel it be no plea for the other to say  that before the say feoff I S feoff he of the acre except be take a express  traverse that it be not parcel of the manor at the time of the feoff Plowden  so it be in the case here the substance of the matter of the replication make  for the plaintiff but it want a traverse wherefore the two judge do not agree  in the consequence arise upon the exception of the say acre another exception  be take to the replication videlicet that the plaintiff have recite part of  the Act of h and have not recite the whole for it be say it be a entire Act  and ought to be entire recite as other matter of record but the whole court  agree that the replication be good notwithstanding this exception a see ante f  and the book there cite Bac Abr statute e S pl exception vin Abr title a for  it be the common course in all court to recite only that part of the statute  which make for he who recite it as the statute of nonresidence of maintenance  of give of livery and the like another exception be take to the replication  videlicet that the manner of the enrolment of the surrender be not show for it  be say he ought to say that the deed be acknowledge before such a man then be  a master d the chancery or master of the roll or Lord chancellor to which the  other party may have a answer b die pl b but Whiddon and Portman justice hold  that the exception be of no weight c see I keb Keeling say it have be adjudge  that a surrender of a copyholder to the king lord of a manor be good without  matter of record c for the king can take the surrender without matter of  record and the enrolment only make it of record which shall be d l p   Litt b  Leon d intend by the plead to be duly make without any circumstance be show  and if such circumstance shall fail to make it a enrolment then the party may  traverse the enrolment and it shall be try by the record and it be say if a  man plead a fine levy by husband and wife be shall not show how the wife be  examine nor before what justice it be acknowledge nor such other circumstance  but he shall say general that a fine be levy and so here the plaintiff shall  say general that it be enrol Bromley do not touch this point in his argument  another exception be take to the replication videlicet that it be contain  therein that the king by force of the say deed enrol be seize in his demesne  as of fee in right of his crown whereas he be not seize in right of his crown  for in the Act of h it be recite that diverse abbot c bad surrender their  house to the king before that c and it be ordain and enact that the king shall  have they and all other religious and ecclesiastical hereditament which shall  fall after the say Act to he he S heir and successor for ever and do not say  as parcel of his crown but the first Act videlicet that make in h ordain that  the king shall have all the possession give to he thereby that be those under  the annual value of mark as parcel of his crown but this Act have no such word  and therefore it be but a purchase in which case it shall not be parcel of the  crown c but the whole court disallow the exception for the statute say that  the king shall have they to he his heir and successor which word successor  declare that they be annex to the crown and shall go in succession and that be  shall have they as king Plowden er p another exception be take to the  replication videlicet that in the end of it it be aver that the second lease  be void by the statute and the averment ought to have be that it be void in  the hand of the king by the statute for the second lease be not void against  the abbot but it be good until the tenement come to the king and when the  inheritance be in his hand the lease be void and so it ought to be aver and  that the king grant the land as land in possession to the earl of Surre c and  not to aver it as it be aver for this averment may be take to intend that it  be void at first or that it be void after the grant of the manor make to the  plaintiff wherefore c but the justice in their argument do not give any answer  to this exception as to the rejoinder all the justice hold that the defendant  by the rejoinder bad depart from his bar e dyer pl Litt r donc Pla finch finch  king e for in the bar be plead a lease for year and in the rejoinder he  conclude upon a lease for year and although the year shall be account parcel  of the year yet it shall be a departure for now the end of the lease be short  than the lease plead in bar for the lease in bat be a full and entire lease  end at such a day and now it be show to end soon and therefore it vary from  the lease intend in the bar and the defendant may have show the statute and  the whole matter at first wherefore be shall not be aid now by the say branch  of the statute f t h b bro departure plead Litt r Yelv vin Abr title departure  a pl f and if a man will show that I S be seize in fee and grant to he a rend  charge and avow for it the plaintiff say that I S have nothing in the land at  the time of the grant the defendant by the rejoinder show that I be then  beneficiary and use in fee and so the grant good this be a departure for by  the avowry I S shall be intend seize in fee and that the grant be good by the  commonlaw and now by therejoinder the defendant do not maintain it but will  enable himself by the statute of use and so will aid himself by and when a man  in his former plea plead a estate make by the commonlaw in the second be shall  not make it good by Act of parliament   Litt a Lutw finch finch statute law so  here the lease plead in bar shall be intend a full lease b the commonlaw and  now by the rejoinder be will rely upon a lease for a short time make good by  statute law and this matter come after the first lease and under it and not  before it and therefore it be not pursuant to the bar g m h a per Keble  Fitzherbert departure h Edward b per collow bro ibidem donc Pla   Litt a I  finch finch Bac Abr g as if a man plead in bar a feoff of I S the plaintiff  show that I S seize he and after feoff the defendant upon who he reenter c the  defendant by rejoinder show that the plaintiff after the seize confirm the  estate of I S and afterward I S feoff he this be a good plea and no departure  because the confirmation be make before the feoff and so it fortify the bar  but if be bad plead by the rejoinder a confirmation make by the plaintiff to  himself such rejoinder have be a departure because it come after the feoff  plead in bar so here the Act of parliament come after the lease which he may  have plead in bar and therefore it be a departure by the opinion of the whole  court Plowden another exception be take to the rejoinder videlicet that it be  not show therein nor by the bar that any rend be reserve upon the second lease  and the proviso in the Act recite in the rejoinder be conditional videlicet it  make the lease good for year so that the ancient rend be reserve thereupon or  else not and it be not show that any rend be reserve upon the second lease for  which reason the rejoinder be bad for the defendant ought to have show that  such rend be reserve and ought to have aver that it be the ancient rend and  since he have not show it he have not show himself to be within the purview of  the proviso to which the whole court agree and as to the principal matter  videlicet admit it have be allege that the ancient Plowden er p rend be  reserve and that the plead have be good it be well debate whether the second  lease shall be good for all the year limit in it or whether it shall be utter  void by the statute or if it shall be good for year only and all the justice  agree unanimous that the second lease shall be good for year only to be  account from the time of the make such second lease but Portman and Bromley do  not agree in the reason thereof for Portman say we ought to consider two  branch of the statute the first be the branch which make void lease make  within a year before the statute of such possession as after the statute shall  come to the hand of king Henry the eight because the same thing be in lease  before the second branch be the proviso and part of the statute recite in the  rejoinder and as it seem to I if the say second branch bad not be make both  the lease have be void m h a per Brudnel et brook bro lease surrender   b Perk  Bac Abr for the take of the second lease by the defendant be a surrender of  the first lease which he have at that time by the course of the commonlaw and  it seem to I also that by the say first branch the second lease have be utter  void if the say last branch of the statute have not be make for the word of  the say first branch concern lease then make be if any ecclesiastical governor  of any ecclesiastical house or place which after the statute shall come to the  king within one year before the first day of the parliament have make any  lease under his common seal for year of any hereditament whereof and in which  any estate or interest for life year or year all the time of the make of such  grant or lease then have its be or continuance and then be not determine  finish or expire that then every such lease shall be utter void and of no  effect which word will avoid the second lease in our case for it be make by a  ecclesiastical governor videlicet the master and fellow of a college and under  their common seal and within a year before the first day of the parliament and  of hereditament which afterward come to the hand of king Henry the eight and  in which a estate for year at the time of the make such new lease then have  its be or continuance and then be not determine finish or expire for as I  apprehend this clause then have its be or continuance and then be not  determine finish or expire be one same sentence speak and put two different  way and each part of the sentence take by itself alone contain in itself as  much as both the part for that lease which bath its be be not finish and if it  be not finish it have its be and if it have its continuance ergo it be not  expire and if it be expire ergo it have not continuance and so as I say it be  one substance of matter express by word two way each way contain ill itself  the contrary which contrariety be prove mutual by the other word and so each  of the phrase of speech contain one same sentence and substance and not  diverse and then I say that at the time of make the new lease the ancient  lease have its be and continuance and then be not determine finish or expire  for these word at the time of the make of such lease have the same meaning  with the word when the lease be make and then I say that when the new lease be  make the first lease have its be and be not determine for it be determine by  the make of the new lease in which case it may be say that at the time of the  make the new lease the ancient lease have its be or be in force for if the  tenant feoff the lord in fee hereby the signiory be extinct yet it may well be  say that at the time of the feoff the signiory be in be and it be the usual  phrase in that case and therefore as it seem to I the thing which be determine  by any act may be say to be in be at the time of that act do so here this  first clause of the statute which make void lease of thing in which any estate  or interest for year at the time of the make of they have its be or  continuance and then be not determine or finish will have determine the new  lease if the second clause have not be add to it and for remedy thereof be the  second branch make which do not come proper under a proviso but be a new Act  which ordain that if any governor aforesaid within one year next before the  first day of the parliament have make any demise lease or grant to any person  for year of any tenement which person at the time of the say demise lease or  grant have and hold the same tenement to farm for year then not expire that  then the same person to who any such demise lease or grant have be make shall  have and hold the same tenement for the term of year only from the time of the  Plowden er p make of the say demise lease or grant if so many year be specify  limit and express in the same demise lease or grant or for so many year as be  express in such demise lease or grant so that the ancient rend be thereupon  reserve and so that the same lease or lease do not exceed year which branch be  very obscure by reason of these word therein videlicet so that the same lease  or lease do not exceed year and how these word shall be take in our case  inasmuch as the new lease be make for year we be to consider and herein it be  to be see whether the say word be conditional or not as the word of the  reservation of the ancient rend be and whether they shall be refer only to the  last part of the disjunctive that be to these word or for so many year c or if  they shall be refer to both the part of the disjunctive and as it seem to I  this branch of the statute will make the lease good for year Plowden which the  first branch will have utter avoid and therefore it be to be observe that our  case be within all the word of the say branch except only the say word concern  the ancient rend and the extent of the lease above he number of year for it be  make by such a governor as be mention in the say branch and within one year  next before the first day of the parliament and to such person as at the time  of the demise hold the same tenement to farm for year then not expire and what  impediment then be there to the contrary but that the lease shall be good for  year from the time of the make nun certain unless the clause concern the  reservation of the ancient rend and the number of year exceed be a obstacle  thereto and as to the ancient rend not be reserve I have show before that the  plead be not good upon that account and so my opinion appear before in this  point and as to these word videlicet so that the same lease or lease do not  exceed year a wing Max ring pl a they be refer only to those word which be the  last part of the disjunctive videlicet or for so many year as be express in  such demise lease or grant for they can be intend to refer to the first branch  videlicet that it shall be good for year for the intent of the maker may not  by any mean be take to make lease for year to be good for year and no other  lease exceed year for there be not many such lease make for when man see that  all abbey be likely to be suppress they take new lease for a very long time  and the abbot and other governor be content to enlarge the lease of their  farmer who be their friend and of their acquaintance for a very long time and  to make such lease good for a reasonable time videlicet for year only be the  intent of the two branch of the statute and not only to make good the lease  make for year for if the statute shall be so take it will affect but a small  number of lease but the intent of the maker be as I have say above and then  the say clause videlicet and so that the same lease or lease do not exceed  year have relation only to the last part of the disjunctive videlicet or for  so many year as in such demise lease or grant be express and the say clause  add together stand thus videlicet or for so many year as in such demise lease  or grant be express so that the same lease or lease do not exceed year and  this be the proper relation of the say clause as if I will say you shall have  my land for year or for so many year as I S shall appoint so that it do not  exceed year there the so that have relation to the last part of the  disjunctive only videlicet to the number appoint by I S and not to the number  appoint by I so in our principal case the so that shall have relation to the  say last part of the say disjunctive and if the so that be thus refer then it  be not a condition for it can restrain unto year the term that be short than  year and therefore it be not a condition but be a full demonstration of the  say last part of the disjunctive which in effect be but superfluous and  superabundant and in this manner the branch shall be construe as it seem to I  and so as I have say before this last branch make good that which the first  branch will otherwise have take away and revive that which the other branch if  it have be make at another time will have extinguish and therefore the lease  shall be good only for year unless it be hinder by reason of the ancient rend  not be reserve Bromley argue the same day that the other argue and also at  another day afterward the judge speak to the matter and the effect of bromley  argument both time as to the point of the statute be as follow it seem to I  that the Plowden er p first lease be surrender by the take of the second lease  as have be say b post per dyer b for both the estate can not be in one same  person at one same time c m h a per Brudenel et brook bro lease surrender   b  Perk Bac Abr c and there before when the defendant be possess of the first  term take a new lease of the same tenement to commence present this by the  course of the commonlaw be a surrender of the first lease and as to that which  have be object at the bar to the contrary videlicet that it shall not be a  surrender because the statute make the second lease void for the cause why it  shall be a surrender be the take of the second estate and if the statute make  the take of the second estate to be mere void then the operation of the  commonlaw as to the surrender be thereby take away sir as to this I say that  it be part of the matter in dispute whether the second lease be void by the  statute or not but notwithstanding I grant it to be so yet the statute which  say it shall be void may not be construe to make it void ab beginning and as  if it have never be make but it shall be expound to make it void as to the  king and after the same land be come to the hand of the king and not otherwise  for at the time of the make of the second lease the master and fellow be  lawful seize in fee and have then good power to make a new lease and so the  word of the statute shall not be intend to make it void ab beginning and  therefore it do not avoid the operation of the commonlaw in the surrender d    Litt b finch finch Bac Abr d for if a man make a lease for year the lessee  afterward take a new lease for year upon condition that if he do not such a  act the lease shall be void and after he break the condition so that thereby  the second lease be void yet it be not so void nor with such relation as to  take away the surrender of the year for the surrender by the take the new  lease for year be execute absolute at that time and it be not defeat although  the condition make the second lease void ab beginning for diverse purpose and  if a recovery be bad of land which be afterward reverse by error which avoid  the recovery yet it do not so avoid it that the recoveror shall be punish by  trespass for take the issue in the mean time so if the feoff enter upon the  feoff for condition break yet he have not so avoid the feoff as to punish the  feoff for the mean profit receive therefore where thing be make void by the  commonlaw or by statute law it be to be consider how and that shall be rule by  common reason and so the statute here admit it make void the second lease as  Plowden in rei in point of fact it make some lease void shall not so make void  the second lease as if it have never be make and the first lease as I have say  before be surrender by the take of the second lease and this surrender  although the statute shall make the second void be not defeat and as to the  second lease it seem to I that the say first branch of the statute will not  defeat it but it will have be good for the whole year if the say second branch  have not be make and the sense of the word of the say first branch be right  discuss and know will make this manifest for the word of the say branch be as  have be recite and the doubt lie in these word videlicet in which a estate for  year all the time of the make such new lease then have its be or continuance  and then be not determine finish or expire and as it seem to I this clause be  not one sentence put and express two different way so that each part of the  sentence take by itself alone contain in itself as much as both the part  together as it be last say but it be two several sentence between which the  copulative and be interpose which make it that no lease shall be avoid thereby  except both the part of the copulative be first perform and that there be here  two sentence and two thing to be perform whereof one may be perform and the  other not be easy prove for the word be which then have its be and then be not  determine and sir some thing at one same time may be in be and do determine  and some thing at one same time may be in be and be determine as if a man bath  land charge with a rentcharge to I d and he make a feoff thereof to I S there  the rend at the time of the feoff be in be and not determine for the rend be  in be before the feoff and at the time of the feoff and after the feoff and  therefore it may be well say that at the time of the feoff the Plowden er p  rend have its be and then be not determine but if he have make a feoff of the  same land to I d who have the rend out of it there at the time of the feoff  the rend bad its be and then be determine for it be determine by the feoff and  so you see there that these word which have its be and the word and be not  then determine be not of one same effect but be several clause join together  by the copulative and which have several sense and several effect the one  contrary to the other and so in our case the statute have these clause join  together by the copulative and make void no lease but such wherein both the  part of the copulative be first perform which be not in the second lease in  our case but one part only be perform which be that at the time of the make of  it a estate for year have its be and continuance and if the clause have stop  there I will confess the second lease have be void but the second part of the  clause be not perform which be and then be not determine finish or expire for  here the first lease at the time of the make of the second be determine and  finish and so no lease be make void of any hereditament but only of such  wherein a estate for year at the time of the make the lease have its be and be  not determine and in our case a estate for year at the time of the make the  lease bad its be and be determine wherefore it be out of the annul word of the  statute for these word at the time of the make mean the same instant of the  make for they do not contain the time before nor the time after but the very  instant of the make which the statute intend to be the end of one time and the  be ginning of another for it say all the time of the make have its be and be  not determine which word imply that at that time some thing may have their be  and also be determine to which the statute do not extend and some thing may  have their be and be not determine which last be intend by the statute and so  there be a instant intend by the statute which contain a be and a  determination to which the statute do not extend but it extend only to thing  then in be and not determine and our case be that it be in be and determine at  one same instant and so the second lease be out of the danger of this branch  and therefore it shall be good for the whole year notwithstanding the same  branch and sir it have be object at the bar by my brother gawdy to the  contrary videlicet that these word at the time of the make shall be intend the  time before the act do and that the first lease be not determine until the  second lease be make and this word make be the time before and hereupon he put  a example as if a man be bind in pound to give he meat and drink to one for  the time he be in make his house or his account there he be bind to give he  meat and drink while be be in make the house or the account and when the house  or the account be make then be be discharge from give he meat and drink and  therefore make shall be there intend the time before the act do so here as he  say the statute make void lease of thing in which a estate for year at the  time of the make of they have its be which word make as he apprehend ought to  be take for the time in which the necessary circumstance precede the delivery  as write or seal be in do sir as to this I answer that the case of make a  house or account be good law for the common phrase of speech and the matter  itself show that the word make extend there only to the time which be before  the act finish but here in our principal case this word make contain in itself  the time of the consummation of the act as in a action of debt upon a  obligation the defendant plead that tempore destroying scribe which be at the  time of the make the deed he be within age if issue be join upon it the  plaintiff may give in evidence that at the time of the delivery of the deed  the defendant be of full age and that be sufficient although the defendant  give in evidence that at the time of the write and seal of the deed he be  within age for there these word at the time of the make the deed   a per cur  ld raym per holt CJ the time of the make commence by the delivery mean the  time in which all the circumstance that contribute to the make of it be  accomplish and consummate and so in our case the word at the time of the make  the lease mean Plowden the time when the lease take effect and be consummate  wherefore it seem to I that notwithstanding this objection or any other matter  in the say first branch of the statute the new lease shall be good for the  whole Plowden er p year and in order to abbreviate such long lease as be not  touch by the say first branch the second branch be make which be proper a  proviso and not a new act the word of which be as have be recite and the doubt  lie in these word videlicet and so that the same lease or lease do not exceed  year and it seem to I that these word be not conditional nor be to be refer to  the number of year contain in the write of the new lease but they be to be  refer to the number of year appoint and limit in the same branch videlicet to  the number of year to which number the long term be abridge and that they  shall be so refer be prove by the word of the same branch for the word thereof  be that then the say person to who such demise lease or grant have be so make  shall have and hold the same land for the term of year only from the time of  the make of such demise lease or grant c which word only prove that the word  so that the same lease or lease do not exceed year shall not be refer to the  number of year contain in the write of the new lease for if they shall be so  refer then the word only have no sense or meaning at all nor have it any apt  signification to serve such construction for if it have be put by word at  large videlicet that the same new lease shall be good for year only if year or  a lesser number contain in such new lease what sort of phrase will this have  be and to what purpose have the word only there serve certain to no manner of  purpose but it will have be absurd put there for the word only be a word of  abbreviation and the word that he shall hold for year only be as much as to  say he shall hold for year and no more which be not a proper expression if  there be only year in all limit in the lease for then it can abridge that  which be not for a abridgment be to reduce a thing less from great and a term  may not be abridge unto year if it do not exceed the number of year and so as  I say the word only will not permit the word so that the same lease or lease  do not exceed year to be refer to the number of year limit in the new demise  but they refer to a abbreviation of a great term than year to year wherefore  the say word be not conditional but be in nature of a double repetition and it  be all one as if the word shall be good for have be put instead of the word  shall not exceed and then the sentence have be thus videlicet so that the same  lease or lease shall be good for year and thus it be as a double repetition of  one same thing and therefore as I say the word so that be not a condition as  it shall not be in many other case put by my brother dyer at the bar videlicet  in writ which go to sheriff to seize good for the king the word be ita quod no  one ad she shades of dead to put at and in the statute de gift conditional ita  quod non to have power to make strange which do it make a condition but be a  full declaration of the thing before speak and so shall they be here and thus  accord to my exposition every word have its apt signification and relation and  the lease shall be good for year and sir if this word only have not be in the  branch yet the clause so that it do not exceed year may not reasonable be  refer to the number of year contain in the new lease nor be construe a  condition or to make total void all lease limit for more than year for it can  be reasonable take that such be the intent of the maker of the statute for it  will be against all reason and equity utter to avoid lease new make and to  leave their former lease void also for although it may be presume that the new  lease be make by the governor of house for this reason only that they see they  must quit their possession yet it can not be intend but that their former  lease be make without that design and forasmuch as the new lease be good and  lawful by law when they be make it will not be equitable to make they total  void and leave no estate at all in they and therefore it be not reasonable to  a Popham a expound the word which seem contrary to reason accord to good  reason and equity b hob Bac Abr vin Abr title statute e pl b and so the judge  who be our predecessor have sometime expound the word quite contrary to the  text and sometime have take thing by equity contrary to the text in order to  make they agree with reason and equity thus the statute of Edward cap say that  by exception of nontenure of part no writ shall abate but for the quantity of  the nontenure which be allege c m h pl Fitzherbert brief bro die pl theol dig  lib cap vin Abr title nontenure d pl wing Max ring pl post c yet in a praecipe  Plowden er p quod To give back of a manor if the tenant plead nontenure of  parcel the whole writ shall abate and so it have be adjudge since the statute  because the manor be a thing entire in which case the demandant ought to have  a exception in the writ and therefore the judge have take it to be against  reason that by his demand of the whole manor he shall recover against he that  be but tenant of parcel of the manor for which cause they have expound the  statute to extend only to writ where the thing demand be several as acre be  and not where the thing be entire which exposition S quite contrary to the  text for the text be that no writ shall abate and they have expound it that  some writ shall abate and so their exposition exclude the generality of the  statute and make it particular and therefore they have construe it contrary to  the text in order to make it agree with reason and in the same manner they  have expound the statute de Prerogativa king cap which say that the king shall  have primer seize after the death of such as hold of he in chief of all land  whereof they be seize in their demesne as of fee c which statute be general  yet it have be expound d h bro livery b n c Stamf prerog b Poph post d that if  a man hold of the king by socage in chief only the king shall not have primer  seize of all his other land and so the judge have expound the text which be  general to be but particular which exposition be contrary to the text because  the text be contrary to reason that for so small a Plowden tenure a man shall  pay so great a charge and therefore they take it that the intent of the maker  of the statute can not be accord to the letter and the statute of its  Westminster cap of cessavit say writ of entry shall be make for the heir of  the demandant against the heir of the tenant and against they to who such land  shall be alien a Vet n b b Inst   a Brownl wing Max ring pl a yet if the  demandant in a cessavit die the heir shall not have a cessavit because be  shall not have the arrearage and so the statute have be expound and take which  exposition be quite contrary to the text to all intent and purpose because the  text be contrary to all reason to give a action to the heir for one thing in  consideration of another thing which be not due to he and the statute of  Gloucester cap ordain that upon the alienation of tenant by the courtesy if  warranty be plead against the heir he shall be bar if he have asset by descent  but if asset be not then descend to he but in time afterward be descend by the  same father then shall the tenant recover against he of the seize of his  mother by a judicial writ that shall issue out of the roll of the justice  before who the plea be plead c b h h a b per vavisor bro to know facias m h b  per hankf bro ibidem   a   Litt a Inst wing Max ring pl ring pl see more b and  by the equity of the same statute it be take that if the warranty of tenant in  tail with asset be plead in bar where he have no asset at all but afterward  asset descend to the issue there the tenant shall have a to know facias to  have the asset and not the land entail for if he shall have the land entail  then it be consider that if he have alien the asset the issue inheritable to  the tail shall afterward have a formedon and shall recover the land entail and  therefore in order to make a perpetual bar to the issue touch that which the  feoff with warranty shall have it be take more reasonable to give the asset  than the land entail to the tenant and for this reason he shall have a to know  facias for the asset and not for the land entail and so there the thing take  by equity of the statute be in a different order and degree from the principal  thing give by the statute for the statute ordain that the tenant shall have  the land alien and that the issue shall retain the asset and by the equity of  the statute it be take that the tenant shall have the asset and that the issue  shall retain the land alien and so reason shall guide the exposition of the  word of statute and the equity of they and if the word of statute shall be  construe contrary to the text and thing shall be take by the equity of statute  in other manner than the principal provision of the statute be and all this in  order to make they agreeable with reason Plowden er p then I say that in our  principal case the say word so that such lease or lease shall not exceed year  admit that there have not be another exposition of they ill the same branch  may not be conditional nor defeat the whole estate but shall be take by reason  to abridge the estate unto year but as I say the say word only declare and  explain the other word and therefore it seem to I that the new lease in our  case shall be good for year and so note all the justice agree that the lease  shall be good for year in the principal case notwithstanding it be make for  year and note that dyer sergeant in his argument say if one have a lease for  year take a new lease within a year of the make of the statute for year to  commence after the other lease end that the lessee shall hold the land until  year only to be account from the time of the make the last lease for he say  that such be the intent of the last branch of the statute which say so that  the same lease or lease do not exceed year which word lease be in the plural  number warrant his say as he hold but there the first branch will avoid the  second lease and then the say second branch of the statute will revive that in  part which the first branch if it have be make at another time will extinguish  bat quaere in the say case put by dyer if the first lease have be for year and  the last also for year whether the say last branch of the statute will abridge  the first year into year only and note at the say other day after the argument  of the justice when they speak of the matter of the instant Portman say we  have need of a philosopher to explain it and one who then stand at the bar say  that a instant be thus define in logic videlicet   Litt b vin Abr title  instant a pl eager be One indivisible in tempore quod non be time nec pars  time ad quod yet part time to couple