XI for human knowledge which concern the mind it have two part the one that  inquire of the substance or nature of the soul or mind the other that inquire  of the faculty or function thereof unto the first of these the consideration  of the original of the soul whether it be native or adventive and how far it  be exempt from law of matter and of the immortality thereof and many other  point do appertain which have be not more laborious inquire than various  report so as the travail therein take seem to have be rather in a maze than in  a way but although I be of opinion that this knowledge may be more real and  sound inquire even in nature than it have be yet I hold that in the end it  must be hound by religion or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion  for as the substance of the soul in the creation be not extract out of the  mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a to lead forth but be  immediate inspire from God so it be not possible that it shall be otherwise  than by accident subject to the law of heaven and earth which be the subject  of philosophy and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the  soul must come by the same inspiration that give the substance unto this part  of knowledge touch the soul there be two appendix which as they have be handle  have rather vapour forth fable than kindle truth divination and fascination  divination have be ancient and fit divide into artificial and natural whereof  artificial be when the mind make a prediction by argument conclude upon sign  and token natural be when the mind have a presention by a internal power  without the inducement of a sign artificial be of two sort either when the  argument be couple with a derivation of cause which be rational or when it be  only ground upon a coincidence of the effect which be experimental whereof the  latter for the most part be superstitious such as be the heathen observation  upon the inspection of sacrifice the flight of bird the swarm of be and such  as be the Chaldean astrology and the like for artificial divination the  several kind thereof be distribute among particular knowledge the astronomer  have his prediction as of conjunction aspect eclipse and the like the  physician have his prediction of death of recovery of the accident and issue  of disease the politic have his prediction oh city of selling et quickly  to pass away si buyer to come upon which stay not long to be perform in Sulla  first and after in Caesar so as these prediction be now impertinent and to be  refer over but the divination which spring from the internal nature of the  soul be that which we now speak of which have be make to be of two sort  primitive and by influxion primitive be ground upon the supposition that the  mind when it be withdraw and collect into itself and not diffuse into the  organ of the body have some extent and latitude of prenotion which therefore  appear most in sleep in ecstasy and near death and more rare in wake  apprehension and be induce and further by those abstinences and observance  which make the mind most to consist in itself by influxion be ground upon the  conceit that the mind as a mirror or glass shall take illumination from the  foreknowledge of God and spirit unto which the same regiment do likewise  conduce for the retire of the mind within itself be the state which be most  susceptible of divine a flowing in save that it be accompany in this case with  a fervency and elevation which the ancient note by fury and not with a repose  and quiet as it be in the other fascination be the power and act of  imagination intensive upon other body than the body of the imaginant for of  that we speak in the proper place wherein the school of Paracelsus and the  disciple of pretend natural magic have be so intemperate as they have exalt  the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle work  faith other that draw near to probability call to their view the secret  passage of thing and special of the contagion that pass from body to body do  conceive it shall likewise be agreeable to nature that there shall be some  transmission and operation from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the  sense whence the conceit have grow now almost make civil of the master spirit  and the force of confidence and the like incident unto this be the inquiry how  to raise and fortify the imagination for if the imagination fortify have power  then it be material to know how to fortify and exalt it and herein come in  Crooked and dangerous a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic for it  may be pretend that ceremony character and charm do work not by any tacit or  sacramental contract with evil spirit but serve only to strengthen the  imagination of he that use it as image be say by the Roman church to fix the  cogitation and raise the devotion of they that pray before they but for I own  judgement if it be admit that imagination have power and that ceremony fortify  imagination and that they be use sincere and intentional for that purpose yet  I shall hold they unlawful as oppose to that first edict which God give unto  man in sweat face glutton bread tuum for they propound those noble effect  which God have set forth unto man to be buy at the price of labour to be  attain by a few easy and slothful observance deficience in these knowledge I  will report none other than the general deficience that it be not know how  much of they be verity and how much vanity XII the knowledge which respect the  faculty of the mind of man be of two kind the one respect his understanding  and reason and the other his will appetite and affection whereof the former  produce position or decree the latter action or execution it be true that the  imagination be a agent or nuncius in both province both the judicial and the  ministerial for sense send over to imagination before reason have judge and  reason send over to imagination before the decree can be act for imagination  ever precede voluntary motion save that this Janus of imagination have differ  face for the face towards reason have the print of truth but the face towards  action have the print of good which nevertheless be face wicker basket  it was becoming be sister neither be the imagination simple and only a  messenger but be invest with or at least wise usurp no small authority in  itself beside the duty of the message for it be well say by Aristotle that the  mind have over the body that commandment which the lord have over a bondman  but that reason have over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate  have over a free citizen who may come also to rule in his turn for we see that  in matter of faith and religion we raise our imagination above our reason  which be the cause why religion seek ever access to the mind by similitude  type parable vision dream and again in all persuasion that be wrought by  eloquence and other impression of like nature which do paint and disguise the  true appearance of thing the chief recommendation unto reason be from the  imagination nevertheless because I find not any science that do proper or fit  pertain to the imagination I see no cause to alter the former division for as  for poesy it be rather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty  thereof and if it be a work we speak not now of such part of learning as the  imagination produce but of such science as handle and consider of the  imagination no more than we shall speak now of such knowledge as reason  produce for that extend to all philosophy but of such knowledge as do handle  and inquire of the faculty of reason so as poesy have his true place as for  the power of the imagination in nature and the manner of fortify the same we  have mention it in the doctrine de anima whereunto most fit it belong and last  for imaginative or insinuative reason which be the subject of rhetoric we  think it best to refer it to the be of reason so therefore we content  ourselves with the former division that human philosophy which respect the  faculty of the mind of man have two part rational and moral the part of human  philosophy which be rational be of all knowledge to the most wit the least  delightful and seem but a net of subtlety and spinosity for as it be true say  that knowledge be pabulum animi so in the nature of man appetite to this food  most man be of the taste and stomach of the Israelite in the desert that will  fain have return and ollas venison and be weary of manna which though it be  celestial yet seem less nutritive and comfortable so general man taste well  knowledge that be drench in flesh and blood civil history morality policy  about the which man affection praise fortune do turn and be conversant but  this same lumen dry land do parch and offend most man watery and soft nature  but to speak true of thing as they be in worth rational knowledge be the key  of all other be for as Aristotle say apt and elegant that the hand be the  instrument of instrument and the mind be the from of from so these be true say  to be the be of be neither do they only direct but likewise confirm and  strengthen even as the habit of shoot do not only enable to shoot a near shoot  but also to draw a strong bow the be intellectual be four in number divide  accord to the end whereunto they be refer for man labour be to invent that  which be seek or propound or to judge that which be invent or to retain that  which be judge or to deliver over that which be retain so as the be must be  four be of inquiry or invention be of examination or judgement be of custody  or memory and be of elocution or tradition XIII invention be of two kind much  differ the one of be and science and the other of speech and argument the  former of these I do report deficient which seem to I to be such a deficience  as if in the make of a inventory touch the state of a defunct it shall be set  down that there be no ready money for as money will fetch all other commodity  so this knowledge be that which shall purchase all the rest and like as the  west Indies have never be discover if the use of the mariner needle have not  be first discover though the one be vast region and the other a small motion  so it can be find strange if science be no further discover if the be itself  of invention and discovery have be pass over that this part of knowledge be  want to my judgement stand plain confess for first logic do not pretend to  invent science or the axiom of science but pass it over with a whoever it be  in to sew be credendum and cels acknowledge it grave speak of the empirical  and dogmatical sect of physician that medicine and cure be first find out and  then after the reason and cause be discourse and not the cause first find out  and by light from they the medicine and cure discover and Plato in his  Theaetetus note well that particular be infinite and the high generalty give  no sufficient direction and that the pith of all science which make the  artsman differ from the inexpert be in the middle proposition which in every  particular knowledge be take from tradition and experience and therefore we  see that they which discourse of the invention and original of thing refer  they rather to chance than to be and rather to beast bird fish serpent than to  man no. genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida grown up stalk leaf et floor camantem  purpure non that wild beast incognita shegoat grass come back  bird to hang  arrow so that it be no marvel the manner of antiquity be to consecrate  inventor that the Egyptian have so few human idol in their temple but almost  all bruit Omnigenumque god monster et latrator Anubis contra Neptune et  sexual activity in opposition the goddess of wisdom c and if you like better  the tradition of the grease and ascribe the first invention to man yet you  will rather believe that prometheus first stroke the flint and marvel at the  spark than that when he first stroke the flint he expect the spark and  therefore we see the west Indian prometheus have no intelligence with the  European because of the rareness with they of flint that give the first  occasion so as it shall seem that hitherto man be rather behold to a wild goat  for surgery or to a nightingale for music or to the ibis for some part of  physic or to the potlid that fly open for artillery or general to chance or  anything else than to logic for the invention of be and science neither be the  from of invention which Virgil describe much other ut  A small city of the Sabines use meditand to beat out be little by little for  if you observe the word well it be no other method than that which bruit beast  be capable of and do put in ure which be a perpetual intend or practice some  one thing urge and impose by a absolute necessity of conservation of be for so  Cicero say very true use uni rei to give away et nature et arm often bind and  therefore if it be say of man labour all bind not good et hardships  roll up  in rebus need it be likewise say of beast quis parrot to cause to know suum  who teach the raven in a drought to throw pebble into a hollow tree where she  spy water that the water may rise so as she may come to it who teach the be to  sail through such a vast sea or air and to find the way from a field in a  flower a great way off to her hive who teach the ant to bite every grain of  corn that she bury in her hill lest it shall take root and grow add then the  word to beat out which import the extreme difficulty and the word  little by little which import the extreme slowness and we be where we be even  among the Egyptians God there be little leave to the faculty of reason and  nothing to the duty or be for matter of invention second the induction which  the logician speak of and which seem familiar with Plato whereby the principle  of science may be pretend to be invent and so the middle proposition by  derivation from the principle their from of induction I say be utter vicious  and incompetent wherein their error be the foul because it be the duty of be  to perfect and exalt nature but they contrariwise have wrong abuse and traduce  nature for he that shall attentive observe how the mind do gather this  excellent due of knowledge like unto that which the poet speak of copper coin  honey divinity dona distil and contrive it out of particular natural and  artificial as the flower of the field and garden shall find that the mind of  herself by nature do manage and act a induction much better than they describe  it for to conclude upon a enumeration of particular without instance  contradictory be no conclusion but a conjecture for who can assure in many  subject upon those particular which appear of a side that there be not other  on the contrary side which appear not as if Samuel shall have rest upon those  son of Jesse which be bring before he and fail of David which be in the field  and this from to say truth be so gross as it have not be possible for wit so  subtle as have manage these thing to have offer it to the world but that they  haste to their theory and dogmaticals and be imperious and scornful towards  particular which their manner be to use but as lictor and traveler for  sergeant and whiffler and summovend commotion to make way and make room for  their opinion rather than in their true use and service certain it be a thing  may touch a man with a religious wonder to see how the footstep of seducement  be the very same in divine and human truth for as in divine truth man can  endure to become as a child so in human they repute the attend the induction  whereof we speak as if it be a second infancy or childhood three allow some  principle or axiom be right induce yet nevertheless certain it be that middle  proposition can be deduce from they in subject of nature by syllogism that be  by touch and reduction of they to principle in a middle term it be true that  in science popular as morality law and the like yea and divinity because it  please God to apply himself to the capacity of the simple that from may have  use and in natural philosophy likewise by way of argument or satisfactory  reason who assent make ready need effaeta be but the subtlety of nature and  operation will not be enchain in those bind for argument consist of  proposition and proposition of word and word be but the current token or mark  of popular notion of thing which notion if they be gross and variably collect  out of particular it be not the laborious examination either of consequence of  argument or of the truth of proposition that can ever correct that error be as  the physician speak in the first digestion and therefore it be not without  cause that so many excellent philosopher become sceptic and academic and deny  any certainty of knowledge or comprehension and hold opinion that the  knowledge of man extend only to appearance and probability it be true that in  Socrates it be suppose to be but a from of irony knowledge to make unlike  to make like for he use to disable his knowledge to the end to enhance his  knowledge like the humour of Tiberius in his beginning that will reign but  will not acknowledge so much and in the late academy which Cicero embrace this  opinion also of acatalepsia I doubt be not hold sincere for that all those  which excel in copy of speech seem to have choose that sect as that which be  fit to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourse be rather like  progress of pleasure than journey to a end but assure many scatter in both  academy do hold it in subtlety and integrity but here be their chief error  they charge the deceit upon the sense which in my judgement notwithstanding  all their a jeering be very sufficient to certify and report truth though not  always immediate yet by comparison by help of instrument and by produce and  urge such thing as be too subtle for the sense to some effect Comprehensible  by the sense and other like assistance but they ought to have charge the  deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual power and upon the manner of  collect and conclude upon the report of the sense this I speak not to disable  the mind of man but to stir it up to seek help for no man be he never so  cunning or practice can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness  of hand which may be easy do by help of a ruler or compass this part of  invention concern the invention of science I purpose if God give I leave  hereafter to propound have digest it into two part whereof the one I term  a trial literata and the other interpretation nature the former be but a  degree and rudiment of the latter but I will not dwell too long nor speak too  great upon a promise the invention of speech or argument be not proper a  invention for to invent be to discover that we know not and not to recover or  resummon that which we already know and the use of this invention be no other  but out of the knowledge whereof our mind be already possess to draw forth or  call before we that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into  our consideration so as to speak true it be no invention but a remembrance or  suggestion with a application which be the cause why the school do place it  after judgement as subsequent and not precedent nevertheless because we do  account it a chase as well of deer in a enclose park as in a forest at large  and that it have already obtain the name let it be call invention so as it be  perceive and discern that the scope and end of this invention be readiness and  present use of our knowledge and not addition or amplification thereof to  procure this ready use of knowledge there be two course preparation and  suggestion the former of these seem scarce a part of knowledge consist rather  of diligence than of any artificial erudition and herein Aristotle witty but  hurtful do deride the sophist near his time say they do as if one that profess  the be of shoemaking shall not teach how to make up a shoe but only exhibit in  a readiness a number of shoe of all fashion and size but yet a man may reply  that if a shoemaker shall have no shoe in his shop but only work as he be  bespeak he shall be weak custom but our saviour speak of divine knowledge say  that the kingdom of heaven be like a good householder that bring forth both  new and old store and we see the ancient writer of rhetoric do give it in  precept that pleader shall have the place whereof they have most continual use  ready handle in all the variety that may be as that to speak for the literal  interpretation of the law against equity and contrary and to speak for  presumption and inference against testimony and contrary and Cicero himself be  break unto it by great experience deliver it plain that whatsoever a man shall  have occasion to speak of if he will take the pain he may have it in effect  premeditate and handle in proposition so that when he come to a particular he  shall have nothing to do but to put to name and time and place and such other  circumstance of individual we see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes  who in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into cause have  to make a good impression have ready frame a number of preface for oration and  speech all which authority and precedent may overweigh aristotle's opinion  that will have we change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears but the nature  of the collection of this provision or preparatory store though it be common  both to logic and rhetoric yet have make a entry of it here where it come  first to be speak of I think fit to refer over the further handle of it to  rhetoric the other part of invention which I term suggestion do assign and  direct we to certain mark or place which may excite our mind to return and  produce such knowledge as it have former collect to the end we may make use  thereof neither be this use true take only to furnish argument to dispute  probable with other but likewise to minister unto our judgement to conclude  aright within ourselves neither may these place serve only to apprompt our  invention but also to direct our inquiry for a faculty of wise interrogate be  half a knowledge for as Plato say whosoever seek know that which he seek for  in a general notion else how shall he know it when he have find it and  therefore the large your anticipation be the more direct and Compendious be  your search but the same place which will help we what to produce of that  which we know already will also help we if a man of experience be before we  what question to ask or if we have book and author to instruct we what point  to search and revolve so as I can report that this part of invention which be  that which the school call topic be deficient nevertheless topic be of two  sort general and special the general we have speak to but the particular have  be touch by some but reject general as inartificial and variable but leave the  humour which have reign too much in the school which be to be vain subtle in a  few thing which be within their command and to reject the rest I do receive  particular topic that be place or direction of invention and inquiry in every  particular knowledge as thing of great use be mixture of logic with the matter  of science for in these it hold ars to come upon advances come invention for  as in go of a way we do not only gain that part of the way which be pass but  we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remain so every degree  of proceed in a science give a light to that which follow which light if we  strengthen by draw it forth into question or place of inquiry we do great  advance our pursuit XIV now we pass unto the be of judgement which handle the  nature of proof and demonstration which as to induction have a coincidence  with invention for all induction whether in good or vicious from the same  action of the mind which invent judge all one as in the sense but otherwise it  be in proof by syllogism for the proof be not immediate but by mean the  invention of the mean be one thing and the judgement of the consequence be  another the one excite only the other examine therefore for the real and exact  from of judgement we refer ourselves to that which we have speak of  interpretation of nature for the other judgement by syllogism as it be a thing  most agreeable to the mind of man so it have be vehement end excellent labour  for the nature of man do extreme covet to have somewhat in his understanding  fix and unmovable and as a rest and support of the mind and therefore as  Aristotle endeavour to prove that in all motion there be some point quiescent  and as he elegant expound the ancient fable of Atlas that stand fix and bear  up the heaven from fall to be mean of the pole or axle tree of heaven  whereupon the conversion be accomplish so assure man have a desire to have a  Atlas or axle tree within to keep they from fluctuation which be like to a  perpetual peril of fall therefore man do hasten to set down some principle  about which the variety of their disputatious may turn so then this be of  judgement be but the reduction of proposition to principle in a middle term  the principle to be agree by all and exempt from argument the middle term to  be elect at the liberty of every man invention the reduction to be of two kind  direct and invert the one when the proposition be reduce to the principle  which they term a probation ostensive the other when the contradictory of the  proposition be reduce to the contradictory of the principle which be that  which they call per disadvantage or press a absurdity the number of middle  term to be as the proposition stand degree more or less remove from the  principle but this be have two several method of doctrine the one by way of  direction the other by way of caution the former frame and set down a true  from of consequence by the variation and deflection from which error and  inconsequences may be exact judge towards the composition and structure of  which from it be incident to handle the part thereof which be proposition and  the part of proposition which be simple word and this be that part of logic  which be comprehend in the analytic the second method of doctrine be introduce  for expedite use and assurance sake discover the more subtle from of sophism  and illaqueations with their to fall into contempt which be that which be term  elenches for although in the more gross sort of fallacy it happen as Seneca  make the comparison well as in juggle feat which though we know not how they  be do yet we know well it be not as it seem to be yet the more subtle sort of  they do not only put a man beside his answer but do many time abuse his  judgement this part concern elenches be excellent handle by Aristotle in  precept but more excellent by Plato in example not only in the person of the  sophist but even in Socrates himself who profess to affirm nothing but to  infirm that which be affirm by another have exact express all the from of  objection fallace and redargution and although we have say that the use of  this doctrine be for redargution yet it be manifest the degenerate and corrupt  use be for caption and contradiction which pass for a great faculty and no  doubt be of very great advantage though the difference be good which be make  between orator and sophister that the one be as the greyhound which have his  advantage in the race and the other as the hare which have her advantage in  the turn so as it be the advantage of the weak creature but yet further this  doctrine of elenches have a more ample latitude and extent than be perceive  namely unto diverse part of knowledge whereof some be labour and other omit  for first I conceive though it may seem at first somewhat strange that that  part which be variably refer sometime to logic sometime to metaphysic touch  the common adjunct of essence be but a a costly for the great sophism of all  sophism be equivocation or ambiguity of word and phrase special of such word  as be most general and intervene in every inquiry it seem to I that the true  and fruitful use leave vain subtlety and speculation of the inquiry of  majority minority priority posteriority identity diversity possibility act  totality part existence privation and the like be but wise caution against  ambiguity of speech so again the distribution of thing into certain tribe  which we call category or predicament be but caution against the confusion of  definition and division second there be a seducement that work by the strength  of the impression and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation not so much  perplex the reason as overrule it by power of the imagination but this part I  think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric but last there be  yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacy in the mind of man  which I find not observe or inquire at all and think good to place here as  that which of all other appertain most to rectify judgement the force whereof  be such as it do not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particular but  do more general and inward infect and corrupt the state thereof for the mind  of man be far from the nature of a clear and equal glass wherein the beam of  thing shall reflect accord to their true incidence nay it be rather like a  enchant glass full of superstition and imposture if it be not deliver and  reduce for this purpose let we consider the false appearance that be impose  upon we by the general nature of the mind behold they in a example or two as  first in that instance which be the root of all superstition namely that to  the nature of the mind of all man it be consonant for the affirmative or  active to affect more than the negative or privative so that a few time hit or  presence countervail ofttimes fail or absence as be well answer by Diagoras to  he that show he in neptune temple the great number of picture of such as have  escape shipwreck and have pay their vow to neptune say advice now you that  think it folly to invocate neptune in tempest yea but say Diagoras where be  they paint that be drown let we behold it in another instance namely that the  spirit of man be of a equal and uniform substance do usual suppose and feign  in nature a great equality and uniformity than be in truth hence it come that  the mathematician can satisfy themselves except they reduce the motion of the  celestial body to perfect circle reject spiral line and labour to be discharge  of eccentrics hence it come that whereas there be many thing in nature as it  be monodica Himself law yet the cogitation of man do feign unto they relative  parallel and conjugates whereas no such thing be as they have feign a element  of fire to keep square with earth water and air and the like nay it be not  credible till it be open what a number of fiction and fantasy the similitude  of human action and be together with the make of man common measure have bring  into natural philosophy not much better than the heresy of the  anthropomorphite breed in the cell of gross and solitary monk and the opinion  of Epicurus answerable to the same in heathenism who suppose the God to be of  human shape and therefore Velleius the Epicurean needs not to have ask why God  shall have adorn the heaven with star as if he have be a aedil one that shall  have set forth some magnificent show or play for if that great work master  have be of a human disposition he will have cast the star into some pleasant  and beautiful work and order like the fret in the roof of house whereas one  can scarce find a posture in square or triangle or straight line among such a  infinite number so differ a harmony there be between the spirit of man and the  spirit of nature let we consider again the false appearance impose upon we by  every man own individual nature and custom in that feign supposition that  Plato make of the cave for certain if a child be continue in a grot or cave  under the earth until maturity of age and come sudden abroad he will have  strange and absurd imagination so in like manner although our person live in  the view of heaven yet our spirit be include in the cave of our own complexion  and custom which minister unto we infinite error and vain opinion if they be  not recall to examination but hereof we have give many example in one of the  error or peccant humour which we run brief over in our first book and last let  we consider the false appearance that be impose upon we by word which be frame  and apply accord to the conceit and capacity of the vulgar sort and although  we think we govern our word and prescribe it well to speak ut vulgus  to discern by sense ut wise  man yet certain it be that word as a tartar bow  do shoot back upon the understanding of the wise and mighty entangle and  pervert the judgement so as it be almost necessary in all controversy and  disputation to imitate the wisdom of the mathematician in set down in the very  beginning the definition of our word and term that other may know how we  accept and understand they and whether they concur with we or no for it come  to pass for want of this that we be sure to end there where we ought to have  begin which be in question and difference about word to conclude therefore it  must be confess that it be not possible to divorce ourselves from these  fallacy and false appearance because they be inseparable from our nature and  condition of life so yet nevertheless the caution of they for all elenches as  be say be but caution do extreme import the true conduct of human judgement  the particular elenches or caution against these three false appearance I find  altogether deficient there remain one part of judgement of great excellency  which to I understanding be so slight touch as I may report that also  deficient which be the application of the differ kind of proof to the differ  kind of subject for there be but four kind of demonstration that be by the  immediate consent of the mind or sense by induction by syllogism and by  congruity which be that which Aristotle call demonstration in orb or circle  and not a the every of these have certain subject in the matter of science in  which respective they have chief use and certain other from which respective  they ought to be exclude and the rigour and curiosity in require the more  severe proof in some thing and chief the facility in content ourselves with  the more remiss proof in other have be among the great cause of detriment and  hindrance to knowledge the distribution and assignation of demonstration  accord to the analogy of science I note as deficient