brown case Charles selby Amherst appellant William Robinson Lytton and other  respondent that march Mews dig xv amhurst v Litton land mortgage for two  several term of one thousand year be afterward settle to a in tail remainder  to b in tail remainder to a in fee whereby a and b have successive a equity of  redemption incident to their estate a by his will appoint the mortgage to be  pay off and the term to be assign to m and by the same will devise all his  land be seize of other land in fee to c and his heir a and b both die without  issue whereby the estate tail be spend and upon a question whether the equity  of redemption pass to m by the will of a and be thereby sever from the  reversion it be hold that it do not and that m stand only in the place of the  mortgagee and be liable to be redeem by c a devise his estate to his son in  tail male remainder to b for life remainder to his son in tail male on  condition treat he shall change his name and if he or any son of his refuse so  to do then the testator direct the devise to be void and give the estate over  to d the son die without issue b perform the condition and die without issue  and upon a question whether d shall have the estate after the death of b it be  certify by the judge of king b that d take no estate on the death of b but  that it go to the heir at law of a see Fearne count Rem brown er p the point  of this case be thus state in the marginal note to mosely a tenant in tail of  land in Sussex and elsewhere subject to mortgage remainder to b for life  remainder to his first and other son in tailmale with other like intermediate  remainder reversion in fee to a and seize of other land in fee by his will  direct his executor to pay off the mortgage in Sussex that they shall be keep  on foot and assign by the mortgagee to his mother for her sole use and benefit  during the remainder of the several term and as for and concern all his manor  land etcetera which he be then seize of in law or equity or which he have  power to give or charge etcetera he devise they to c and his heir this be not  a devise of the absolute term to the mother but of the money only and the  equity of redemption passes to c this decree which be make on a rehear and by  which Lord chancellor king reverse his former decree be affirm in parliament  after great debate by lord against see also Powell on mortgage vol cap where  the circumstance of the case and the reason of the decree be very clear state  viner vol p can Eq can ab can Fitzgib barn mosely sir George stride be seize  in fee of the manor of itchingham and diverse land and hereditament in the  county of Sussex of the yearly value of pound and upward part whereof be  subject to two several mortgage make by he to Francis brook each for a term of  year for secure pound and interest and other part thereof be subject to  another mortgage make by he to mary Seyliard for another term of year for  secure pound and interest and sir George be also seize of other estate in the  county of Worcester Gloucester and Hereford subject to other mortgage do by  his will date the saint of may devise all his manor message land and  hereditament to his only son Lytton Lytton and the heir male of his body  remainder to his godson stride Bedingfield for life remainder to his first and  other son in tail male upon condition that the say stride Bedingfield and his  issue male shall change his name of Bedingfield to stride and take the arm of  the strodes and in case the say stride Bedingfield or any son of his shall  refuse or neglect to change his surname from Bedingfield to stride then the  testator will be that the say devise shall be void and in such case he give  the same to his godson brown George Darnelly for life remainder to his first  and other son in tail male he and they change their surname in the same manner  as stride Bedingfield be to do and in case he and his issue shall refuse then  the devise to he and they be to be void and in such case the testator devise  the same to his own right heir the testator soon afterward die and his son  Lytton Lytton become seize of the mortgage premise in Sussex as tenant in tail  subject to the say mortgage of pound and pound and he also become seize of the  reversion in fee of the some premise as the only son and heir of sir George  his father subject to the several intermediate remainder before mention and  the say Lytton Lytton be also seize of several other real estate of  considerable yearly value and have no issue at the time of execute his will  and entertain a great kindness for the respondent William Robinson Lytton who  be his near relation make his will date the that of April and thereby give to  his mother dame Margaret stride pound and after give several other pecuniary  legacy he direct and appoint that his executrix shall within six month after  his decease pay off and discharge all mortgage and encumbrance charge upon his  estate in Sussex by his father sir George stride videlicet one mortgage of  pound to Mr brook and one other mortgage of pound to mrs Seyliard and that the  say several mortgage lease shall be keep on foot and upon payment of the money  due thereon shall be assign by the mortgagee to his mother dame Margaret  stride for her sole use and benefit during the remainder of the several term  in the say mortgage contain and he give to his say mother dame Margaret stride  a yearly rentcharge of for her life to be issue out of all his manor and land  in the county of Hertford and Bedford and to his wife Bridget Lytton a yearly  rentcharge of pound brown er p to be issue out of all his manor and land in  the county of Hertford and Bedford for her life and as for and concern all and  every his manor message land tenement and hereditament which he be then seize  of in law or equity or which he have a power to give or charge he give and  dispose of the same in manner follow videlicet if his wife shall be with child  at the time of his decease then he give all his say manor message land  tenement and hereditament to his cousin the respondent William Robinson Lytton  until such child shall be bear and after the birth of such child if it shall  prove a son he devise all his say manor message land tenement and hereditament  to his say afterborn son and to the heir male of his body the remainder to his  say cousin the respondent William Robinson Lytton and his heir and in case of  the birth of such son then he devise a rentcharge of a year issue and to be  pay by his say son out of the say manor and land unto the say respondent and  his heir with a power of distress in case of nonpayment but if the say after  brown bear child prove a daughter then he give to such daughter pound to be  raise and pay out of the rend and profit of the say estate at the age of or  marriage and if his wife shall not be with child at his death then he give all  his say manor message land tenement and hereditament to his say cousin the  respondent William Robinson Lytton and his heir the testator then order his  executrix to pay all his father sir George stride just debt and give the  residue of his personal estate after his debt legacy and funeral expense be  pay to his say wife Bridget Lytton who he appoint sole executrix of his will  and he appoint that all his furniture good and household stuff then be in his  manor seat at Knebworth shall remain and continue in his say house after his  death for the use and benefit of the say respondent to who he thereby give the  same the testator Lytton Lytton soon after die without issue and immediate  after his death stride Bedingfield enter upon the premise in Sussex comprise  in the mortgage to brook and Seyliard and comply with the condition in sir  George stride will by take the surname and arm of stride and in Michaelmas  term bring his bill in the court of chancery against dame Margaret stride and  Bridget Lytton the executrix and the respondent William Robinson Lytton and  also against brook and Seyliard the mortgagee and dame Ann Bedingfield and  Elizabeth Bedingfield the heir at law of sir George stride to redeem the  mortgage premise the several defendant have put in their answer to that bill  the cause be hear before the Lord chancellor Harcourt on the d of February  when it be inter alian decree that the money due to brook and Seyliard on  their respective mortgage for principal and interest together with their cost  shall be pay out of the asset of Lytton Lytton and that brook and Seyliard on  payment thereof shall assign their respective mortgage to dame Margaret stride  or to who she shall appoint in order to secure to her what principal and  interest be due thereon at the death of Lytton Lytton together with all other  interest which shall grow due from that time but the same be to be subject to  a redemption by the say Strode stride and therefore if stride stride shall pay  to dame Margaret stride the principal and interest due on the say mortgage at  the death of Lytton Lytton with all such interest as shall become due for the  same at such time and place as the master to who the account be refer shall  appoint and no assignment shall have be make of the say mortgage to dame  Margaret stride then brook and Seyliard be first pay their say principal  interest and cost out of Lytton Lyttons asset as aforesaid be at stride stride  charge to assign the say mortgage to he or as he shall appoint but such  assignment be to be subject to such further direction as the court shall think  fit to make when proper party shall be before the court brown pursuant to this  decree by indenture date the saint of July Francis brook in consideration of  pound S be the money report due to he for principal interest and cost pay to  he by the respondent William Robinson Lytton who have purchase of Bridget  Lytton the benefit of Lytton Lyttons personal estate assign to the appellant  who pen that suit have marry dame Margaret stride the premise mortgage to the  say brook for the remainder of the say two term of year subject to a condition  that if stride stride or such other persons as shall be entitle to the  inheritance of the premise under sir George stride brown er p will shall pay  to the appellant pound and interest at a day therein mention then the  appellant shall assign the premise to such person as stride stride or such  other person so entitle as aforesaid shall appoint for the residue of the say  term but such assignment be to be subject to such further direction as the  court shall think fit to make touch the remainder of the say term when proper  party shall be before the court and by indenture date the that of April the  appellant in consideration of pound pay to he by the respondent mascall and  Joseph meal since decease assign the same premise to mascall and meal for the  remainder of the say term subject to redemption and subject to the like  further direction of the court and by another indenture date the saint of  August mary Seyliard in consideration of pound S d be the sum report due to  her for principal interest and cost pay also by the respondent William  Robinson Lytton assign to the appellant the premise mortgage to her for the  remainder of her term of year subject to the like redemption as aforesaid and  to the like further direction of the court and by indenture date the that of  April the appellant in consideration of pound pay to he by the respondent  Bedingfield assign the same mortgage premise to Bedingfield for the remainder  of the say term subject to redemption and to the like further direction of the  court as in the forgo assignment but the respondent William Robinson Lytton do  not join in the execution of any of these assignment in December dame Margaret  stride die upon who death the appellant her husband obtain letter of  administration with her will annex by which will she give the residue of her  estate to the appellant in may stride stride die without issue and upon his  death the reversion and inheritance of the mortgage premise do by virtue of  the will of Lytton Lytton come to the respondent William Robinson Lytton  subject to the say mortgage make by sir George stride to brook and Seyliard  and afterward assign to the other respondent mascall and Bedingfield as  aforesaid in Michaelmas term the appellant exhibit his bill in the court of  chancery against the now respondent and George brown Darnelly pray that the  respondent mascall and Bedingfield may receive what be due to they for  principal and interest on the say mortgage and reassign the mortgage premise  to the appellant and that he may hold and enjoy the same for the remainder of  the say several term of year to which bill the several respondent put in their  answer and the respondent Lytton by his answer insist that he be well entitle  under the will of Lytton Lytton to the say mortgage premise subject to the  money due thereon and hope he shall be at liberty to redeem the same in easter  term the respondent Lytton exhibit his cross bill against the appellant and  George Darnelly and the other respondent to redeem the say mortgage premise  upon payment of the principal and interest due on the say mortgage and to be  quiet in the possession of the premise both these cause be beard on the that  of November before the Lord chancellor king when his lordship be please to  order that the judge of the king bench shall be attend with a case upon the  will of sir George stride for their opinion whether George Darnelly alias  stride upon the death of stride stride become entitle to the say estate by sir  George stride will and after the judge have give their opinion either party be  at liberty to resort back to the court for further direction the judge of the  king bench accord certify their opinion that George Darnelly can not take any  estate after the death of stride stride by virtue of sir George stride will  the say stride stride have during his life take upon he the surname of stride  and in every other respect comply with the will of sir George stride on the d  and that of march the cause be beard upon this certificate and the matter  reserve by the former decree when the Lord chancellor way please to declare  that George Darnelly do not take any estate by the will of sir George stride  and decree that a account shall be take of what be due for principal interest  and cost to the respondent mascall and Bedingfield on the say several brown er  p mortgage and that upon payment thereof by the appellant the say respondent  shall at the appellant cost assign to he or as he shall appoint the say  respective mortgage term but in default of payment by the appellant his bill  shall be dismiss with cost and as between the appellant and the respondent  Lytton it be decree that the appellant shall hold the mortgage premise  absolute against the say respondent and his heir and all claim under he and  that the tenant shall pay the rend of the mortgage premise accrue since the  death of stride stride to the appellant and that the say respondent cross bill  shall be dismiss the respondent Lytton conceive himself aggrieve by this  decree obtain a order for rehear the cause and the brown same be reheard  accord on the that of October his lordship be please to declare his opinion in  favour of the respondent Lytton against the former decree but offer the  appellant if he desire it to rehear the cause again assist with two of the  judge which the appellant desire it be order that the say cause shall come on  again to be reheard on that day fortnight accord the cause come on again to be  reheard on the that of November follow before his lordship assist by the Lord  chief justice Raymond and Mr justice Denton when his lordship and the judge be  all unanimous of opinion and do declare that the respondent Lytton be entitle  to the equity of redemption of the say several mortgage and mortgage premise  and therefore his lordship reverse his former decree in that point and decree  that a account shall be take by the master of what be due to the respondent  mascall and Bedingfield for principal interest and cost on the say mortgage  and upon payment thereof by the respondent Lytton the other respondent shall  at his cost assign those mortgage term to he or as he shall appoint and in  default thereof his crossbill be to be dismiss and as between the appellant  and the respondent Lytton it be decree that the say respondent shall hold the  mortgage premise absolute against the appellant his executor and administrator  and all claim under dame Margaret stride decease and that the tenant shall pay  the rend of the mortgage premise accrue since the death of stride stride to  the respondent Lytton and the appellant have receive some of the rend he be  decree to account for the same before the master and to pay what shall be  report due from he to the say respondent Lytton and the appellant original  bill be dismiss the appellant therefore appeal from this last decree insist c  Talbot t Lutwyche that the testator Lytton have the remainder in fee of the  estate in Sussex which be mortgage he have undoubted a power to dispose of the  year term and the equity of redemption thereof absolute against every one  except stride Bedingfield who have a estate for life by the will of sir George  stride and except the contingent remainder create by the same will if they  have happen to take place which they do not that as Lytton have such power he  have by plain and express word give these term for year to his mother dame  Margaret stride absolute and without any condition or subject to any  redemption so far as he have power for he direct that his executrix shall pay  off and discharge all mortgage and encumbrance upon his estate in Sussex  charge by his father sir George stride and that the several mortgage lease  shall be keep on foot and be assign to his say mother for her sole use and  benefit during the remainder of the several term in the say mortgage contain  that in case the general devise to the respondent Lytton and his heir may be  sufficient to include the premise in Sussex by virtue of brown the general  word though not express mention yet it be apprehend that both devise of the  same premise be consistent they ought both to stand and that accord the  appellant be entitle to the term of year absolute and the respondent Lytton  only to the reversion in fee of the premise comprise in those term he have by  the same will a very large estate give to he in possession in other county  that the appellant and the respondent Lytton both derive their respective  title to the premise in Sussex under the same will as voluntary devisees and  therefore it be high reasonable that the will shall be construe in such a  manner as that a express and particular devise of land full and plain  ascertain and describe shall not be defeat or invalidate by a general  indefinite clause but it be object that the devise of these term to dame  Margaret stride be too brown er p remote a limitation of a estate or interest  of that nature and therefore void to this it may be answer that here be no  devise or limitation of any term in tail or any tendency to a perpetuity but  only a devise of these term for year which be capable of be dispose of by will  accord to the interest which the testator have in they and though stride  stride have such a interest for his life that he may redeem they by virtue of  the will of sir George stride in respect of such interest yet subject thereto  they be well devise to dame Margaret her executor and administrator it be also  object that by the decree in the former cause the court do in effect determine  that dame Margaret be entitle to the term only as a security for the mortgage  money by decree a redemption to stride stride but to this it be answer that  stride stride title arise under the will of sir George the testator Lytton can  not deprive he of his right of redemption in respect of his estate for life  but the respondent claim under the will of Lytton only can have no great  interest than be give he by that will and by the old decree before stride  stride can redeem the mortgage so as to have the term attendant upon his  estate for life he be order to pay dame Margaret the several sum advance for  her benefit out of the asset of the testator Lytton and apply in discharge  those mortgage but this be not decree to her in lieu and satisfaction of all  her interest in the term and therefore the assignment to be make be to be  subject to the further direction of the court and such assignment be draw  accord but where the court intend that another mortgage which be to one bridge  upon another estate shall attend the inheritance it be express so order by the  decree it be therefore pray that the say decree of the that of November may be  reverse and the former decree of the that of march affirm on behalf of the  respondent mascall and Bedingfield it be hope I wood that as they be no way  interest in the question brown between the appellant and the respondent Lytton  touch the right of redemption and have by their answer to both bill submit to  accept their principal interest and cost from such of the party as have a  right to redeem they that whether they shall be decree to assign their  mortgage term to the appellant or the respondent Lytton they shall upon such  assignment be pay not only their principal and interest together with their  cost in the court of chancery but also their cost occasion by this appeal and  on the part of the respondent Lytton it be argue that the testator Lytton do  not intend to give dame Margaret stride the absolute interest in the term but  only to give her the same as a security for the money due upon those mortgage  and that this be his intention appear manifest from the whole frame of the  will the devise to dame Margaret of these mortgage term be among the pecuniary  legacy and before the devise of his land and when he come to devise his land  to the respondent Lytton he describe they by all and every his manor message  land tenement and hereditament which he be then seize of in law or equity or  which he have power to give which convey the land in question to the  respondent in as plain and certain a manner as if the testator have devise  they by express word that this intention be still the more evident if it be  consider that the devise of his real estate to the respondent Lytton be in the  same word as the devise to the testator own son in case his wife have be with  child of a son and it can not be imagine that the testator intend to give  these land from his own son to his mother that no devise by the testator of  these term but as mortgage interest can possible take effect till the  determination of the estate to stride stride and the estate tail to his son  and the contingent estate limit to George Darnelly for life and to his son in  tail and it be hardly to be imagine that it can ever enter into the think of  the testator to give his mother a remote interest in land which she can never  probable either enjoy or sell only in order to sever such long term of year  from the inheritance of his estate and that his mother may have the power of  give they away from his family to a stranger as the fact have real happen that  the word of the devise in question be proper to convey these term as security  and to put his mother in the place of the mortgagee and such interest only  they must necessary be understand to pass so long as any of the intermediate  estate precedent to the testator reversion in fee subsist and there be no  reason to imagine that the testator intend his word shall have two brown er p  different meaning that as the decree now stand dame Margaret under who the  appellant claim and who have a jointure beside of pound per and have by the  will of her son Lytton legacy to the amount of pound over and above a  rentcharge of pound per and thereby give to her for her life and which be very  near as ample a brown provision as he design for a only daughter in case he  have leave one but if the construction now contend for by the appellant shall  prevail then he in right of his wife will receive out of Lyttons estate four  time as much as the provision make by the testator for a only daughter which  it can never be imagine he intend but suppose it to be ever so plain the  testator intent to devise the absolute interest in the term to dame Margaret  yet it be apprehend such a devise can not take effect in point of law because  those term or which be the same thing as to the present question the equity of  redemption of they will then at the testator death stand limit in the follow  manner videlicet in trust to attend the freehold and inheritance so long as  the estate for life of stride Bedingfield the estate tail to his son and the  contingent estate for life and in tail of George Darnelly and his son shall  last and the residue after all those estate spend not to attend the  inheritance but to be for the benefit of dame Margaret her executor and  administrator as term in gross but it be conceive that such a devise of the  remainder of term after estate tail be void as be too remote when separate  from and not attendant upon the inheritance it be therefore hope that the last  decree will be affirm and the appeal dismiss with cost and accord after hear  counsel on this appeal it be order and adjudge that the same shall be dismiss  and the decree therein complain of affirm and it be further order that the  appellant shall pay to the respondent mascall and Bedingfield pound for their  cost in respect of the say appeal jour vol p