Inference in Ordered Response Games with Complete Information.∗

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October 28, 2018

Abstract

We study econometric models of complete information games with ordered action spaces, such as the number of stores operated in a market by a firm, or the daily number of flights on a city-pair offered by an airline. The model generalizes single agent models such as ordered probit and logit to a simultaneous equations model of ordered response, allowing for multiple equilibria and set identification. We characterize identified sets for model parameters under mild shape restrictions on agents’ payoff functions. We then propose a novel inference method for a parametric version of our model based on a test statistic that embeds conditional moment inequalities implied by equilibrium behavior. The behavior of our test statistic depends upon the set of conditional moments that are close to binding in the sample, but bypasses the need for explicit inequality selection by embedding a thresholding sequence that enables automatic adaptation to the contact set. We show that an asymptotically valid confidence set is attained by employing an easy to compute fixed critical value, namely the appropriate quantile of a chi-square random variable. We apply our method to study the number of stores operated by Lowe’s and Home Depot in geographic markets, and perform inference on various quantities of economic interest, such as the probability that any given outcome is an equilibrium, the propensity with which any particular outcome is selected among multiple equilibria, and counterfactual store configurations under both collusive and monopolistic regimes.

Keywords: Discrete games, ordered response, partial identification, conditional moment inequalities.

∗This paper is a revised version of the 2013 CeMMAP working paper CWP33/13. We have benefited from comments from seminar audiences at NYU, Berkeley, UCLA, Cornell, and the June 2013 conference on Recent Contributions to Inference on Game Theoretic Models co-sponsored by CeMMAP and the Breen Family Fund at Northwestern. We thank Eleni Aristodemou, Andrew Chesher, Jeremy Fox, Ariel Pakes, Aureo de Paula, Elie Tamer, and especially Francesca Molinari for helpful discussion and suggestions. Adam Rosen gratefully acknowledges financial support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council through a grant (RES-589-28-0001) to the ESRC Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (CeMMAP) and through the funding of the “Programme Evaluation for Policy Analysis” node of the UK National Centre for Research Methods, from the European Research Council (ERC) grant ERC-2009-StG-240910-ROMETA, and from a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship.
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1 Introduction

This paper provides set identification and inference results for a model of simultaneous ordered response in which multiple economic agents simultaneously choose actions from a discrete ordered action space. Agents have complete information regarding each others’ payoff functions, which depend on both their own and their rivals’ actions. Agents’ payoff-maximizing choices are observed by the econometrician, whose goal is to infer latent payoff functions and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Given the degree of heterogeneity allowed and the dependence of each agent’s payoffs on rivals’ actions, the model generally admits multiple equilibria. We remain agnostic as to equilibrium selection, thus rendering the model incomplete, and its parameters set identified.

Our model can be used for econometric analysis of complete information games in which players’ actions are discrete and ordered. Our motivation lies in application to models of firm entry. Typically, empirical models of firm entry have either allowed for only binary entry decisions, or have placed restrictions on firm heterogeneity that limit strategic interactions. Yet in many contexts firms may decide not only whether to be in a market, but also how many stores to operate, which may reflect important information on firm profitability, and in particular on strategic interactions. Such information could be lost by only modeling whether the firm is present in the market and not additionally how many stores it operates. Consider, for example, a setting in which there are two firms, A and B, with \((a, b)\) denoting the number of stores each operates in a given market. Observations of \((a, b) = (1, 3)\) or \((a, b) = (3, 1)\) are intrinsically different from observations with e.g. \((a, b) = (2, 2)\), the latter possibly reflecting less firm heterogeneity or more fierce competition relative to either of the former. Yet each of these action profiles appear identical when only firm presence is considered, as then they would all be coded as \((a, b) = (1, 1)\).

Classical single-agent ordered response models such as the ordered probit and logit have the property that, conditional on covariates, the observed outcome is weakly increasing in an unobservable payoff-shifter. Our model employs shape restrictions on payoff functions that deliver an analogous property for each agent. These restrictions facilitate straightforward characterization of regions of unobservable payoff shifters over which observed model outcomes are feasible. This in turn enables the transparent development of a system of conditional moment equalities and inequalities that characterize the identified set of agents’ payoff functions.

When the number of actions and/or players is sufficiently large, characterization of the identified set can comprise a computationally overwhelming number of moment inequalities. While ideally one would wish to exploit all of these moment restrictions in order to produce the sharpest possible

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1 See e.g. Berry and Reiss (2006) for a detailed overview of complications that arise from and methods for dealing with heterogeneity in such models.
set estimates, this may in some cases be infeasible. We thus also characterize outer sets that embed a subset of the full set of moment inequalities. Use of these outer sets can be computationally much easier for estimation and, as shown in our application, can sometimes achieve economically meaningful inference.

We apply a parametric version of our model to study capacity decisions (number of stores) in geographic markets by Lowe’s and Home Depot. If pure-strategy behavior is maintained, a portion of the parameters of interest are point-identified under mild conditions. We provide point estimates for these and then apply a novel inference procedure by additionally exploiting conditional moment inequalities (CMI) implied by the model\(^2\). In applications primary interest does not always rest on model parameters, but rather quantities of economic interest which can typically be written as (possibly set-valued) functions of these parameters. We illustrate in our application how our model also allows us to perform inference on such quantities, such as the likelihood that particular action profiles are equilibria, and the propensity of the underlying equilibrium selection mechanism to choose any particular outcome among multiple equilibria.

The application reveals several substantive findings. When entry by only Lowe’s is one of multiple equilibria, there is a much higher propensity for Lowe’s to be the sole entrant than there is for Home Depot to be the sole entrant when that outcome is one of multiple equilibria. We find a greater propensity for the symmetric outcome \((1,1)\) to obtain when it is one of multiple equilibria than it is for either \((0,1)\) or \((1,0)\) to occur when either of those are one of multiple equilibria. Among an array of counterfactual experiments performed under different equilibrium selection rules, we find that those favoring selection of more symmetric outcomes better match features of the observed data than do more asymmetric selection rules. We perform experiments to investigate market configurations under counterfactual scenarios in which (i) the firms behave cooperatively, and (ii) each firm is a monopolist. Results indicate that if Lowe’s were a monopolist it would operate in many geographic regions where currently only Home Depot is present, while in contrast there are many markets in which only Lowe’s is currently present where Home Depot would choose not to open a store. It thus appears that many more markets would go unserved were Home Depot a monopolist than if Lowe’s were a monopolist. This seems consistent with the casual observation that, relative to Lowe’s, Home Depot targets its brand more to professional customers such as building contractors and construction managers rather than nonprofessional homeowners, at least if there are rural markets that possess only a very small number of professional customers.

Our method for inference shares some conceptual similarities to other CMI criterion function based approaches such as those of Andrews and Shi (2013), Lee, Song, and Whang (2013, 2014),

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\(^2\) Other recent papers that feature set identification with a point-identified component but with different approaches include Kaido and White (2014), Kline and Tamer (2013), Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014), and Shi and Shum (2014). The first of these focuses primarily on consistent set estimation, with subsampling suggested for inference. The other three papers provide useful and widely applicable approaches for inference based on unconditional moment inequalities, but do not cover inference based on conditional moment inequalities with continuous conditioning variables, as encountered here.
Armstrong (2014, 2015), Chetverikov (2012), and Armstrong and Chan (2013). But with two important differences. The first difference regards the scaling of moment inequality violations. The procedures cited above use statistics that measure empirical violations of CMIs scaled by their standard errors. The statistic here instead first aggregates these violations, and then scales the aggregate violation. Specifically, the aggregate inequality violation is taken together with the equality violations in a quadratic form, using their inverse variance matrix as weights. When evaluated at any \( \theta \) in the region of interest, this statistic is asymptotically distributed chi-square. If none of the conditional moment inequalities are satisfied with equality with positive probability for the given \( \theta \), then only the moment equalities contribute to the asymptotic distribution, which is chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of such equalities. If, however, any of the conditional moment inequalities are satisfied with equality with positive probability, then there is an additional contribution to the asymptotic distribution. Nonetheless, appropriate scaling ensures the statistic remains asymptotically distributed chi-square, but with degrees of freedom increased by one due to the contribution of the binding moment inequalities.

The second key difference is that our test statistic adapts automatically to the “contact set” of values of conditioning variables on which moment inequalities bind. Like other approaches in the literature, the behavior our test statistic depends on the behavior of sample moments that are close to binding. Other approaches in the literature either adopt a conservative approach based on a least favorable configuration or estimate the contact set or use moment selection to appropriately calibrate critical values. Our test statistic instead incorporates a thresholding sequence that enables it to automatically adapt to “pick up” only those inequalities that are close to binding in the sample. See Section 5 for details.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.1 we discuss the related literature on econometric models of discrete games. In Section 2 we define the structure of the underlying complete information game and shape restrictions on payoff functions. In Section 3 we derive observable implications, including characterization of the identified set and computationally simpler outer sets. In Section 4 we provide specialized results for a parametric model of a two player game with strategic substitutes, including point identification of a subset of model parameters. In Section 5 we then introduce our approach for inference on elements of the identified set. In Section 7 we apply our method to model capacity (number of stores) decisions by Lowe’s and Home Depot. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.

The scale factor employs a truncation sequence to ensure that it is bounded away from zero, similar to that used by Armstrong (2014) when scaling individual moment inequality violations. Armstrong (2014) shows that for a test based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic this can lead to improvements in estimation rates and local asymptotic power relative to using bounded weights. For the statistic considered here, which is based on aggregate moment inequality violations, truncation by a decreasing sequence ensures that the violation is asymptotically weighted by its inverse standard error, which is used to establish the asymptotic validity of fixed chi-square critical values.
1.1 Related Literature on Econometric Models of Games

Our research follows the strand of literature on empirical models of entry initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991a), and Berry (1992). Additional early papers on the estimation of complete information discrete games include Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b). These models often allow the possibility of multiple or even no equilibria for certain realizations of unobservables, and the related issues of coherency and completeness have been considered in a number of papers, going back at least to Heckman (1978), see Chesher and Rosen (2012) for a thorough review. Berry and Tamer (2007) discuss the difficulties these problems pose for identification in entry models, in particular with heterogeneity in firms’ payoffs, and Berry and Reiss (2006) survey the various approaches that have been used to estimate such models.

The approach we take in this paper, common in the recent literature, is to abstain from imposing further restrictions simply to complete the model. Rather, we work with observable implications that may only set identify the model parameters. In the context of entry games with multiple equilibria, this idea was initially proposed by Tamer (2003), who showed how an incomplete simultaneous equations binary choice model implies a system of moment equalities and inequalities that can be used for estimation and inference. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) apply this approach to an entry model of airline city-pairs, employing inferential methods from Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004) also consider a bounds approach to the estimation of entry games, based on necessary conditions for equilibrium. Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) show how empirical models of games in industrial organization can generally lead to moment inequalities, and provide an empirical example based on Ishii (2005), which we discuss below. Aradillas-López and Tamer (2008) show how weaker restrictions than Nash Equilibrium, in particular rationalizability and finite levels of rationality, can be used to set identify the parameters of discrete games. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) use techniques from random set theory to elegantly characterize the identified set of model parameters in a class of models including entry games. Galichon and Henry (2011) use optimal transportation theory to likewise achieve a characterization of the identified set applicable to discrete games. Chesher and Rosen (2012) build on concepts in both of these papers to compare identified sets obtained from alternative approaches to deal with incompleteness and in particular incoherence in simultaneous discrete outcome models. What primarily distinguishes our work from most of the aforementioned papers is the particular focus on a simultaneous discrete model with non-binary, ordered outcomes.

Also related are a recent strand of papers on network economies faced by chain stores when setting their store location profiles, including Jia (2008), Holmes (2011), Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins (2013), and Nishida (2015). These papers study models that allow for the measurement of payoff externalities from store location choices across different markets, which, like most of the aforementioned literature, our model does not incorporate. On the other hand, our model incorporates aspects that these do not, by both not imposing an equilibrium selection rule and by
allowing for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity.\footnote{Of the papers in this literature, only Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins (2013) and Nishida (2015) also allow an ordered but non-binary within-market action space. Nishida (2015), in similar manner to Jia (2008), employs an equilibrium selection rule to circumvent the identification problems posed by multiple equilibria. We explicitly allow for multiple equilibria, without imposing restrictions on equilibrium selection. Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins (2013) allow for multiple equilibria and partial identification, but employ a very different payoff structure. In particular, they model unobserved heterogeneity in market-level payoffs through a single scalar unobservable shared by all firms. In our model, within each market each firm has its own unobservable.}

Some other recent papers specifically consider alternative models of ordered response with endogeneity. Davis (2006) considers a simultaneous equations model with a game-theoretic foundation, employing enough additional structure on equilibrium selection so as to complete the model and achieve point-identification. Ishii (2005) studies ATM networks, using a structural model of a multi-stage game that enables estimation of banks’ revenue functions via GMM. These estimates are then used to estimate bounds for a single parameter that measures the cost of ATMs in equilibrium. Chesher (2010) provides set identification results for a single equation ordered response model with endogenous regressors and instrumental variables. Here we exploit the structure provided by the simultaneous (rather than single equation) model. Aradillas-López (2011) and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2013) also consider simultaneous models of ordered response. In contrast to this paper, Aradillas-López (2011) focusses on nonparametric estimation of bounds on Nash outcome probabilities, and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2013) on a model with incomplete information. The parametric structure imposed here allows us to conduct inference on economic quantities of interest and perform counterfactual experiments that are beyond the scope of those papers.

## 2 The Model

Our model consists of $J$ economic agents or players $\mathcal{J} = \{1, \ldots, J\}$ who each simultaneously choose an action $Y_j$ from the ordered action space $\mathcal{Y}_j = \{0, \ldots, M_j\}$. Each set $\mathcal{Y}_j$ is discrete but $M_j$ can be arbitrarily large, possibly infinite. $Y \equiv (Y_1, \ldots, Y_J)'$ denotes the action profile of all $J$ players, and for any player $j \in \mathcal{J}$ we adopt the common convention that $Y_{-j}$ denotes the vector of actions of $j$’s rivals, $Y_{-j} \equiv (Y_1, \ldots, Y_{j-1}, Y_{j+1}, \ldots, Y_J)'$. As shorthand we sometimes write $(Y_j, Y_{-j})'$ to denote an action profile $Y$ with $j^{th}$ component $Y_j$ and all other components given by $Y_{-j}$. We use $\mathcal{Y} \equiv \mathcal{Y}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{Y}_J$ to denote the space of feasible action profiles, and for any player $j$, $\mathcal{Y}_{-j} \equiv \mathcal{Y}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{Y}_{j-1} \times \mathcal{Y}_{j+1} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{Y}_J$ to denote the space of feasible rival action profiles.

The actions of each agent are observed across a large number $n$ of separate environments, e.g. markets, networks, or neighborhoods. The payoff of action $Y_j$ for each agent $j$ is affected by observable and unobservable payoff shifters $X_j \in \mathcal{X}_j \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{k_j}$ and $U_j \in \mathbb{R}$, respectively, as well as their rivals’ actions $Y_{-j}$. We assume throughout that $(Y, X, U)$ are realized on a probability space \footnote{That is, the actions are labeled from 0 to $M_j$ from “smallest” too “largest”. For example, action $y_j + 1$ denotes the next action above action $y$. The action labels $0, \ldots, M_j$ are of ordinal but not cardinal significance, just as in models of single agent ordered response.}.
Payoffs are strictly concave in \( (\text{Shape Restrictions}) \): Payoff functions \((\text{Restriction SR})\) payoff shifters \((\text{positive density on } \mathbb{R})\) of \((\text{throughout that } \Pi)\) functions \((U)\) of observables \((Y,X)\) of \((\text{of } \Pi)\) functions in unobservables in single agent decision problems, implying that the optimal choice of \(\pi_j(y,x,u_j)\) aids identification analysis by guaranteeing the existence of intervals for \(\pi_j\) and \(\pi_j(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot) : Y \times X \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}\) satisfies: (i) Payoffs are strictly concave in \(y_j\):

\[
\forall y_j \in Y_j, \quad \pi_j ((y_j + 1, y_{-j}), x_j, u_j) - \pi_j ((y_j, y_{-j}), x_j, u_j) < \pi_j ((y_j, y_{-j}), x_j, u_j) - \pi_j ((y_j - 1, y_{-j}), x_j, u_j),
\]

where \(\pi_j(-1, x_j, u_j) = \pi_j(M_j + 1, x_j, u_j) = -\infty\). (ii) \(\forall (y_{-j}, x) \in Y_{-j} \times X\), \(\pi_j((y_j, y_{-j}), x, u_j)\) has strictly increasing differences in \((y_j, u_j)\), that is if \(u_j' > u_j\) and \(y_j' > y_j\), then

\[
\pi_j((y_j, y_{-j}), x, u_j) - \pi_j((y_j, y_{-j}), x, u_j) < \pi_j((y_j', y_{-j}), x, u_j') - \pi_j((y_j, y_{-j}), x, u_j').
\]

Restriction SR(i) imposes that marginal payoffs are decreasing in each player’s own action \(y_j\). It also implies that, for any fixed rival pure strategy profile \(y_{-j}\), agent \(j\)’s best response is unique with probability one. Restriction SR(ii) plays a similar role to the monotonicity of latent utility functions in unobservables in single agent decision problems, implying that the optimal choice of \(y_j\) is weakly increasing in unobservable \(u_j\), as in classical ordered choice models. This restriction aids identification analysis by guaranteeing the existence of intervals for \(u_j\) within which any \(y_j\) maximizes payoffs for any fixed \((y_{-j}, x)\).

We study models in which the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is restricted to be independent of payoff shifters. This restriction can be relaxed, see e.g. Kline (2012), though at the cost of weakening the identifying power of the model, or requiring stronger restrictions otherwise. **Restriction I (Independence):** \(U\) and \(X\) are stochastically independent, with the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity \(P_U\) belonging to some class of distributions \(P_U\).

A structure comprises a collection of payoff functions \((\pi_1, ..., \pi_J) \in \Pi\) satisfying Restrictions SR and I, and a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity \(P_U \in P_U\). Identification analysis aims to

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\[ 6 \]We impose random sampling for simplicity and expositional ease, but our results can be generalized to less restrictive sampling schemes. For instance our identification results require that \(P_0\) is identified, for which random sampling is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition.
deduce which structures \((\pi, P_U) \in \Pi \times \mathcal{P}_U\), and what relevant functionals of \((\pi, P_U)\) are compatible with \(P_0\). The collections \(\Pi\) and \(\mathcal{P}_U\) may each be parametrically, semiparametrically, or nonparametrically specified. If they are both parametrically specified, then \(\Pi\) and \(\mathcal{P}_U\) may be indexed by a finite dimensional parameter vector, say \(\theta\). Then each \(\theta\) in some given parameter space \(\Theta\) represents a unique structure \((\pi, P_U)\), and identification analysis reduces to deducing which \(\theta \in \Theta\) have associated structures \((\pi, P_U)\) are compatible with \(P_0\).

### 3 Equilibrium Behavior and Observable Implications

We assume that players have complete information and thus know the realizations of all payoff shifters \((X, U)\) when they choose their actions.\(^7\) We focus attention on Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) as our solution concept, although other solution concepts can be used with our inference approach. For example, mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium behavior can be readily handled through conditional moment inequalities that follow as special cases of the results in Aradillas-López (2011). In the working paper Aradillas-Lopez and Rosen (2014) we further describe an alternative behavioral model that nests Nash equilibrium (in either pure or mixed strategies) as a special case but that allows for incorrect beliefs, and we outline how our inference approach can then be applied.\(^8\)

We now formalize the restriction to PSNE behavior. Define each player \(j\)'s best response correspondence as

\[
y^*_j(y_{-j}, x_j, u_j) = \arg \max_{y_j \in Y_j} \pi_j((y_j, y_{-j}), x_j, u_j),
\]

which delivers the set of payoff maximizing alternatives \(y_j\) for player \(j\) as a function of \((y_{-j}, x_j, u_j)\).

**Restriction PSNE** (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium): With probability one, for all \(j \in J\),

\[Y_j = y^*_j(Y_{-j}, X_j, U_j).\]

Strict concavity of each player \(j\)'s payoff in her own action under Restriction SR(i) guarantees that \(y^*_j(y_{-j}, X_j, U_j)\) is unique with probability one for any \(y_{-j}\), though it does not imply that the equilibrium is unique. It also provides a further simplification of the conditions for PSNE.

**Lemma 1** Suppose Restriction SR(i) holds. Then Restriction PSNE holds if and only if

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\(^7\)For econometric analysis of incomplete information binary and ordered games see for example Aradillas-López (2010), de Paula and Tang (2012), Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2013) and the references therein.

\(^8\)One motivation for using alternative solution concepts is the possibility of non-existence of PSNE. However, in games in which all actions are strategic complements, or in 2 player games where actions are either strategic substitutes or complements, such as that used in our application, a PSNE always exists. This follows from observing that in these cases the game is supermodular, or can be transformed into an equivalent representation as a supermodular game. This was shown for the binary outcome game by Molinari and Rosen (2008), based on the reformulation used by Vives (1999, Chapter 2.2.3) for Cournot duopoly. Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, see e.g. Theorem 2.2 of Vives (1999) or Section 2.5 of Topkis (1998), then implies the existence of at least one PSNE.
probability one, for all \( j \in \mathcal{J} \),
\[
\pi_j (Y, X, U_j) \geq \max \{ \pi_j ((Y_j + 1, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j), \pi_j ((Y_j - 1, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j) \},
\]

where we define \( \pi_j ((-1, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j) = \pi_j ((M_j + 1, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j) = -\infty \).

The proof of Lemma 1 is simple and thus omitted. That Restriction PSNE implies (3.2) is immediate. The other direction follows from noting that if (3.2) holds then violation of (3.1) would contradict strict concavity of \( \pi_j ((y_j, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j) \) in \( y_j \).

We now characterize the identified set of structures \((\pi, P_U)\). Define
\[
\Delta \pi_j (Y, X, U_j) \equiv \pi_j (Y, X, U_j) - \pi_j ((Y_j - 1, Y_{-j}), X_j, U_j),
\]
as the incremental payoff of action \( Y_j \) relative to \( Y_j - 1 \) for any \((Y_{-j}, X, U_j)\). From Restriction SR (ii) we have that \( \Delta \pi_j (Y, X, U_j) \) is strictly increasing in \( U_j \) and thus invertible. Combining this with Lemma 1 allows us to deduce that for each player \( j \) there is for each \((y_{-j}, x)\) an increasing sequence of non-overlapping thresholds,
\[
\{ u^*_j (y_j, x) : y_j = 0, ..., M_j + 1 \}
\]
with
\[
u^*_j (M_j + 1, y_{-j}, x) = -\infty, u^*_j (0, y_{-j}, x) = \infty,
\]
such that
\[
y_j^* (y_{-j}, x, u_j) = y_j \iff u^*_j (y_j, y_{-j}, x) < u_j \leq u^*_j (y_j + 1, y_{-j}, x).
\]
That is, given \((y_{-j}, x)\), each player \( j \)'s best response \( y_j \) is uniquely determined by within which of the non-overlapping intervals \( \{ u^*_j (y_j, y_{-j}, x), u^*_j (y_j + 1, y_{-j}, x) \} \) unobservable \( U_j \) falls. It follows that with probability one
\[
U \in \mathcal{R}_\pi (Y, X) \equiv \times_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \{ u^*_j (Y_j, Y_{-j}, X), u^*_j (Y_j + 1, Y_{-j}, X) \}.
\]
In other words, \( Y \) is an equilibrium precisely if \( U \) belongs to the rectangle \( \mathcal{R}_\pi (Y, X) \).

The equilibrium implication (3.4) is the key implication that, when combined with previous set identification results in the literature – e.g. those of Galichon and Henry (2011), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), and Chesher and Rosen (2012, 2014) – delivers the identified set for \((\pi, P_U)\). Define for any set \( \tilde{\mathcal{Y}} \subseteq \mathcal{Y} \) and all \( x \in \mathcal{X} \),
\[
\mathcal{R}_\pi (\tilde{\mathcal{Y}}, x) \equiv \cup_{y \in \tilde{\mathcal{Y}}} \mathcal{R}_\pi (y, x),
\]
which is the union of all rectangles \( \mathcal{R}_\pi (y, x) \) across \( y \in \tilde{\mathcal{Y}} \), and
\[
\mathcal{R}^J (x) \equiv \{ \mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J : \mathcal{U} = \mathcal{R}_\pi (\tilde{\mathcal{Y}}, x) \text{ for some } \tilde{\mathcal{Y}} \subseteq \mathcal{Y} \}.
\]
to be the collection of all such unions for any \( x \in X \).

**Theorem 1** Let Restrictions SR, I, and PSNE hold. Then the identified set of structures is

\[
S^* = \{ (\pi, P_U) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{P}_U : \forall U \in R^U (x), P_U (U) \geq \mathbb{P}_0 [R_{\pi} (Y, X) \subseteq U | X = x] \text{ a.e. } x \in X \},
\]

(3.5)

where, for any \( x \in X \), \( R^U (x) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 (x) \) denotes the collection of sets

\[
R^U (x) \equiv \left\{ U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J : U = R_\pi (\tilde{Y}, x) \text{ for some } \tilde{Y} \subseteq Y \text{ such that } \forall \text{ nonempty } \tilde{Y}_1, \tilde{Y}_2 \subseteq Y \text{ with } \tilde{Y}_1 \cup \tilde{Y}_2 = \tilde{Y} \text{ and } \tilde{Y}_1 \cap \tilde{Y}_2 = \emptyset, P_U \left( R_\pi (\tilde{Y}_1, x) \cap R_\pi (\tilde{Y}_2, x) \right) > 0 \right\}.
\]

(3.6)

The characterization (3.5) applies results from Chesher and Rosen (2012, 2014) to express the identified set as those \((\pi, P_U)\) such that

\[
P_U (U) \geq \mathbb{P}_0 [R_{\pi} (Y, X) \subseteq U | X = x], \text{ a.e. } x \in X,
\]

over the collection of sets \( U \in R^U (x) \). The collection \( R^U (x) \) is a collection of core-determining test sets, as defined by Galichon and Henry (2011, Theorem 1), shown to be sufficient by Chesher and Rosen (2014, Theorem 3) to imply (3.5) for all closed \( U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^J \), thus ensuring sharpness. Applying those results here, and in particular using the implication that \( Y \) is a PSNE if and only if (3.4) holds, we see that the core-determining sets in this model comprise unions of rectangles in \( \mathbb{R}^2 \).

The identified set \( S^* \) expressed in (3.5) may comprise a rather large number of conditional moment inequalities, namely as many as belong to \( R^U (x) \), for each \( x \). More inequalities will in general produce smaller identified sets, but the use of a very large number of inequalities may pose a practical challenge, both with regard to the quality of finite sample approximations as well as computation. As stated in the following Corollary, consideration of those structures satisfying inequality (3.5) applied to an arbitrary sub-collection of those in \( \mathbb{R}^U (x) \), or indeed any arbitrary collection of sets in \( U \), will produce an outer region that contains the identified set.

**Corollary 1** Let \( U (x) : X \to 2^U \) map from values of \( x \) to collections of closed subsets of \( U \). Let

\[
S^* (U) = \{ (\pi, P_U) \in \Omega \times \mathcal{P}_U : \forall U \in U (x), P_U (U) \geq \mathbb{P}_0 [R_{\pi} (Y, X) \subseteq U | X = x] \text{ a.e. } x \in X \}.
\]

(3.7)

Then \( S^* \subseteq S^* (U) \).

Because \( S^* (U) \) contains the identified set, it can be used to estimate valid, but potentially non-sharp bounds on functionals of \((\pi, P_U)\), i.e. parameters of interest. Although \( S^* (U) \) is a larger...
set than $S^*$, its reliance on fewer inequalities can lead to significant computational gains for bound estimation and inference relative to the use of $S^*$. Even in cases where the researcher wishes to estimate $S^*$, it may be faster to first base estimation on $S^*(U)$ by then incorporating additional restrictions, either proceeding to use $S^*(U')$ for some superset $U'$ of $U$, or by using $S^*$ itself. Typically, checking the imposed inequality restrictions involves searching over a multi-dimensional parameter space, so the computational advantage can be substantial.

The difference between the size of the outer set $S^*(U)$ and the identified set may or may not be large. For a given collection of conditional moment inequalities defining $S^*(U)$, this will depend on the particular distribution of $(Y, X)$ at hand, and is thus an empirical question. In the two-player parametric model introduced in the following Section, and used in the application of Section 7, we show that a particular $U(\cdot)$ is sufficient to point identify all but three of the model parameters, and we are able to achieve useful inferences based on an outer region that makes use of this and other conditional moment restrictions.

### 4 A Two-Player Game of Strategic Substitutes

In this section we introduce a parametric specification satisfying Restriction SR for a two-player game with $J = \{1, 2\}$. We use this specification in our empirical application, and thus focus particular attention on analysis of this model. We continue to maintain Restrictions I and PSNE.

In this model, existence of at least one PSNE a.e. $(X, U)$, is guaranteed by e.g. Theorem 2.2 of Vives (1999) or Section 2.5 of Topkis (1998), as noted in Section 3.

#### 4.1 A Parametric Specification

For each $j \in J$ we specify

$$
\pi_j (Y, X_j, U_j) = Y_j \times (\delta + X_j \beta - \Delta_j Y_{-j} - \eta Y_j + U_j),
$$

(4.1)

where we impose the restriction that $\eta > 0$ to ensure that payoffs are strictly concave in $Y_j$, ensuring Restriction SR(i). Given this functional form, Restriction SR(ii) also holds. In this specification the parameters of the players’ payoff functions differ only in the interaction parameters $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$, both restricted to be nonnegative so that actions are strategic substitutes.

---

11 This will be valid a valid procedure if the researcher can ensure that the confidence sets are constructed such that one based on the first outer set contains the one based on the second set incorporating further restrictions with probability one.
Given this functional form, each player $j$’s best response function takes the form (3.3), where for all $\tilde{y}_j \in \{1, ..., M_j\}$,

$$u^*_j(\tilde{y}_j, y_{-j}, x_j) \equiv \eta (2\tilde{y}_j - 1) + \Delta_j y_{-j} - \delta - x_j \beta. \tag{4.2}$$

In addition we restrict the distribution of bivariate unobserved heterogeneity $U$ to the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula indexed by parameter $\lambda \in [-1, 1]$. Specifically $U_1$ and $U_2$ each have the logistic marginal CDF

$$G(u_j) = \frac{\exp(u_j)}{1 + \exp(u_j)}, \tag{4.3}$$

and their joint cumulative distribution function is

$$F(u_1, u_2; \lambda) = G(u_1) \cdot G(u_2) \cdot [1 + \lambda (1 - G(u_1)) (1 - G(u_2))]. \tag{4.4}$$

The parameter $\lambda$ measures the degree of dependence between $U_1$ and $U_2$ with correlation coefficient given by $\rho = 3\lambda/\pi^2$. This copula restricts the correlation to the interval $[-0.304, 0.304]$. This is clearly a limitation, but one which appears to be reasonable in our application in Section 7. Note that $\rho$ captures the correlation remaining after controlling for $X$. Thus with sufficiently many variables included in $X$ a low “residual” correlation may be reasonable. Naturally, we could use alternative specifications, such as bivariate normal, but the closed form of $F(u_1, u_2; \lambda)$ is easy to work with and provides computational advantages. Compared to settings with a single agent ordered choice model, our framework offers a generalization of the ordered logit model, whereas multivariate normal $U$ generalizes the ordered probit model.

For notational convenience we define $\alpha \equiv \eta - \delta$ and collect parameters into a composite parameter vector $\theta \equiv (\theta_1', \theta_2')'$ where $\theta_1 \equiv (\alpha, \beta', \lambda)'$ and $\theta_2 = (\eta, \Delta_1, \Delta_2)'$. We show in the following Section that under fairly mild conditions the parameter subvector $\theta_1$ is point identified, another advantage of the specification for the distribution of $U$ given in (4.4).

### 4.2 Observable Implications of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Given a parametric model, we re-express the sets $\mathcal{R}_\pi(Y, X)$ described in (3.4) as $\mathcal{R}_\theta(Y, X)$ in order to indicate explicitly their dependence on the finite-dimensional parameter $\theta$. It follows from (4.2)
that observed \((Y, X, U)\) correspond to PSNE if and only if \(U \in R_\theta (Y, X)\) where

\[
\mathcal{R}_\theta (Y, X) \equiv \left\{ u : \begin{array}{l}
\eta (2Y_1 - 1) + \Delta_1 Y_2 - \delta - X_1 \beta < u_1 \leq \eta (2Y_1 + 1) + \Delta_1 Y_2 - \delta - X_1 \beta \\
\eta (2Y_2 - 1) + \Delta_2 Y_1 - \delta - X_2 \beta < u_2 \leq \eta (2Y_2 + 1) + \Delta_2 Y_1 - \delta - X_2 \beta
\end{array} \right\}. \tag{4.5}
\]

and from Theorem 1 we have the inequality

\[
P_U (\mathcal{U}) \geq P_0 [\mathcal{R}_\theta (Y, X) \subseteq \mathcal{U} | X = x] \tag{4.6}
\]

for each \(\mathcal{U} \in R^U (x)\), a.e. \(x \in \mathcal{X}\) (see the definition of \(R^U (x)\) in (3.6)). However, it is straightforward to see that \(Y = (0, 0)\) is a PSNE if and only if

\[
U \in (−\infty, \alpha - X_1 \beta) \times (−\infty, \alpha - X_2 \beta). \tag{4.7}
\]

and that when this holds, \(Y = (0, 0)\) is the unique PSNE. This follows by the same reasoning as in the simultaneous binary outcome model, see for example Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) and Tamer (2003), and this observation implies that the conditional moment inequality (4.6) using \(U = (−\infty, \alpha - X_1 \beta) \times (−\infty, \alpha - X_2 \beta)\) in fact holds with equality. \(^{13}\)

Therefore with \(\beta \equiv (\alpha, \beta')'\), and \(Z_j \equiv (1, -X_j)\),

\[
P_0 [Y = (0, 0) | X = x] = F (Z_1 \beta, Z_2 \beta; \lambda), \tag{4.8}
\]

with \(F (Z_1 \beta, Z_2 \beta; \lambda)\) defined in (4.4). The log-likelihood for the event \(Y = (0, 0)\) and its complement is then

\[
\mathcal{L} (b, \lambda) = \sum_{i=1}^n \ell (b, \lambda; z_i, y_i), \tag{4.9}
\]

where

\[
\ell (b, \lambda; z, y) \equiv 1 [y = (0, 0)] \log F (z_1 b_1, z_2 b_2; \lambda) + 1 [y \neq (0, 0)] \log (1 - F (z_1 b_1, z_2 b_2; \lambda)).
\]

The following theorem establishes that under suitable conditions \(E [\mathcal{L} (b, \lambda)]\) is uniquely maximized at the population values for \(\hat{\beta}, \lambda\), which we denote \(\beta^*, \lambda^*\). Thus there is point identification of \(\theta_1\), which is consistently estimated by the maximizer of (4.9) at the parametric rate.

**Theorem 2** For each player \(j \in \{1, 2\}\) let payoffs take the form (4.1), with \(U \parallel X\), and let Restriction PSNE hold. Assume (i) \(\forall j \in \{1, 2\}\) there exists no proper linear subspace of the support of \(Z_j \equiv (1, -X_j)\) that contains \(Z_j\) \(wp1\), and (ii) For all conformable column vectors \(c_1, c_2\)

\(^{13}\)Indeed, this equality is implied by the set of inequalities that define the identified set \(S^*\) stated in Theorem 1. This is because those inequalities imply that (4.6) holds for both \(R_\theta ((0, 0), x)\) and its complement. Since these two sets partition \(R^'\), each side of the inequalities (4.6) applied to them sum to one, and it follows that both inequalities must hold with equality. See also Chesher and Rosen (2012) for general conditions whereby the inequality in (4.6) can be strengthened to equality in simultaneous equations discrete outcome models.
with $c_2 \neq 0$, either $\mathbb{P} \{ Z_2 c_2 \leq 0 | Z_1 c_1 < 0 \} > 0$ or $\mathbb{P} \{ Z_2 c_2 \geq 0 | Z_1 c_1 > 0 \} > 0$. Then:

1. If $U$ has known CDF $F$, then $\tilde{\beta}^*$ is identified. If the CDF of $U$ is only known to belong to some class of distribution functions $\{ F_\lambda : \lambda \in \Gamma \}$, then the identified set for $\left( \tilde{\beta}^*, \lambda^* \right)$ takes the form $\{(b(\lambda), \lambda) : \lambda \in \Gamma'\}$ for some function $b(\cdot) : \Gamma \to B$ and some $\Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma$.

2. If $U$ has CDF $F(\cdot ; \lambda)$ given in (4.4) for some $\lambda \in [-1, 1]$, then $\left( \tilde{\beta}^*, \lambda^* \right)$ is point identified and uniquely maximizes $E[\mathcal{L}(b, \lambda)]$. Moreover,

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \left( \hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1^* \right) \xrightarrow{d} N \left( 0, H_0^{-1} \right), \quad (4.10)$$

where

$$H_0 = E \left[ \frac{\partial \ell (\theta_1; Z, Y)}{\partial \theta_1} \frac{\partial \ell (\theta_1; Z, Y)}{\partial \theta_1}^T \right]. \quad (4.11)$$

Theorem 2 makes use of two conditions on the variation in $X$. The first condition is standard, requiring that for each $j$, $Z = (1, -X_j)$ is contained in no proper linear subspace with probability one. This rules out the possibility that $X$ contains a constant component. The second condition restricts the joint distribution of $Z_1$ and $Z_2$, requiring that conditional on $Z_j c_j < 0$ ($> 0$), $Z_{-j} c_{-j}$ is nonpositive (nonnegative) with positive probability. This condition guarantees that for any $b \neq \tilde{\beta}^*$ there exists a positive measure set of values for $Z$ such that the indices $z_1 b$ and $z_2 b$ are either both larger than or both smaller than each of $z_1 \tilde{\beta}^*$ and $z_2 \tilde{\beta}^*$, with at least one of the comparisons holding strictly. Thus, either $F \left( z_1 \tilde{\beta}^*, z_2 \tilde{\beta}^* ; \lambda \right) > F \left( z_1 b, z_2 b ; \lambda \right)$ or $F \left( z_1 \tilde{\beta}^*, z_2 \tilde{\beta}^* ; \lambda \right) < F \left( z_1 b, z_2 b ; \lambda \right)$. Condition (ii) is automatically satisfied under well-known semiparametric large support restrictions, for example that $X_j$ has a component $X_{jk}$ that, conditional on all other components of $X_j$, has everywhere positive density on $\mathbb{R}$, with $\beta_{1k} \neq 0$. However, it is a less stringent restriction and does not require large support. It does require an exclusion restriction, but can accommodate bounded and even discrete covariates.

The theorem establishes point identification of $\theta_1$ if the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is known. If instead the model restricts the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to a parametric family $\{ F_\lambda : \lambda \in \Gamma \}$, there is for each $\lambda \in \Gamma$ a unique $\beta = b(\lambda)$ that maximizes the expected log-likelihood for each $\lambda \in \Gamma$. Thus, the identified set for $\theta_1$ belongs to the set of pairs $(b(\lambda), \lambda)$ such that $\lambda \in \Gamma$. This can simplify characterization and estimation of the identified set, since for each $\lambda \in \Gamma$ there is only one value of $\beta$ to consider as a member of the identified set. Thus, for estimation, one need only scan over $\lambda \in \Gamma$ and compute the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator for each such value, rather than search over all values of $\beta \in B$. When $F_\lambda$ is restricted to the FGM family, there is in fact point identification of $\lambda^*$ and hence also of $\theta_1$, which can be consistently estimated via maximum likelihood using the coarsened outcome $1[Y = (0, 0)]$. The parameter vector $\theta_2 = (\eta, \Delta_1, \Delta_2)'$ remains in general partially identified.
5 Inference on the Full Parameter Vector

To perform inference on \( \theta \) we combine the results of Theorem 2 with conditional moment inequalities of the form (4.6). To characterize the asymptotic properties of our inference approach we introduce Restrictions I1-I6, which entail smoothness restrictions, bandwidth restrictions, and regularity conditions.

Our approach is based on “moment functions” \( m_k (Y, y, x; \theta) \) consisting of indicators over classes of sets, indexed by \( y, x \) and \( \theta \):

\[
m_k (Y, y, x; \theta) = 1 \left[ \mathcal{R}_\theta (Y, x) \subseteq \mathcal{U}_k (x, y; \theta) \right] - P_U \left( \mathcal{U}_k (x, y; \theta); \theta \right),
\]

where \( \mathcal{R}_\theta \) is the rectangle defined in (4.5). For values of \((y, x)\) we use those values \( (y_i, x_i) \) which are observed in the data. Test sets \( \mathcal{U}_k (x_i, y_i; \theta) \) – and hence the corresponding moment inequalities – are additionally indexed by both \( k = 1, \ldots, K \) and \( \theta \).

Define

\[
R (\theta) \equiv E \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} (T_k (Y, X; \theta))_+ \right], \quad T_k (y_i, x_i; \theta) \equiv E [m_k (Y, y_i, x_i; \theta) | X = x_i] \cdot f_X (x_i) \leq 0,
\]

where \( f_X (\cdot) \) is the density of \( x, (\cdot)_+ \equiv \max \{\cdot, 0\} \), and the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution of \((Y, X)\). The function \( R (\theta) \) is nonnegative, and positive only for \( \theta \) that violate the conditional moment inequality \( E [m_k (Y, y_i, x_i; \theta) | X = x_i] \leq 0 \) for some \( k = 1, \ldots, K \) with positive probability. For the purpose of inference we employ an estimator for \( R (\theta) \) that incorporates a kernel estimator, denoted \( \hat{T}_k (y, x; \theta) \), for \( T_k (Y, X; \theta) \), for each \( k = 1, \ldots, K \).

We assume throughout that each element of \( X \) has either a discrete or absolutely continuous distribution with respect to Lebesgue measure, and we write \( X = (X^d, X^c) \), where \( X^d \) denotes the discretely distributed components and \( X^c \) the continuously distributed components. For kernel-weighting we define

\[
K (x_i - x; h) \equiv K^c \left( \frac{x_i^c - x^c}{h} \right) \cdot 1 \left[ x_i^d = x^d \right],
\]

where \( K^c : \mathbb{R}^z \to \mathbb{R} \) is an appropriately defined kernel function. The estimators \( \hat{T}_k (y_i, x_i; \theta) \) are then defined as

\[
\hat{T}_k (y, x; \theta) \equiv \frac{1}{nh^z} \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_k (y_i, y, x_i; \theta) K (x_i - x; h).
\]

To establish desirable properties for these estimators we impose in Restriction I1 that the functions \( f_X (x) \) and \( T_k (y_i, x_i; \theta) \) be sufficiently smooth in the continuous components of \( x \). Restriction I2

---

The number of inequalities used can also be allowed to vary with \((y_i, x_i)\). In this case we could write \( K (y, x_i) \) for the number of conditional moment inequalities for \((y_i, x_i)\) and set \( m_k (Y, y_i, x_i; \theta) = 0 \) for each \( i, k \) with \( K (y_i, x_i) < k \leq \tilde{K} \equiv \max_i K (y_i, x_i) \).
contains our formal requirements for the kernel function and bandwidth sequences.

**Restriction I1** (Smoothness): As before, let $z \equiv \text{dim}(X^c)$. For some $M \geq 2z + 1$, uniformly in $(y, x) \in \text{Supp}(Y, X)$ and $\theta \in \Theta$, $f_X(x)$ and $T_k(y, x; \theta)$ are almost surely $M$-times continuously differentiable with respect to $x_c$, with bounded derivatives. ■

**Restriction I2** (Kernels and bandwidths): $K^c$ is a bias-reducing kernel of order $M$ with bounded support, exhibits bounded variation, is symmetric around zero, and $\sup_{v \in \mathbb{R}^z} |K(v)| \leq \bar{K} < \infty$. The positive bandwidth sequences $b_n$ and $h_n$ satisfy $n^{1/2}h_n^2b_n \to \infty$, and there exists $\epsilon > 0$, such that $h_n^{-z/2}b_n^{n\epsilon} \to 0$, and $n^{1/2+\epsilon}b_n^2 \to 0$. In addition, $M$ is large enough such that $n^{1/2+\epsilon}b_n^M \to 0$. ■

Our approach requires that the bias of each $\hat{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta)$ disappears uniformly at the same rate over the range of values of $x_i$ in the data. For this purpose we employ a trimming technique, making use of conditioning variables $x_i$ that belong to a pre-specified “set” $X^*$, such that the projection of $X^*$ onto $X^c$ is contained in the interior of the projection of $X$ onto $X^c$. In principle we could allow $X^*$ to depend on $n$ and approach $X$ at an appropriate rate as $n \to \infty$. For the sake of brevity, rather than formalize this argument, we presume fixed $X^*$ and state results for the convergence of $\hat{R}(\theta)$ to an appropriately re-defined $R(\theta)$:

$$R(\theta) \equiv E \left[ 1_X \sum_{k=1}^K (T_k(Y, X; \theta))^+ \right], \quad (5.3)$$

where $1_X \equiv 1 \{ x_i \in X_i^* \}$ is our trimming function.

In addition, our test statistic replaces the use of the function $(\cdot)^+ = \max \{ \cdot, 0 \}$ with the function $\max \{ \cdot, -b_n \}$ for an appropriately chosen sequence $b_n \searrow 0$. The estimator is thus of the form

$$\hat{R}(\theta) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \cdot 1 \left[ \hat{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \geq -b_n \right] \right).$$

The limiting distribution of our test statistic, like others in the literature, is driven by values of observable variables for which moment inequalities are satisfied with equality, i.e. the contact set:

$$\{(x, y) \in X^* \times Y : \exists k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \ s.t. \ T_k(y, x; \theta) = 0\}. \quad (5.4)$$

Several papers have proposed methods to explicitly detect the set of inequalities that are close to binding for the purpose of calibrating critical values. These include generalized moment selection as developed by Andrews and Soares (2010) and Andrews and Shi (2013), adaptive inequality selection as in Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), and the use of contact set estimators proposed by Lee, Song, and Whang (2014). These procedures also make use of tuning parameters.

In this paper the sequence $b_n$ is used to ensure that the sample criterion $\hat{R}(\theta)$ adapts automatically to the contact set, bypassing the need to estimate it explicitly or employ moment selection for computing critical values. If $\theta \in \Theta^*$ and $b_n$ is chosen to satisfy Restriction I2, then $b_n \searrow 0$ at a
slower rate than \( n^{-1/2} \) and \( \hat{R}(\theta) \) is asymptotically equivalent to

\[
\hat{R}^* (\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{Y_i \in \Theta} \sum_{k} \hat{T}_k (y_i, x_i, \theta) 1 \left[ b_n \leq \hat{T}_k (y_i, x_i, \theta) \geq -b_n \right],
\]

since \( \hat{T}_k (y_i, x_i, \theta) > b_n \) occurs with probability converging to zero. The statistic \( \hat{R}^* (\theta) \) sums over only those values of \((x, y)\) for which the moment inequalities are close to zero. If instead \( \theta \notin \Theta^* \), the statistic \( \hat{R}(\theta) \) is preferred to \( \hat{R}^* (\theta) \) because \( \hat{R}(\theta) \geq \hat{R}^* (\theta) \). It is thus asymptotically equivalent to \( \hat{R}^* (\theta) \) for \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), but can provide better power when \( \theta \notin \Theta^* \).

The use of \( b_n \) in the objective function effects the way in which violations of the population inequalities \( T_k (y, x, \theta) \geq 0 \) are measured. This is because in finite samples, whenever \( 0 > \hat{T}_k (y, x, \theta) \geq -b_n \), the \( k \)th term in the sum that defines \( \hat{R}(\theta) \) is strictly negative. Thus, in finite samples, there can be values of \( \theta \) for which \( \hat{R}(\theta) < 0 \) if there are moments \( \hat{T}_k (y, x, \theta) \) that satisfy the inequality \( \hat{T}_k (y, x, \theta) \leq 0 \), but that are close to violating it.

Two restrictions ensure that the effect of \( b_n \) is sufficiently small so that this does not occur asymptotically, such that uniform consistency of \( \hat{R}(\theta) \) for \( R(\theta) \) is preserved. The first of these restrictions is that \( b_n \downarrow 0 \) at a suitable rate, as specified in Restriction I2. The second such restriction, formalized now as Restriction I3, is that for each \( T_k (Y, X, \theta) \) and sufficiently large \( n \) (and thus sufficiently small \( b_n \)) the probability of the event \( 0 > \hat{T}_k (Y, X, \theta) \geq -b_n \) is not “too big”.

**Restriction I3** (Behavior of \( T_k (Y, X, \theta) \) at zero from below): There are constants \( \tilde{b} > 0 \) and \( \tilde{A} < \infty \) such that for sufficiently large \( n \), for all positive \( b < \tilde{b} \) and each \( k = 1, \ldots, K \):

\[
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta} \mathbb{P} (-b \leq T_k (Y, X; \theta) < 0) \leq b \tilde{A}.
\]

This restriction ensures that

\[
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta} \left( R(\theta) - \hat{R}(\theta) \right)_+ = O_p (1/\tau_n) \tag{5.5}
\]

for some sequence \( \tau_n \rightarrow \infty \). Such uniform consistency conditions are a standard requirement for consistency of extremum estimators, and the condition here corresponds to that of condition C.1(d) of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), in this paper’s notation.

Restriction I3 is a relatively mild requirement, because whenever \( 0 > \hat{T}_k (Y, X, \theta) \geq -b_n \), then \( \left| \hat{T}_k (Y, X, \theta) \right| < b_n \downarrow 0 \). For instance, for the probability of \( 0 > \hat{T}_k (Y, X, \theta) \geq -b_n \) to not be “too big” as stated in Restriction I3, it suffices simply that the density of \( T_k (Y, X, \theta) \) be bounded by some finite \( \tilde{A} \) in the range \( 0 > \hat{T}_k (Y, X, \theta) \geq -\tilde{b} \) for some fixed but arbitrarily small \( \tilde{b} > 0 \). This restriction admits the possibility that \( \mathbb{P} (T_k (Y, X; \theta) = 0) > 0 \), and it also allows the distribution of \( T_k (Y, X; \theta) \) to have mass points. Figure [4] provides three illustrations to further clarify which
types of discontinuities in the distribution of $T_k(Y, X, \theta)$ are permitted.

We next state Restriction I4 requiring manageability of relevant empirical processes, as defined in Definition 7.9 of Pollard (1990).

**Restriction I4 (Manageability of Empirical Processes I):** For each $k = 1, \ldots, K$, (i) the process $\mathcal{M} \equiv \{ m_k(Y_i, y, x; \theta) \cdot K(X_i - x; h) : (y, x, \theta) \in \text{Supp}(Y, X) \times \Theta, h > 0, 1 \leq i \leq n \}$ is manageable with respect to the constant envelope $\bar{K} \equiv \sup_{v \in R} K^c(v; h)$, and (ii) there exists a $\bar{c} > 0$ such that the process $I \equiv \{ 1 \{ -\bar{c} \leq T_k(Y_i, X_i; \theta) < 0 \} : \theta \in \Theta, 0 < c < \bar{c}, 1 \leq i \leq n \}$ is manageable with respect to the constant envelope 1.

Sufficient conditions for manageability are well-established in the empirical process literature. For example, if the kernel function $K^c$ is of bounded variation then Lemma 22 in Nolan and Pollard (1987) and Lemmas 2.4 and 2.14 in Pakes and Pollard (1989) imply that the the class of functions $\{ K(x - v; h) : v \in \mathcal{X}, h > 0 \}$ is Euclidean, as defined in Pakes and Pollard (1989) Definition 2.7, with respect to the constant envelope $\bar{K}$. From here, manageability of $\mathcal{M}$ follows, for example, if the classes of functions $\{ g(y) = m_k(y, y', x; \theta) : (y, x, \theta) \in \mathcal{S}_{Y, X} \}$ are Euclidean with respect to the constant envelope $1$. Sufficient conditions for this property can also be found in Nolan and Pollard (1987) and Pakes and Pollard (1989), for example.

Likewise, sufficient conditions for manageability of $I$ can be established, for example, if the class of sets $\Psi_k \equiv \{(y, x) \in \mathcal{S}_{Y, X} : -\bar{c} \leq T_k(y, x; \theta) < 0, \theta \in \Theta, 0 < c < \bar{c} \}$ have polynomial discrimination (see Pollard (1984) Definition 13) of degree at most $r < \infty$. Lemma 1 of Asparouhova, Golanski, Kasprzyk, Sherman, and Asparouhov (2002) provides a sufficient condition for this to hold, namely that the number of points at which $T_k(y, x; \cdot)$ changes sign be uniformly bounded over $(y, x) \in \mathcal{S}_{Y, X}$ and $k = 1, \ldots, K$.

Consider now

$$
\hat{R}(\theta) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{\mathcal{X}_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \hat{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \cdot 1 \{ T_k(y_i, x_i, \theta) \geq 0 \} \right), 
$$

which is equivalent to $\hat{R}(\theta)$ but for the replacement of $1 \left\{ \hat{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \geq -b_n \right\}$ with $1 \{ T_k(y_i, x_i, \theta) \geq 0 \}$.

With the following Lemma we establish that $\bar{R}(\theta)$ and $\hat{R}(\theta)$ differ by no more than $o_p(n^{-1/2})$ uniformly in $\theta$.

**Lemma 2** Let Restrictions I1-I4 hold. Then there exists $a > 1/2$ such that

$$
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta} \left| \bar{R}(\theta) - \hat{R}(\theta) \right| = O_p(n^{-a}) .
$$

The task of producing a linear representation for $n^{1/2} \left( \hat{R}(\theta) - R(\theta) \right)$ is now simplified to establishing such a representation for $n^{1/2} \left( \bar{R}(\theta) - R(\theta) \right)$, which does not depend on the bandwidth.
b_n. To do this we impose an additional restriction and employ a Hoeffding projection and results from Sherman (1994).

**Restriction I5 (Euclidean Class):** For each \( k = 1, \ldots, K \), the class of functions

\[
\mathcal{V}_k = \{ v : v(w_1, w_2) = v_k(w_1, w_2; \theta), \theta \in \Theta, h > 0 \},
\]

is Euclidean with respect to an envelope \( \bar{V} \) such that \( E[\bar{V}^{2+\delta}] < \infty \) for some \( \delta > 0 \).

For the definition of Euclidean classes we refer to Definition 2.7 in Pakes and Pollard (1989) or Definition 3 in Sherman (1994). Primitive conditions to establish this property can be found, e.g., in Nolan and Pollard (1987), Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Sherman (1994). In fact, our proof method only requires that the U-process produced by the class \( \mathcal{V}_k \) satisfy the maximal inequality in Sherman (1994), for which the Euclidean property is sufficient. Restriction I5 provides a sufficient condition for application of Sherman’s results, used in the following Theorem.

**Theorem 3** Let Restrictions I1-I5 hold. Then for some \( a > 1/2 \),

\[
\hat{R}(\theta) = R(\theta) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_R(y_i, x_i; \theta, h_n) + \xi_n(\theta), \quad \text{where} \quad \sup_{\theta \in \Theta} |\xi_n(\theta)| = O_p(n^{-a}),
\]

where

\[
\psi_R(y_i, x_i; \theta, h) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left( 1_{X_i}(T_k(w_i, \theta))_+ - E[1_{X_i}(T_k(W, \theta))_+] \right) + \left[ \tilde{g}(w_i; \theta, h) - E[\tilde{g}(W; \theta, h)] \right].
\]

We combine the linear representation for \( \hat{R}(\theta) \) given by Theorem 3 with the maximum likelihood estimator described in Theorem 2 for \( \theta_1 \) to perform inference on the set of parameters

\[
\Theta^* \equiv \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \forall k = 1, \ldots, K, \forall y \in \mathcal{Y}, E[m_k(Y, y, X; \theta) | X = x] \leq 0 \land \mathbb{P}_0[Y = (0, 0) | X = x] = F\left(Z_1\tilde{\beta}, Z_2\tilde{\beta}; \lambda\right), \text{a.e. } x \in X^* \right\}.
\]

As before, group \( w_i = (y_i, x_i) \). Let \( \psi_M(w_i) \) denote the MLE influence function for \( \hat{\theta}_1 \). From Theorems 2 and 3 we have that uniformly over \( \theta \in \Theta \), for some \( \epsilon > 0 \),

\[
\hat{V}(\theta) \equiv n^{1/2} \left( \hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1 \right) R(\theta) = n^{1/2} \left( \hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1 \right) + \left( \frac{n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_M(w_i)}{n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_R(w_i; \theta, h_n)} \right) + \left( \frac{o_p(1)}{o_p(n^{-\epsilon})} \right). \tag{5.7}
\]

For inference we use the quadratic form

\[
\hat{Q}_n(\theta) \equiv \hat{V}(\theta)' \hat{\Sigma}(\theta)^{-1} \hat{V}(\theta),
\]

---

15 The details are in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix B, subsequently used to prove Theorem 3.
where

\[ \hat{\Sigma} (\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} \hat{\Sigma}_{MM} (\theta) & \hat{\Sigma}_{MR} (\theta) \\ \hat{\Sigma}_{MR} (\theta) & \hat{\Sigma}_{RR} (\theta) \end{pmatrix}, \]

is an estimator for the variance of \( \hat{V} (\theta) \). Specifically, we set

\[ \hat{\Sigma}_{MM} (\theta) = \left( n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\psi}_M (w_i) \hat{\psi}_M (w_i)' \right)^{-1}, \]
\[ \hat{\Sigma}_{MR} (\theta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\psi}_M (w_i) \hat{\psi}_R (w_i; \theta, h_n)', \]
\[ \hat{\Sigma}_{RR} (\theta) = \max \left\{ n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\psi}_R (w_i; \theta, h_n)^2, \kappa_n \right\}, \]

where \( \hat{\psi}_M (w_i) \) and \( \hat{\psi}_R (w_i; \theta, h_n) \) consistently estimate \( \psi_M (w_i) \) and \( \psi_R (w_i; \theta, h_n) \), respectively, and where \( \kappa_n \rightarrow \infty \) is a slowly decreasing sequence of nonnegative constants such that for all \( \epsilon > 0 \), \( n^\epsilon \kappa_n \rightarrow \infty \), for example \( \kappa_n = (\log n)^{-1} \). This ensures that for any \( n \), \( \hat{\Sigma}_{RR} (\theta) \) is bounded away from zero. Using \( \kappa_n \) in this way achieves valid inference, as it guarantees that for all \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), \( \hat{\Omega}^{-1}(\theta) - \hat{\Sigma}^{-1}(\theta) \) is positive semidefinite with probability approaching one as \( n \rightarrow \infty \), where \( \hat{\Omega} (\theta) \) is the same as \( \hat{\Sigma} (\theta) \), but with \( \hat{\sigma}_n^2 (\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{\psi}_R (w_i; \theta, h_n)^2 \) in place of \( \hat{\Sigma}_{RR} (\theta) \).

Under appropriate regularity conditions, the quadratic form \( \hat{V} (\theta) \) is asymptotically distributed \( \chi^2 \) for any \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), where the degrees of freedom of the asymptotic distribution depend on whether any of the \( K \) conditional moment inequalities bind with positive probability \( \mathbb{P}_X \). If \( \theta \in \Theta^* \) and all of the conditional moment inequalities are satisfied strictly at \( \theta \), then \( n^{1/2} \hat{R} (\theta) = o_p (1) \), and \( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \overset{d}{\to} \chi^2_r \), where \( r \equiv \dim (\theta_1) \). If instead \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), but at least one of the conditional moment inequalities are satisfied with equality at \( \theta \) with positive probability, i.e. if \( \theta \) belongs to the set

\[ \Theta^* \equiv \left\{ \theta \in \Theta^* : \mathbb{P} \left\{ x \in X^* : E [m_k (Y, y, X; \theta) | X = x] = 0 \right\} > 0, \right. \]
\[ \left. \text{for at least one } k \in \{1, ..., K\} \text{ and some } y \in \mathcal{Y} \right\}, \]

then \( n^{1/2} \hat{R} (\theta) \) is asymptotically normal and shows up in the asymptotic distribution of \( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \) such that \( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \overset{d}{\to} \chi^2_{r+1} \). Finally, if \( \theta \notin \Theta^* \), then \( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \) “blows up”, i.e. for any \( c > 0 \), \( \Pr \left\{ \hat{Q}_n (\theta) > c \right\} \rightarrow 1 \) as \( n \rightarrow \infty \).

Theorem 4 uses these results to provide an asymptotically valid confidence set for \( \theta \), namely

\[ \text{CS}_{1-\alpha} = \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \leq c_{1-\alpha} \right\}, \quad (5.8) \]

where \( \alpha > 0 \), \( c_{1-\alpha} \) is the \( 1 - \alpha \) quantile of the \( \chi^2_{r+1} \) distribution, and \( r \equiv \dim (\theta_1) \). The Theorem requires an additional restriction which imposes some mild regularity conditions on the influence
function $\psi_R(w_i; \theta, h_n)$ over $\theta \in \Theta^*$. To state the restriction let

$$
\Sigma (\theta) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
\Sigma_{MM}(\theta) & \Sigma_{MR}(\theta) \\
\Sigma_{MR}^*(\theta) & \Sigma_{RR}(\theta)
\end{pmatrix},
$$

with $\Sigma_{MM}(\theta)$, $\Sigma_{MR}(\theta)$, $\Sigma_{RR}(\theta)$ defined identically to $\hat{\Sigma}_{MM}(\theta)$, $\hat{\Sigma}_{MR}(\theta)$, $\hat{\Sigma}_{RR}(\theta)$, respectively, but with $E[\cdot]$ replacing sample means and taking the limit as $h_n \to 0$ for $\Sigma_{MR}$ and $\Sigma_{RR}$.

**Restriction 16** (Regularity on $\Theta^*$): $\Sigma_{MR}(\theta)$ and $\Sigma_{RR}(\theta)$ are continuous on $\Theta^*$ and the estimator $\hat{\Sigma}(\theta)$ is uniformly consistent on $\Theta^*$, namely

$$
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta^*} \| \hat{\Sigma}(\theta) - \Sigma_n(\theta) \| = o_p(1),
$$

In addition, the following integrability and manageability conditions hold:

(i) For some $\bar{C} < \infty$ and $\delta > 0$,

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \sup_{\theta \in \Theta^*} E \left[ \frac{|\psi_R(w_i; \theta, h_n)|^{2+\delta}}{\sigma_n^{2+\delta}(\theta)} \right] \leq \bar{C},
$$

where $\sigma_n^2(\theta) \equiv \text{var}(\psi_R(w_i; \theta, h_n))$; (ii) The triangular array of processes

$$
\{ \psi_R(w_i; \theta, h_n) : i \leq n, n \geq 1, \theta \in \Theta^* \}
$$

is manageable with respect to an envelope $\bar{G}$ satisfying $E[\bar{G}^2] < \infty$.

**Theorem 4** Let Restrictions 11 - 16 hold. Then (i) $\lim_{n \to \infty} \inf_{\theta \in \Theta^*} P(\theta \in \text{CS}_{1-\alpha}) \geq 1 - \alpha$, and (ii) for any sequence of alternatives $\theta_{na}$ such that for some fixed $C > 0$ and some sequence of positive constants $\mu_n \to \infty$, either $\|\theta_{na,1} - \theta_1^*\| \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2} C$ or $R(\theta_{na}) \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2} C$ wp $\to 1$, $\lim_{n \to \infty} P(\theta_{na} \in \text{CS}_{1-\alpha}) = 0$.

The Theorem establishes that the confidence set $\text{CS}_{1-\alpha}$ provides correct ($\geq 1 - \alpha$) asymptotic coverage for fixed $P$ uniformly over $\theta \in \Theta^*$, Moreover, the associated test for $\theta \in \Theta^*$ is consistent against all local alternatives of the form $\theta_{na} \notin \Theta^*$ described in the Theorem, which includes fixed alternatives as a special case. The first condition defining the class of local alternatives simply states that the test is consistent against alternatives with point identified components further than

---

16 It is worth noting that our $\text{CS}_{1-\alpha}$ can attain good pointwise asymptotic properties, i.e.

$$
\inf_{\theta \in \Theta^*} \lim_{n \to \infty} P(\theta \in \text{CS}_{1-\alpha}) \geq 1 - \alpha,
$$

under weaker regularity conditions than those stated here. In particular, with Restrictions 11, 12, 13 maintained we could relax Restrictions 14 and 16, as well as the Euclidean property invoked in Lemma 4 as only sufficient conditions for the asymptotically linear representation of Theorem 3 to hold pointwise in $\theta$ would be required.
\( O_p(n^{-1/2}) \) from the true value. The second condition is satisfied whenever one of the conditional moment functions \( T_k(y, x; \theta_{na}) \) is strictly positive on a set whose measure does not shrink to zero too fast, such that \( E[1_X(T_k(Y, X; \theta_{na}))] \) exceeds \( \mu_n n^{-1/2} C \). As is the case with other methods for inference based on conditional moment inequalities, the class of alternatives covered generally depends on both the set of values for which the conditional moment inequalities are violated and the shape of the moment functions \( T_k(y, x; \theta_{na}) \) under the sequence of local alternatives.

6 Monte Carlo experiments

This section is motivated by two goals. First, to analyze the properties of our econometric approach and second, to study the consequences of incorrectly estimating an ordered-response game as a binary-choice game. We present several variations of an experiment design, allowing us to explore the extent to which these games have multiple equilibria, the variation in the range of possible outcomes, and the inferential implications of these features of the model. We find that our methodology performs well in our designs, while a binary-choice misspecification carries severe bias, both for the strategic-interaction parameters and for the non-strategic payoff parameters. A binary game ignores the intensive-margin nature of strategic interaction (e.g., the fact that competitors care, not only about whether other firms “enter”, but the \textit{intensity} with which they enter).

In a game of strategic substitutes, this leads to fewer “entry” outcomes than a binary-choice game would predict (where only the extensive-margin decision of “entry” matters); as a result, we find in our experiment designs that misspecifying an ordered-response game of strategic substitutes as a binary-choice one will lead to a systematic downward bias in the non-strategic component of payoff functions, in order to fit the relative lack of “entry” outcomes produced by an ordered-response game. We conjecture that, at least in designs similar to the ones we use, the opposite would be observed in strategic-complements games: misspecification as binary choice would lead to systematic upward bias in the non-strategic component of payoff functions. We also find that binary choice misspecifications also lead to poor inferential results for the strategic component of payoffs.

\textsuperscript{17}Our test statistic transforms conditional moment inequalities to conditional ones using a kernel function as an “instrument function” and then integrates over violations of these unconditional moment functions. The use of instrument functions to move from conditional to unconditional moment inequalities is conceptually similar to Andrews and Shi (2013), and integration over these violations is conceptually similar to their Cramer von-Mises statistic as well as the \( L_p \)-type functionals used by Lee, Song, and Whang (2014). Our statistic differs from theirs, and in particular adapts automatically to the contact set in place of using generalized moment selection or explicit contact set estimation, but nonetheless shares qualitatively similar local asymptotic power properties relative to sup-norm type tests such as those of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Armstrong (2015). Thus our test statistic should be expected to perform well from a power standpoint against relatively flat local alternatives, but less well against relatively sharp-peaked alternatives where the violation of conditional moment inequalities occurs on a set of shrinking measure under the sequence of local alternatives.
6.1 Experiment designs

One of our goals here is to present designs that follow closely our empirical application in Section 7, where we model multiple entry decisions (number of stores in a geographic market) between competitors Lowe’s and Home Depot. To this end, we use the same number of observable payoff shifters and the same parametrization as our empirical application. In our empirical application, these are: population ($X^{\text{pop}}$), total payroll per capita ($X^{\text{pay}}$), land area ($X^{\text{area}}$), and distance ($X^{\text{dist}}_j$) to the nearest distribution center of player $j$ for $j = \{1, 2\}$. $X$ includes 5 covariates, 3 common to each player ($X^{\text{pop}}, X^{\text{pay}}, X^{\text{area}}$), as well as the player-specific distances to their own distribution centers ($X^{\text{dist}}_j$). All these covariates are, by nature, nonnegative. Once again, in order to approximate the features of the data in our empirical example, we generated them here as jointly-distributed log-Normal random variables with mean and variance-covariance matrix given by the sample mean and the sample variance-covariance matrix observed in the data of our empirical application. We employ the parametric specification described in (4.1). We have,

$$\pi_j (Y, X_j, U_j) = Y_j \times \left( \delta + X^{\text{pop}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pop}} + X^{\text{pay}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pay}} + X^{\text{area}} \cdot \beta^{\text{area}} + X^{\text{dist}}_j \cdot \beta^{\text{dist}} - \Delta_j Y_{-j} - \eta Y_j + U_j \right),$$

with intercept and slope coefficients: $\delta = 2$, $\beta^{\text{pop}} = 2$, $\beta^{\text{pay}} = 0.25$, $\beta^{\text{area}} = 0.25$ and $\beta^{\text{dist}} = -0.5$. The strategic interaction parameters were fixed at $\Delta_1 = 1$ and $\Delta_2 = 2$. All these parameter values were chosen because they were interior points in the estimated CS of our empirical application. Denote

$$W_j = X^{\text{pop}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pop}} + X^{\text{pay}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pay}} + X^{\text{area}} \cdot \beta^{\text{area}} + X^{\text{dist}}_j \cdot \beta^{\text{dist}}$$

as the non-strategic, observable payoff “index” for player $j$. By the nature of payoffs in our designs, both $W_1$ and $W_2$ are highly positively correlated; in this case we have $\rho(W_1, W_2) = 0.840$.

The concavity coefficient $\eta$ has a significant effect on the properties of the equilibrium outcomes: small values of $\eta$ imply “flatter” payoff functions, favoring the existence of multiple equilibria, and to a richer range of equilibrium outcomes. The opposite is true for large values of $\eta$, which imply that marginal payoffs decrease quickly in players’ own action. To investigate the effect of those properties, we tried multiple values of $\eta$ in our designs. We considered $\eta = \{0.25, 0.75, 1.5, 4.5\}$. As a way to evaluate the performance of our approach (and that of a misspecified binary-choice game), we will often refer to the following aggregate index:

$$\overline{W} = E \left[ X^{\text{pop}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pop}} + E \left[ X^{\text{pay}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pay}} + E \left[ X^{\text{area}} \cdot \beta^{\text{area}} + \frac{1}{2} \left( E \left[ X^{\text{dist}}_1 \right] + E \left[ X^{\text{dist}}_2 \right] \right) \right] \right] \cdot \beta^{\text{dist}}$$

$\overline{W}$ is the average of the non-strategic component of payoff shifters (without the intercept) between both players. Given the parameters of our designs, its true value is $\overline{W} = 5.463$. We will consider in our analysis here how well our method performs in constructing confidence intervals for $\overline{W}$ and we will compare these results with those of a misspecified binary-choice game.
Finally, the unobserved (to the econometrician) payoff shifters $U_1$ and $U_2$ were generated as described in Section 4.1 with marginal logistic CDFs and a joint CDF given by the FGM copula described in (4.4). In our designs, we considered two values for the copula coefficient, $\lambda = \{0.5, -0.5\}$, with resulting correlation coefficients between $U_1$ and $U_2$ of 0.153 and $-0.153$, respectively. Thus, our experiments included eight MC designs in total.

The strategy space was capped at $M_1 = M_2 = 100$, which was sufficiently large to be non-binding in any of our simulations. In each simulation we solved the game, looking for all PSNE, with an equilibrium selection rule that chose an equilibrium at random, assigning uniform probability to each of the existing PSNE. The equilibrium selection device was independent from all other covariates in the game. Table 10 summarizes the population properties of our MC designs. As we see there, smaller values of $\eta$ (the payoff concavity coefficient) lead to the prevalence of multiple equilibria, and to a richer range of possible outcomes, while the opposite is true for larger values of $\eta$. We also see that, even though we have an underlying game of strategic substitutes, the observed correlation in outcomes, $Y_1$ and $Y_2$ can range from negative to positive depending on the degree of concavity of payoffs. When payoffs are flat and the range of equilibrium outcomes is richer and has more variation, the strategic-substitute property of the underlying game becomes apparent in the outcomes, but this feature becomes obscured in designs where marginal payoffs decrease faster (and concavity is more pronounced). In this case, the positive correlation of non-strategic payoff indices leads to a positive correlation in $Y_1$ and $Y_2$. Given the values we used for $\lambda$, changing the sign in the correlation between $U_1$ and $U_2$ had a small effect in the distribution of outcomes.

### 6.1.1 Comparison with a binary-choice game

One of our goals is to investigate the consequences of misspecifying a true ordinal game as a binary-choice one. To this end, our first step is to contrast the predictions in both cases. A binary game ignores the intensive-margin nature of strategic interaction; that is, the fact that players care, not only about whether other firms “enter” (the extensive-margin choice), but the intensity with which they enter. In a game of strategic substitutes like our designs, this would lead to a lower probability of mutual-entry outcomes than a binary-choice game would predict. Table 11 compares the predictions (duopoly, monopoly, no-entry) of our designs against those of a binary-choice game with the same payoff parameters (intercept, slope coefficients and strategic-interaction parameters). As we can see there, a binary-game systematically predicts a higher probability of having a duopoly (mutual “entry”) relative to all of our designs. In fact, the predicted probability of a duopoly is at least 85% larger in the binary-choice case. Conversely, a binary game underpredicts the probabilities of monopoly and no-entry. Clearly, given our MC designs it is impossible for a binary-choice game to match the predictions of an ordered-response game if we use the same payoff parameters in both cases. Intuitively, one way to make the predictions of a binary choice game align with those of an ordered response game would involve systematically lowering the non-

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strategic portion of payoffs in the binary case. To this end, we use the following set of alternative slope coefficients in the binary case: $\beta_{\text{pop}} = 0.2$, $\beta_{\text{pay}} = 0.025$, $\beta_{\text{area}} = 0.025$ and $\beta_{\text{dist}} = -0.75$. These parameter values systematically lower payoffs and produce outcome predictions in the binary game that are now within the range of predictions of the ordered-response game, as shown in Table 11. To emphasize how significant the reduction in non-strategic payoffs was, note that the index $\overline{W}$ defined in (6.1) now fell to $\overline{W} = -1.835$. Intuitively, this leads us to expect that if we mis-specify our designs as binary games, we will obtain results where the non-strategic payoff coefficients are significantly biased downwards. Our results corroborate this intuition, as well as the fact that the inferential results for the strategic parameters are also poor.

6.1.2 Relationship between binary choices and intensive margin decisions when the true game is ordinal

Constructing econometric specification tests of binary vs. ordered-response decisions in complete information games is a subject of ongoing research, as this problem presents challenges that are absent in incomplete-information settings (see de Paula and Tang (2012), Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2013)). However, it is interesting to ask whether, in designs such as ours, a true ordered-response game manifests itself in a systematic way when we study the relationship between the binary choice of “entry” by player $i$ and the level of entry (the intensive margin decision) of player $j$. After all, in a true binary choice game, conditional on the realization of payoff shifters and the equilibrium selection mechanism, the binary choice $d_i \equiv 1 \{Y_i \neq 0\}$ depends only on $d_j \equiv 1 \{Y_j \neq 0\}$, but not on the actual value of $Y_j$ (as long as $Y_j \geq 1$). A relevant question to ask is whether, in designs like the ones used in this section, there exists a systematic stochastic relationship between $d_i$ and $Y_j$ after we condition on observable payoff shifters. Table 12 presents $\Pr(d_i = 1|Y_j, W_i = \text{median}(W_i))$ for different values of $Y_j$. As we can see there, these probabilities are monotonically decreasing in $Y_j$ in all cases studied, and this is true for both players. The probabilities shown in the table were obtained for other values of $W_j$, such as the 25th and 75th quantiles and the same monotonicity pattern was observed in all cases. While this monotonic feature arises in our designs and it is not a generic property of all ordered-response games that satisfy our assumptions, it can be nevertheless a useful diagnostic tool. In the empirical application of Section 7 we find evidence in our data consistent with this property.

6.2 Results

We apply our methodology to each of our designs and we compare them against the results derived from misspecifying the game as being binary and estimating it by MLE (with the correct specification for the joint distribution of $U_1$ and $U_2$) as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a). The signs of our payoff-slope coefficients (one of them negative, the rest positive) and the distributional proper-
ties of our generated covariates are compatible with the identification conditions in binary games described in Tamer (2003). In order to make a meaningful comparison between the results from the two specifications (binary-choice vs. ordered-response), we focus our analysis on the vector of slope coefficients \( \beta \equiv (\beta_{\text{pop}}, \beta_{\text{pay}}, \beta_{\text{area}}, \beta_{\text{dist}}) \), and on the strategic-interaction parameters \((\Delta_1, \Delta_2)\). We also focus carefully on the inferential results for the non-strategic average payoff index \(W\), to summarize the accuracy with which both approaches lead to inference on the non-strategic payoff coefficients \(\beta\).

### 6.2.1 Results from a binary-game misspecification

Overall, we find that misspecifying an ordered-response game as a binary one leads to systematically biased results, particularly when the underlying true game has multiple equilibria and a rich range of equilibrium outcomes. With regard to the non-strategic components of payoffs, we corroborate our previous conjecture motivated by the results in Table 11: in strategic-substitute designs like the ones we used, a binary-choice misspecification leads to a systematic downward bias in the estimated nonstrategic component of payoffs. Table 13 summarizes the inferential results for \((\Delta_1, \Delta_2)\) from the binary-choice misspecification. We find that an MLE-based CS for these parameters has poor coverage probability, especially when the underlying ordinal game has multiple equilibria and a rich range of outcomes (i.e., when the concavity coefficient \(\eta\) is relatively small). The results are relatively better when the range of outcomes is very limited, as in the designs where \(\eta = 4.5\) (the most extreme case analyzed). Table 14 presents 95% CIs for the misspecified MLE estimates of the index \(W\). As we can see there, these intervals are systematically shifted to the left of the true value of \(W\), supporting the conjecture derived from Table 11: misspecifying the strategy space as a binary-choice generates a systematic downward bias for the non-strategic component of payoffs in our strategic-substitutes designs. This bias is much more pronounced when the underlying game has multiple equilibria and a richer range for outcomes (i.e., when the concavity coefficient \(\eta\) is smaller). However, the bias is present in all our designs. By the same token, we would expect that in strategic-complement designs analogous to ours, we would observe a systematic upward bias for the non-strategic component of payoffs. We do not claim this as a general result because there could be settings where the correlation in non-strategic payoff shifters between players could be sufficiently negative, or the equilibrium selection mechanism could have specific features that may lead to a different conclusion, but we conjecture that this result is robust in settings like ours, where non-strategic payoffs are positively correlated between players and the equilibrium selection rule randomizes uniformly across equilibrium outcomes. The sign of the correlation in the unobserved shocks (the sign of \(\lambda\)) had a small (but consistent) impact in the performance of the misspecified binary game: a positive correlation in \(U_1\) and \(U_2\) increases the positive correlation in the non-strategic component of payoffs, leading to a larger distortion in the predicted outcomes of the binary game vis-a-vis the true ordinal response game. This greater distortion was evident in
Table 11 where the discrepancy between the binary-game prediction of the probability of a duopoly was greater for $\lambda = 0.5$ than for $\lambda = -0.5$.

In summary, the main findings of misspecifying and estimating a binary-choice game when the true model is ordinal were the following: (i) a systematic bias in the estimates of the non-strategic payoffs (this bias was negative in our strategic-substitute designs and our conjecture is that it would be positive in analogous strategic-complement designs). (ii) confidence sets for the strategic interaction coefficients that suffer from significant undercoverage, in many cases excluding these parameters altogether.

6.2.2 Results from our method

The kernels and bandwidths employed to implement our methodology are exactly as described in Section 7. The class of test-sets we use in our procedure are also exactly as described there. For brevity, we refer the reader to that section for the details. Table 15 presents the coverage probability of our CS for the subset of parameters $(\beta, \Delta_1, \Delta_2)$. The results presented there correspond to projections, for that subset of parameters, of the overall CS for the entire parameter vector. Because these are projections, the coverage probability is (for large enough sample sizes) larger than the target nominal coverage probability of 95%. We find that, for very small sample sizes ($n = 250$), our approach has under-coverage when the underlying game has many equilibria and a very rich support of outcomes ($\eta = 0.25$). This problem was largely absent for all the other values of $\eta$ used, and it disappeared quickly for $\eta = 0.25$ for moderately large sample sizes ($n \geq 500$). When the sample size is $n = 1000$ (very close to the sample size of $n = 954$ in our empirical application), our approach has very good coverage for these parameters across the board for all the designs we employed. Table 16 presents a 95% CI for $W$ from our results, constructed once again as the projection of our overall CS. We find that our approach performs well, generating CIs that contain the true value of $W$ in all the designs and for all sample sizes analyzed; furthermore, the resulting CIs are not too wide, and they consistently shrink as $n$ increases. The sign of the correlation in the unobserved shocks (the sign of $\lambda$) had no significant or systematic impact in the performance of our method given the values analyzed for $\lambda$. The inferential results of our approach stand in very sharp contrast with the results from the misspecified binary game.

7 An Application to Home Depot and Lowe’s

We apply our model to the study of the home improvement industry in the United States. According to IBISWorld, this industry has two dominant firms: Home Depot and Lowe’s, whose market shares in 2011 were 40.8% and 32.6%, respectively. We label these two players as

Player 1: Lowe’s,  
Player 2: Home Depot.
We take the outcome of interest \( y_i = (y_{i1}, y_{i2}) \) to be the number of stores operated by each firm in geographic market \( i \). We define a market as a core based statistical area (CBSA) in the contiguous United States. The Office of Budget and Management defines a CBSA as an area that consists of one or more counties and includes the counties containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration (as measured by commute to work) with the urban core. Metropolitan CBSAs are those with a population of 50,000 or more. Some metropolitan CBSAs with 2.5 million people or more are split into divisions. We considered all such divisions as individual markets.

Our sample consists of a cross section of \( n = 954 \) markets in April 2012. Table 1 summarizes features of the observed distribution of outcomes.

Table 1: Summary of outcomes observed in the data, including average, median, and percentiles for each of \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_2 \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( Y_1 )</th>
<th>( Y_2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75\text{th} percentile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90\text{th} percentile</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95\text{th} percentile</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99\text{th} percentile</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>1,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| \( \% Y_1 > Y_2 \) | 33%         |
| \( \% Y_1 < Y_2 \) | 25%         |
| \( \% Y_1 + Y_2 > 0 \) | 74%         |
| \( \% Y_1 + Y_2 > 0, Y_1 = Y_2 \) | 16%         |

player 1: Lowe’s, player 2: Home Depot.

Roughly 75 percent of markets have at most 3 stores. However, more than 10 percent of markets in the sample have 9 stores or more. If we focus on markets with asymmetries in the number of stores operated by each firm, Table 1 suggests that Lowe’s tends to have more stores than Home Depot in smaller markets and vice versa. Our justification for modeling this as a static game with PSNE as our solution concept is the assumption that the outcome observed is the realization of a long-run equilibrium. Because there is no natural upper bound for the number of stores each firm could open in a market, we allowed \( \bar{y}_j \) to be arbitrarily large. We maintained the assumptions of mutual strategic substitutes and pure-strategy Nash equilibrium behavior with the parametrization described in Section 4.

---

\(^{18}\) The relative maturity of the home improvement industry suggests that the assumption that the market is in a PSNE, commonly used in the empirical entry literature, is relatively well-suited to this application. Although, as is the case in any industry, market structure evolves over time, 82% of markets in our data exhibited no change in store configuration between March 2009 and September 2012.

---

\(^{19}\) The Office of Budget and Management defines a CBSA as an area that consists of one or more counties and includes the counties containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration (as measured by commute to work) with the urban core. Metropolitan CBSAs are those with a population of 50,000 or more. Some metropolitan CBSAs with 2.5 million people or more are split into divisions. We considered all such divisions as individual markets.

---

28
7.1 Observable Payoff Shifters

For each market, the covariates included in $X_j$ were: population, total payroll per capita, land area, and distance to the nearest distribution center of player $j$ for $j = \{1, 2\}$. The first three of these were obtained from Census data. Our covariates aim to control for basic socioeconomic indicators, geographic size, and transportation costs for each firm.\footnote{Payroll per capita is included both as a measure of income and as an indicator of the overall state of the labor market in each CBSA. We employed alternative economic indicators such as income per household, but they proved to have less explanatory power as determinants of entry in our estimation and inference results.} Note that $X$ includes 5 covariates, 3 common to each player as well as the player-specific distances to their own distribution centers. All covariates were treated as continuously distributed in our analysis.

Table 1 suggests a pattern where Home Depot operates more stores than Lowe’s in larger markets. In the data we found that median market size and payroll were 50\% and 18\% larger, respectively, in markets where Home Depot had more stores than Lowe’s relative to markets where the opposite held. Overall, Home Depot opened more stores than Lowe’s in markets that were larger and that had higher earnings per capita. Our methodology allows us to investigate whether these types of systematic asymmetries are owed to the structure of the game, the underlying equilibrium selection mechanism, or unobserved heterogeneity.

7.2 Inference on Model Parameters

We began by computing maximum likelihood estimates for $\theta_1$, corresponding to those of equation (4.10), Theorem 2. These are shown in the first column of Table 2. Given the ordinal nature of our action space, these point estimates indicate that within a each market, all else equal, a population increase of 100,000 has roughly the same effect on per store profit as a $45 increase in payroll per capita, a 12,300 sq mile increase in land area, or a 400 mile decrease in distance to the nearest distribution center. The second column of Table 2 shows the corresponding 95\% CI based on these estimates. Figure 2 depicts the estimated log-likelihood for each individual parameter in a neighborhood of the corresponding estimate. Comparing their curvatures, we see that the one for $\rho$ was relatively flatter than those of the remaining parameters. This is reflected in the rather wide MLE 95\% CI for $\rho$. The 95\% CI for the coefficients on population and land area include only positive values, while the 95\% CI for the coefficient on payroll, though mostly positive, contains some small negative values. The MLE 90\% CI for this coefficient (not reported) contained only positive values.
7.2.1 Test sets for the construction of confidence regions

We used the approach described in Section 5 to construct confidence regions for \( \theta \). We now describe the class of test sets \( \mathcal{U}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \) we used. As before let \( \mathcal{R}_\theta \) be as defined in (4.5). Let

\[
\mathcal{Y}^* = \{(y_1, y_2) \in \mathcal{Y} : y_1 \leq 2, \ y_2 \leq 2\}, \\
\mathcal{S}^I_\theta(x_i) = \{S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 : S = \mathcal{R}_\theta(y, x_i) \text{ for some } y \in \mathcal{Y}^*\}, \\
\mathcal{S}^{II}_\theta(x_i) = \{S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2 : S = \mathcal{R}_\theta(y, x_i) \cup \mathcal{R}_\theta(y', x_i) \text{ for some } y, y' \in \mathcal{Y}^* \text{ such that } y \neq y'\}.
\]

We have \( \#(\mathcal{S}^I_\theta(x_i)) = 9 \) and \( \#(\mathcal{S}^{II}_\theta(x_i)) = 72 \). For test sets \( \mathcal{U}_k(x_i, y_i; \theta) \) we use each element of the collections \( \mathcal{S}^I_\theta(x_i) \) and \( \mathcal{S}^{II}_\theta(x_i) \) as well as the set \( \mathcal{R}_\theta(y_i, x_i) \). This yields \( K = 82 \) test sets (not necessarily distinct if \( y_i \in \mathcal{Y}^* \)), and moment functions

\[
m_k (Y, y_i, x_i; \theta) = 1 (y_i \neq (0, 0)) \cdot (1 [\mathcal{R}_\theta(y, x) \subseteq \mathcal{U}_k(x, y; \theta)] - P_U (\mathcal{U}_k(x, y_i; \theta); \theta)), \quad k = 1, \ldots, K.
\]

The term \( 1 (y_i \neq (0, 0)) \) appears because the likelihood for the event \( Y = (0, 0) \) is already incorporated through the equalities used to estimate \( \hat{\theta}_1 \), so the inequalities with \( y = (0, 0) \) would be redundant.

The last column in Table 3 provides 95% projection CIs for each parameter using the approach described in Section 5 using statistic \( V(\theta) \) defined in (5.7). This statistic incorporated both the moment equalities corresponding to likelihood contributions for the events \( Y = (0, 0) \) and \( Y \neq (0, 0) \), as well as further moment inequalities implied by the characterization in Theorem 1. Given the action space, the number of inequalities comprising the identified set would be extremely large. In the interest of computational tractability we restricted attention to those sets \( \mathcal{U}_k(x_i, y_i; \theta) \) described above.\(^{21}\)

Our covariate vector \( X \) comprised five continuous random variables. We employed a multiplicative kernel \( \mathbf{K} (\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_5) = \mathbf{k}(\psi_1)\mathbf{k}(\psi_2) \cdots \mathbf{k}(\psi_5) \), where each \( \mathbf{k}(\cdot) \) was given by

\[
\mathbf{k}(u) = \sum_{\ell=1}^{10} c_\ell \cdot (1 - u^2)^{2\ell} \cdot 1 \{|u| \leq 30\},
\]

with \( c_1, \ldots, c_{10} \) chosen such that \( \mathbf{k}(\cdot) \) is a bias-reducing Biweight-type kernel of order 20. This is the same type of kernel used by Aradillas-López, Gandhi, and Quint (2013). Let \( z \equiv \dim(X^c) = 5 \), and denote

\[
\epsilon \equiv \frac{9}{10} \cdot \frac{1}{4z(2z + 1)}, \quad \alpha_k \equiv \frac{1}{4z} - \epsilon.
\]

\(^{21}\)As indicated previously, in this application the payoff functions \( \pi \) and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity \( P_U \) are known functions of parameters \( \theta \). We therefore write \( \mathcal{R}_\theta (Y, X) \) in place of \( \mathcal{R}_\theta (Y, X) \) defined in (3.4), and \( P_U (\cdot; \theta) \) in place of \( P_U (\cdot) \).
For each element of $X$, the bandwidth used was of the form $h_n = c \cdot \hat{\sigma}(X) \cdot n^{-\alpha}$ \(^{22}\) The order of the kernel and the bandwidth convergence rate were chosen to satisfy Restriction 12. The constant $c$ was set at 0.25 \(^{25}\) The bandwidth $b_n$ was set to be 0.001 at our sample size ($n = 954$). The “regularization” sequence $\kappa_n$ was set below machine precision. All the results that follow were robust to moderate changes in our tuning parameters. The region $X^*$ was set to include our entire sample, so there was no trimming used in our results. Our CS was constructed through a grid search that included over 30 million points. The computational simplicity of our approach makes a grid search of this magnitude a feasible task on a personal computer.

The third column of Table 2 presents the resulting 95% confidence intervals for each component of $\theta$, i.e. projections given by the smallest and largest values of each parameter in our CS. Relative to the MLE CIs shown in column 2, our confidence intervals are shifted slightly and in some cases larger while in other cases smaller. In classical models where there is point identification ML estimators are asymptotically efficient, and hence produce smaller confidence intervals than those based on other estimators. The comparison here however is not so straightforward. The MLE is based only on the observation of whether each player is in or out of the market, and not the ordinal value of the outcome. The statistic we employ incorporates these likelihood equations as moment equalities and additionally some moment inequalities. That is, these inequalities constitute additional information not used in the log-likelihood for the event $Y = (0, 0)$ and its complement. Furthermore, the CIs in Table 2 are projections onto individual parameter components, including parameter components for which the profile likelihood carries no information such as the interaction coefficients, $\Delta_1$ and $\Delta_2$. For all of these reasons, neither approach is expected to provide tighter CIs than the other. Reassuringly, the CIs for point-identified parameter components using either method are in all cases reasonably close to each other, yielding qualitatively similar interpretations.

One and two-dimensional graphical inspections of our CS did not reveal any holes but we are not sure about the robustness of this feature for our CS given its dimension. Population, land area and distance were the only payoff shifters with coefficient estimates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The 95% CS for the correlation coefficient $\rho$ was again wide.

\(^{22}\) Note that the use of a different bandwidth for each element of $X$ is compatible with our econometric procedure. This particular choice of bandwidth is in fact equivalent to one using the same bandwidth for each component of $X$, but where each is first re-scaled by its standard deviation.

\(^{25}\) $c = 0.25$ is approximately equal to the one that minimizes

$$AMISE = \text{plim} \left \{ \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} E \left[ (\hat{f}(x) - f(x))^2 \right] dx \right \},$$

if we employ Silverman’s “rule of thumb”, Silverman (1986), using the Normal distribution as the reference distribution. In this case the constant $c$ simplifies to

$$c = 2 \cdot \left( \frac{\pi^{1/2}}{2M \cdot (2M)^!} \cdot \left( \frac{R_k}{(k^2_{M})} \right) \right)^{1/2},$$

where $R_k \equiv \int_{-1}^{1} k^2(u)du$, $k_M \equiv \int_{-1}^{1} u^M k(u)du$.

Given our choice of kernel, the solution yields $c \approx 0.25$, the value we used.

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and included zero. The payoff-concavity coefficient $\eta$ was significantly positive and well above the lower bound 0.001 of our parameter space, indicating decreasing returns to scale for new stores in a market. Figure 3 depicts joint confidence regions for pairs of parameters.

Table 2: Estimates and Confidence Intervals for each Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MLE Estimate</th>
<th>MLE 95% CI</th>
<th>Moment-inequalities 95% CI†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (100,000)</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>[0.869, 3.568]</td>
<td>[1.757, 3.792]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payroll per capita ($5 USD)</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>[−0.023, 0.510]</td>
<td>[−0.064, 0.667]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area (1,000 sq miles)</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>[0.027, 0.333]</td>
<td>[0.051, 0.409]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (100 miles)</td>
<td>−0.544</td>
<td>[−0.929, −0.159]</td>
<td>[−0.988, −0.410]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$ (Corr$(U_1,U_2)$)</td>
<td>−0.050</td>
<td>[−0.304, 0.204]</td>
<td>[−0.265, 0.302]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta - \eta$ (Intercept minus concavity coefficient)</td>
<td>−1.309</td>
<td>[−2.084, −0.534]</td>
<td>[−1.961, −0.656]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$ (Intercept)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>[−0.351, 5.463]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$ (Concavity coefficient)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>[1.076, 6.533]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_1$ (Effect of Home Depot on Lowe’s)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>[0, 2.741]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_2$ (Effect of Lowe’s on Home Depot)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>[0.910, 4.078]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(†) Denotes the individual “projection” from the joint 95% CS obtained as described in Theorem 4.

Figure 4 depicts the joint CS for the strategic interaction coefficients, $\Delta_1$ and $\Delta_2$. Our grid search for these parameters covered the two-dimensional rectangle $[0,16] \times [0,16]$. As we can see, our results strongly suggest that the strategic effect of Lowes on Home Depot (measured by $\Delta_2$) is stronger than the effect of Home Depot on Lowes (measured by $\Delta_1$). As we can see in the figure, our CS lies almost entirely outside the 45-degree line, with the latter crossing our CS over a very small range. Our results conclusively excluded the point $\Delta_1 = \Delta_2 = 0$, so we can reject the assertion that no strategic effect is present. In particular, while our CS includes $\Delta_1 = 0$, it excludes $\Delta_2 = 0$, leading us to reject the assertion that Lowe’s’ decisions have no effect on Home Depot. Finally, Figure 5 depicts joint confidence sets for strategic interaction coefficients and slope parameters in the model. Once again taking the ML point estimate for the coefficient on population as our benchmark, our 95% CIs on the strategic interaction coefficients from Table 2 can be used to bound the relative effect of interactions on profitability. These indicate that, again all else equal and within a given market, the effect of an additional Home Depot store on Lowe’s profit per store is bounded above by that of a population decrease of roughly 156,000. Similarly, the effect of an additional Lowe’s store on Home Depot’s profit per store is the equivalent of a population decrease of anywhere from roughly 24,000 to 232,000.

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24 We also tried variants of our payoff form specification where strategic interaction was allowed to be a function of market characteristics, including population, population density and relative distance. In all cases our results failed to reject that strategic interaction effect is constant for each firm across markets.
7.3 Analysis of Equilibrium Likelihood, Selection, and Counterfactual Experiments

Primary interest may not lie in the value of underlying model parameters, but rather on quantities of economic interest that can typically be expressed as (sometimes set-valued) functionals of these parameters. Equipped with a confidence set for $\theta$, we now construct confidence regions for several such quantities, namely (i) the probability that a given outcome $y$ is an equilibrium, (ii) the probability that a given outcome $y'$ is an equilibrium conditional on a realized outcome $Y = y$ and covariates $X = x$, (iii) the probability that an equilibrium is selected given it is an equilibrium, and (iv) counterfactual conditional outcome probabilities generated by economically meaningful equilibrium selection rules, including those cases where each firm operates as a monopolist, absent competition from its rival.

The counterfactuals considered are functions of $\theta$, say $g(\theta)$, that map from $\Theta$ to some set $\mathcal{G} \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. In Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 these counterfactuals are smooth functions of $E[\lambda(\theta; X, Y)]$,

$$g(\theta) \equiv \Gamma(E[\lambda(\theta; X, Y)])$$

for some known functions $\lambda$ and $\Gamma$, which are consistently estimated by $\hat{g}(\theta)$ obtained by replacing $E[\lambda(\theta; X, Y)]$ above with its sample analog. By standard arguments a $1 - \alpha$ confidence interval for the counterfactual $g(\theta)$ is then given by

$$\hat{g}(\theta) \pm n^{-1/2}\Phi^{-1}(1 - \alpha/2) \hat{\sigma}(\theta),$$

where $\hat{\sigma}(\theta)$ consistently estimates the standard deviation of $n^{1/2}(\hat{g}(\theta) - g(\theta))$. If $\theta_0$ were known it could be plugged into the expression above to obtain the desired confidence interval for $g(\theta_0)$. Since $\theta_0$ is unknown we use a Bonferroni bound together with $CS_{1 - \alpha}$, our previously obtained confidence interval for $\theta_0$, to construct an asymptotically valid $1 - 2\alpha$ confidence interval for $g(\theta_0)$,

$$CI(g(\theta_0)) \equiv \left[ \min_{\theta \in CS_{1 - \alpha}} \hat{g}(\theta) - n^{-1/2}\Phi^{-1}(1 - \alpha/2) \hat{\sigma}(\theta), \max_{\theta \in CS_{1 - \alpha}} \hat{g}(\theta) + n^{-1/2}\Phi^{-1}(1 - \alpha/2) \hat{\sigma}(\theta) \right].$$

(7.2)

In Sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 we also construct confidence intervals for counterfactuals $g(\theta)$ that are known functions of $\theta$, in which case $g$ need not be estimated. For these counterfactuals we report $1 - \alpha$ confidence intervals by simply taking projections of $CS_{1 - \alpha}$ as

$$CI(g(\theta_0)) \equiv \{g(\theta) : \theta \in CS_{1 - \alpha}\}.$$  

(7.3)
7.3.1 Likelihood of Equilibria

Let \( P_E(y|x) \) denote the probability that \( y \) is an equilibrium outcome given \( X = x \). From Lemma 1 and (3.3) we have

\[
P_E(y|x) = P_U(R_\theta(y, x); \theta).
\]

This relation plays a role in addressing the question: given market characteristics \( x \) and the outcome \( y \) observed in a given market, what is the probability that some other action profile \( y' \) was simultaneously an equilibrium, but not selected? We define this as \( P_E(y'|y, x) \), which, using the rules of conditional probability, is given by

\[
P_E(y'|y, x) = P_E(y', y|x) P_E(y|x) = P_U(R_\theta(y', x) \cap R_\theta(y, x); \theta) P_U(R_\theta(y, x); \theta),
\]

when \( \theta = \theta_0 \), where \( P_E(y', y|x) \) denotes the conditional probability that both \( y' \) and \( y \) are equilibria given \( X = x \). For the sake of illustration, Table 3 presents a 95% CI for \( P_E(y'|y, x) \) using the realized outcome \( y = (2, 2) \) and demographics \( x \) observed in CBSA 11100 (Amarillo, TX), a metropolitan market.

Every outcome \( y \) excluded from Table 3 had zero probability of co-existing with \((2, 2)\) as a PSNE. Notice that the lower bound in our CI was zero in each case. Overall, 12 different equilibrium outcomes \( y' \) could have simultaneously been equilibria with the observed \( y \) with positive probability. In seven cases, the probability \( P_E(y'|y, x) \) could be higher than 95%. If we consider all outcomes included in Table 3 and think of them as possible counterfactual equilibria in this market, we can see that the total number of stores could have ranged between 3 and 7. The actual number of stores observed here (4) was closer to the lower bound. Our results also uncover structural asymmetries at the market level. For instance, while \((4, 1)\) and \((5, 1)\) could have coexisted as Nash equilibria with the observed outcome, our CS rule out \((1, 4)\) and \((1, 5)\) as equilibrium outcomes.

We now consider the unconditional probability that any \( y \in Y \) is an equilibrium, denoted \( P_E(y) \). By the law of iterated expectations we can write

\[
P_E(y) = E[P_E(y|Y, X)],
\]

where the expectation is taken over \( Y, X \). For \( \theta = \theta_0 \), a consistent estimator for \( P_E(y) \) is given by

\[
\hat{P}_E(y, \theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_E(y|y_i, x_i, \theta), \quad P_E(y|y_i, x_i, \theta) \equiv \frac{P_U(R_\theta(y, x_i) \cap R_\theta(y_i, x_i); \theta)}{P_U(R_\theta(y, x_i); \theta)}.
\]

Table 4 presents the 0.90 (\( \alpha = 0.05 \)) CI for \( P_E(y) \) for the ten most frequently observed outcomes in the data.
Table 3: Outcomes $y$ that could have co-existed as equilibria with the realized outcome $(2, 2)$ in CBSA 11100 (Amarillo, TX).

| $y$   | 95% CI for $P_E(y|Y_i, X_i)$ | $y$   | 95% CI for $P_E(y|Y_i, X_i)$ |
|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| $(0, 4)$ | [0, 0.9981] | $(4, 0)$ | [0, 0.9388] |
| $(6, 0)$ | [0, 0.9976] | $(3, 0)$ | [0, 0.2666] |
| $(4, 1)$ | [0, 0.9971] | $(5, 1)$ | [0, 0.1001] |
| $(0, 3)$ | [0, 0.9856] | $(0, 5)$ | [0, 0.0524] |
| $(5, 0)$ | [0, 0.9730] | $(7, 0)$ | [0, 0.0114] |
| $(1, 3)$ | [0, 0.9622] |        |                               |
| $(3, 1)$ | [0, 0.9510] |        |                               |

Table 4: Outcomes $y$ with the largest aggregate probability of being equilibria, $P_E(y)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$y$</th>
<th>90% CI for $P_E(y)$ (α = 0.05)</th>
<th>Observed frequency for $y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 0)$</td>
<td>[0.2415, 0.2847]</td>
<td>0.2631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, 0)$</td>
<td>[0.1973, 0.3001]</td>
<td>0.2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, 1)$</td>
<td>[0.1224, 0.1566]</td>
<td>0.1257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 1)$</td>
<td>[0.1081, 0.2552]</td>
<td>0.1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(2, 1)$</td>
<td>[0.0398, 0.0720]</td>
<td>0.0461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(1, 2)$</td>
<td>[0.0120, 0.0691]</td>
<td>0.0199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(2, 0)$</td>
<td>[0.0083, 0.1200]</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(3, 1)$</td>
<td>[0.0078, 0.0399]</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(2, 2)$</td>
<td>[0.0065, 0.0310]</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(3, 2)$</td>
<td>[0.0040, 0.0276]</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(2, 3)$</td>
<td>[0.0038, 0.0224]</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(3, 3)$</td>
<td>[0.0045, 0.0177]</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes ordered by observed frequency.

7.3.2 Propensity of Equilibrium Selection

Our model is silent as to how any particular market outcome is selected when there are multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, a confidence set for $\theta$ can be used to ascertain some information on various measures regarding the underlying equilibrium selection mechanism $\mathcal{M}$. Consider for example the propensity that a given outcome $y$ is selected when it is an equilibrium,

$$P_M(y) = \frac{P(Y = y)}{P_E(y)}.$$

Recall that $(0, 0)$ cannot coexist with any other equilibrium and therefore $P_M(0, 0) = 1$. In Table 5 we present a CI for the selection propensity $P_M(y)$ for all other outcomes listed in Table 4. In all cases in Table 5 the upper bound of our CIs was 1, so only the lower bounds of our CIs...
We can also make direct comparisons of the selection propensities $P_M(y)$ across particular profiles. Figure 6 makes such comparisons by plotting $\hat{P}_M(y; \theta)$ for each $\theta \in CS_{1-\alpha}$. As Figure 4 shows, $CS_{1-\alpha}$ includes parameter values $\theta$ for which $\Delta_1 = 0$. For such values, the optimal decision of Lowes does not depend on the actions of Home Depot; by strict concavity of payoffs, this eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibria for any such $\theta$. Consequently for such parameter values the propensity to select equilibria is always equal to one for any outcome (since any outcome that is an equilibrium must be the unique equilibrium). This explains why the upper bound for $P_M(y)$ in our CS is always 1 for any $y$. However, as Figure 6 shows, our results yield nontrivial lower bounds for these propensities and they also allow us to make comparisons across different outcomes to try to understand whether firms have a particular preference towards certain equilibrium outcomes. With the exception of $\theta$ yielding selection propensities very close to one for both outcomes considered in each graph, the comparisons in parts (A)-(C) of Figure 6 can be summarized as follows:

(A) Equilibria with at most one store by each firm: We compare the propensity of equilibrium selection for the outcomes $(0, 1)$, $(1, 0)$ and $(1, 1)$. Our results yield two findings: (i) Comparing equilibria where only one store is opened, there is a higher selection propensity for Lowe’s to have the only store than for Home Depot. (ii) There is a greater selection propensity for the equilibrium in which both firms operate one store than those where only one firm does.

(B) Equilibria with a monopolist opening multiple stores: We focus on the outcomes $(0, 2)$, $(2, 0)$, $(0, 3)$ and $(3, 0)$. Our results indicate that the selection propensity is higher for the outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$y$</th>
<th>90% CI for $P_M(y)$</th>
<th>Observed frequency for $y$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1, 1)</td>
<td>[0.8884, 1]</td>
<td>0.1257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 0)</td>
<td>[0.6896, 1]</td>
<td>0.2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 1)</td>
<td>[0.6350, 1]</td>
<td>0.0461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0, 1)</td>
<td>[0.3932, 1]</td>
<td>0.1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 3)</td>
<td>[0.5772, 1]</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
<td>[0.4503, 1]</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 1)</td>
<td>[0.2850, 1]</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3, 2)</td>
<td>[0.2381, 1]</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 3)</td>
<td>[0.2322, 1]</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1, 2)</td>
<td>[0.1920, 1]</td>
<td>0.0199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2, 0)</td>
<td>[0.0506, 1]</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes ranked by the CI lower bound.
in which Lowe’s operates two stores than those where Home Depot operates two stores. Our findings regarding selection propensities for (0, 3) and (3, 0) were less conclusive.

(C) *Equilibria where both firms enter with the same number of stores:* We focus on the outcomes (1, 1), (2, 2) and (3, 3). Although not illustrated in the figure, the propensity to select symmetric equilibria where both firms are present appeared to be comparably higher than the propensity to select equilibria where there is only one firm in the market. For most \( \theta \in CS_1 - \alpha \), the outcome (1, 1) was the most favored.

Without a structural model, the observed frequencies alone are not informative about selection propensities. For example, even though (1, 1) was observed in only 12.5% of markets while (1, 0) was observed in 20.2% of them, our results show that, except for some \( \theta \in CS_1 - \alpha \) with both selection propensities close to one, the selection propensity for (1, 1) when it was an equilibrium was higher than that of (1, 0). The fact that the latter is observed more frequently simply seems to indicate that payoff realizations where (1, 1) is an equilibrium occurred relatively rarely.

### 7.3.3 Counterfactual equilibrium selection rules

As explained above, our framework allows us to study the likelihood that other outcomes could have co-existed as equilibria along with the outcomes actually observed in each market in the data. With this information at hand we can do counterfactual analysis based on pre-specified (by us) equilibrium selection mechanisms. Here we generate counterfactual outcomes in each market based on four hypothetical equilibrium selection rules. We focus our analysis on those markets where at least one firm entered and each firm opened at most 15 stores.\(^{25}\) This accounts for approximately 70% of the entire sample.

**(A) Selection rule favoring Lowe’s.** For each market \( i \), a counterfactual outcome \( y^c_i \equiv (y^c_{i1}, y^c_{i2}) \) was generated through the following steps:

1. Find all the outcomes \( y \) for which

\[
P^c(y|Y_i, X_i) = \max \left\{ \frac{P^c(y, Y_i, X_i|\theta)}{P^c(Y_i, X_i|\theta)} : \theta \in CS_1 - \alpha \right\}
\]

(the upper bound within our CS for the probability of co-existing with \( Y_i \) as NE) was at least 95%. If there are no such outcomes, then set \( y^c_i = Y_i \). Otherwise proceed to step 2.

2. Choose the outcome \( y \) with the largest number of Lowe’s stores. If there are ties, choose the one with the largest number of Home Depot stores.

\(^{25}\)Recall again that observing (0, 0) in a given market implies that no other counterfactual equilibrium was possible.
(B) Selection rule favoring Home Depot. Same as (A), but switching the roles of Home Depot and Lowe’s.

(C) Selection rule favoring entry by both firms and largest total number of stores. Here we took the following steps to determine $y^c_i$:

1. As in (A) and (B), look for all the outcomes $y$ for which $P_E(y|Y_i, X_i) \geq 0.95$. If no such $y \neq Y_i$ exists, set $y^c_i = Y_i$. Do the same if no $y$ was found where both firms enter. Otherwise proceed to step 2.

2. Among the outcomes $y$ found in step 1, look for the one that maximizes the total number of stores $y_1 + y_2$. If there are ties, then choose the one that minimizes $|y_1 - y_2|$. If more than one such outcome exists, choose randomly among them using uniform probabilities.

(D) Selection rule favoring symmetry. Each $y^c_i$ was generated as follows:

1. As in (A)-(C), look for all the outcomes $y$ for which $P_E(y|Y_i, X_i) \geq 0.95$. If no such $y \neq Y_i$ exists, set $y^c_i = Y_i$. Otherwise proceed to step 2.

2. Among the outcomes $y$ found in step 1, look for the one that minimizes $|y_1 - y_2|$. If more than one such outcomes exist, choose randomly among them using uniform probabilities.

Examine Table 6, the pattern of market outcomes that results from counterfactual selection rules (A), (B) and (C) is decisively different from the features of the observed outcomes in the data. This is less so for selection rule (D). Table 6 also suggests that a selection mechanism which maximizes the total number of stores in each market (rule (C)) would produce a pattern of
outcomes heavily biased in favor of Lowe’s. Overall, among these counterfactual experiments, the one employing selection rule (D) favoring symmetry most closely matches the observed pattern of store profiles in the data.

7.3.4 Counterfactual experiments: cooperative behavior

Our results allow us to analyze counterfactual alternatives to noncooperative behavior. Here, we consider a simple cooperative counterfactual scenario in which the firms maximize the sum of their payoff functions, assigning equal weight to each. This produces an outcome on the frontier of the set of feasible firm payoffs. We refer to this counterfactual as “cooperative behavior.”

Fix a parameter value \( \theta \) and focus on market \( i \). Let \((y_i, x_i, u_i)\) denote the realizations of \((Y, X, U)\) in that market. Let \((y^1(x_i, u_i; \theta), y^2(x_i, u_i; \theta))\) be an element of

\[ \arg \max_{(y_1, y_2)} \left[ \pi_1 (y_1, y_2, x_{1,i}, u_{1,i}; \theta) + \pi_2 (y_1, y_2, x_{2,i}, u_{2,i}; \theta) \right], \]

so that \((y^1(x_i, u_i; \theta), y^2(x_i, u_i; \theta))\) denotes an action profile maximizing the sum of firm payoffs. Recall from above that \( P_U (R_\theta(y, x); \theta) \) denotes the probability that \( y \) is an equilibrium outcome given \( X = x \). We are interested in the following two functionals,

\[ \bar{y}_j(y_i, x_i, \theta) = \int_{u \in R_\theta(y_i, x_i)} y^j(x_i, u; \theta) \frac{f(u; \lambda)}{P_U (R_\theta(y_i, x_i); \theta)} du \quad \text{for } j = 1, 2. \]

\[ P^c(y_i, x_i, \theta) = \int_{u \in R_\theta(y_i, x_i)} \frac{1 \left[ (y_{1,i}, y_{2,i}) = (y^1(x_i, u; \theta), y^2(x_i, u; \theta)) \right]}{P_U (R_\theta(y_i, x_i); \theta)} f(u; \lambda) du. \]

Conditional on \( X = x \) and conditional on \( y_i \) being an equilibrium outcome, \( \bar{y}_j(y_i, x_i, \theta) \) is the expected cooperative choice for \( j \) and \( P^c(y_i, x_i, \theta) \) is the probability that the outcome observed in the \( i \)th market is the cooperative outcome.

We apply this analysis to the 308 (out of 954) markets that had a single store in our sample. We use \( S_1 \) to denote this collection of markets. Our goal is to compare observed market outcomes to those that would be obtained under cooperative behavior, and in particular to determine whether cooperation would lead to more stores in the markets in \( S_1 \). Let \([\underline{T}_1, T_1]\) denote a 95% CI for the total number of stores we would observe in the markets in \( S_1 \) under a cooperative regime. Of particular interest to us is how 308 (the actual number of stores observed in \( S_1 \)) compares to this CI. Our results yielded \([\underline{T}_1, T_1]\) = [308, 445].10. Note first that the number of stores observed in these markets corresponds to the lower bound we would observe under cooperation. This is by construction, since the number of stores in markets in \( S_1 \) could only be lower if the outcome were \((0, 0)\), which would necessarily produce lower total payoff (specifically zero) than the observed
single-entrant PSNE outcome, as otherwise it would not have been a PSNE. On the other hand, a market in which equilibrium resulted in a single entrant could have resulted in more stores under cooperation if the firm that did not enter would find it more profitable to operate multiple stores absent the presence of the firm that actually entered. Our analysis reveals that we could have as many as 45% more expected stores under this counterfactual scenario. Table 7 summarizes some of the main findings.

Table 7: Summary of counterfactual results under cooperation.

- There exist at least 96 markets (out of 308) where Home Depot had more stores (and Lowe’s had fewer stores) than the expected outcome under cooperation. The number of such markets could be as large as 110.
- There existed parameter values in our confidence set for which every market in \( S_1 \) had fewer total stores than under cooperation.
- The expected number of total stores under cooperation would increase from 1 to at least 2 in as many as 85 markets.
- There were 286 markets for which we could not reject that \( P^e(y_i, x_i) < 50\% \), 93 markets for which we could not reject that \( P^e(y_i, x_i) < 10\% \) and 47 markets for which we could not reject that \( P^e(y_i, x_i) < 5\% \). There were 15 markets for which we could not reject that \( P^e(y_i, x_i) = 0 \).

Our results suggest that in this market segment noncooperative behavior has led to less entry by Lowe’s and greater entry by Home Depot than would be optimal under the counterfactual cooperative regime. These results are in line with some of the findings in Section 7.3.2 which showed a higher propensity to select equilibria favoring Lowe’s in markets with at most one store.

7.3.5 Counterfactual experiment: Monopolistic behavior

Our results also allow us to analyze the implications of how each of these firms would behave if their opponent left the industry. For firm \( j \) in the \( i^{th} \) market let

\[
y^m_j(x_{j,i}, u_{j,i}; \theta) = \arg \max_{y_j} \pi_j ((y_j, 0), x_{j,i}, u_{j,i}; \theta)
\]

denote the optimal choice if \( j \) is the monopolist in market \( i \). Let

\[
\pi^n_j(y_i, x_i, \theta) = \int_{u_j \in \mathcal{R}_\theta(y_i, x_i)} y^m_j(x_{j,i}, u_j; \theta) f_j(u_j) du_j \frac{1}{P_{U}(\mathcal{R}_\theta(y_i, x_i); \theta)}
\]

40
denote the expected monopolistic choice firm $j$ would make in market $i$ given that the observed outcome there is a PSNE. We constructed a 95% confidence set for this expected choice for every market in our sample. Our main finding is that there is a stark contrast in the monopolistic behavior of both firms. While Lowe’s would enter many markets where it has no current presence if Home Depot dropped out of the industry, the opposite is not true: Home Depot would concentrate its presence in relatively fewer markets, remaining out of multiple markets where it currently has no presence. Lowe’s on the other hand would spread its presence over a larger geographic area including smaller markets. Table 8 summarizes some of our main findings.

**Table 8: Summary of counterfactual results under monopolistic behavior.**

- There exist at least 119 markets where Lowe’s is currently absent where it would enter if it were a monopolist.
- We could not reject that Home Depot would not enter any market where it is currently absent if it were a monopolist.
- In our data there were 251 markets with no stores. If Lowe’s were a monopolist, this number would increase to no more than 257. In contrast, if Home Depot were a monopolist this number could grow to as many as 465 markets (almost half of the total markets in our data).
- There exist 3,483 stores in our data. If Lowe’s were a monopolist the expected number of stores would be at least 2,130. If Home Depot were a monopolist, this number could fall as low as 1,860, constituting approximately a 50% drop).

In summary, a sizeable number of markets that are currently served by Lowe’s (as many as 214) could go unserved by Home Depot if the latter were a monopolist. In contrast, Lowe’s would enter almost every market where Home Depot has a presence, staying out of at most 6 such markets.

While our model does not reveal the source of asymmetry in its predictions of monopolistic behavior, these predictions align with differences in store branding. Fernando (2015) notes that Home Depot’s stores are more geared toward professional customers, with an “industrial asthetic” and some shelves that can only be reached by using forklifts. Lowe’s on the other hand is more friendly to the typical nonprofessional home improvement customer, featuring, “more elaborate floor displays or themed products such as patio sets or holiday decor items.” A similar view of the stores’ distinguishing features is given by Mitchell (2015). It may then be plausible that Lowe’s stores are more suited to certain rural markets with a relatively low density of construction professionals, which Home Depot would not find profitable. Although not directly captured by our model, this conjecture offers a possible explanation for the observed difference in monopolistic behavior.
Estimation as a binary entry game

One of the goals of our Monte Carlo experiments in Section 6 was to study the consequences of misspecifying a true ordinal game as a binary-choice one. Our designs, modeled to mimic the properties of the data used in this empirical application showed two main consequences derived from a binary choice misspecification: (i) a systematic downward bias in the estimates of non-strategic payoff components, and (ii) poor coverage of confidence sets for strategic interaction coefficients. We revisit this issue here by estimating our model as a binary-choice (entry) game under the assumption of strategic substitutes. As we did in Section 6, as proposed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) we estimate the model by using MLE where the outcome variable is the number of entrants (zero, one or two) in each market. As we did in Section 6, for brevity we aggregate the estimation results of non-strategic payoff components through their average. Parallel to our definition of $W$ in (6.1), let

$$\hat{W} = X^{\text{pop}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pop}} + X^{\text{pay}} \cdot \beta^{\text{pay}} + X^{\text{area}} \cdot \beta^{\text{area}} + \frac{1}{2} (X^{\text{dist}}_1 + X^{\text{dist}}_2) \cdot \beta^{\text{dist}} \quad (7.4)$$

The point-estimate when we model the game as binary was $\hat{W} = 5.905$, with a 95% CI (taking the sample means of the payoff shifters as fixed) of $[5.121, 6.688]$. In contrast, a 95% CI for $\hat{W}$ using our approach was $[5.975, 8.914]$, which excluded the binary choice point-estimate, although it had some overlap with the CI in that case. Overall, the feature of estimated non-strategic payoff components “shifted to the left” under a binary choice specification that we observed in our experiments of Section 6 appears to be present in our empirical application. Lastly, we compared the inferential results for the strategic coefficients. Misspecification in Section 6 produced CS for $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$ that undercovered (or excluded) the true parameter values systematically. One way to evaluate this is to compare our CS with that of the binary-choice MLE specification. In this case, a 95% CI (truncated at 0) was $[0, 1.189]$ for $\Delta_1$, and $[0, 0.274]$ for $\Delta_2$. In particular, the CI for $\Delta_2$ is entirely disjoint with the CI that follows from our results. Figure 7 compares the joint $(\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$ CS in both cases (truncated at zero since we maintain strategic substitutability). The figure shows very clearly how both CS are disjoint, which is entirely consistent with the pattern we observed in our experiments of Section 6 when an ordered-response game is misspecified as a binary one. Lastly, let $d_i = 1 [Y_i \geq 1]$ denote the decision of “entry”. In the experiment designs we used in Section 6 we found evidence of monotonic (nonincreasing) features for $Pr (d_i = 1 | Y_j, X)$ – the conditional probabilities of entry (as a binary choice) given the rival’s intensity of entry $Y_j$ – when the true underlying game is ordinal instead of binary. While this does not constitute a proper specification test but rather a feature of our designs (which were motivated by our empirical data), it is useful to revisit them here. Table 9 displays the observed probabilities conditional on POPULATION
(market size) being between the 45th and the 55th percentiles (i.e., around the median market size). The probabilities shown there display monotonically decreasing properties consistent with the features produced by ordered-response games with the types of designs analyzed in Section 6. We reiterate that, while these features do not constitute in any way a formal specification test for the true strategy space, they are nevertheless consistent with the properties of true ordered-response games with the types of designs analyzed in Section 6.

Table 9: Probability of entry \( (d_i = 1) \) conditional on the number of stores of the opponent \( (Y_j) \) for markets whose size (population) was between the 45th and the 55th percentiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1 (Lowe’s)</th>
<th>( Y_2 = 1 )</th>
<th>( Y_2 = 2 )</th>
<th>( Y_2 = 3 )</th>
<th>( Y_2 \geq 4 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_1 = 1</td>
<td>Y_2) )</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 2 (Home Depot)</th>
<th>( Y_1 = 1 )</th>
<th>( Y_1 = 2 )</th>
<th>( Y_1 = 3 )</th>
<th>( Y_1 \geq 4 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_2 = 1</td>
<td>Y_1) )</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Conclusion

In this paper we have analyzed a simultaneous equations model for a complete information game in which agents’ actions are ordered. This generalized the well-known simultaneous binary outcome model used for models of firm entry to cases where firms take ordered rather than binary actions, for example the number of stores to operate in a market, or the number of daily routes offered on a city pair by an airline.

We applied recently-developed methods from the literature to characterize (sharp) identified sets for model structures via conditional moment inequalities under easily interpreted shape restrictions. While one may ideally wish to incorporate all of the identifying information delivered by the model in performing estimation and inference, the number of implied conditional moment inequalities can be rather large, potentially posing significant challenges for both computation and the quality of asymptotic approximations in finite samples. However, the structure of this characterization lends itself readily to outer regions for model parameters, also characterized by conditional moment inequalities, which may be easier to use for estimation and inference. We further showed that in a parametric two player instance of our model, we achieve point identification of all but 3 parameters under fairly mild conditions, without using large support restrictions.

\(^{27}\) For other quantiles of POPULATION these probabilities immediately died off to zero.

\(^{28}\) While there were quantiles of POPULATION for which the probabilities shown in increased, in all cases they were nonincreasing for \( Y_j \geq 3 \).
We proposed a novel method for inference based on a test statistic that employed density-weighted kernel estimators of conditional moments, summing over measured deviations of conditional moment inequalities. We used results from the behavior of U-processes to show that our test statistic behaves asymptotically as a chi-square random variable when evaluated at points in the identified set, with degrees of freedom dependent upon whether the conditional moments are binding with positive probability. This was then used to construct confidence sets for parameters, where the critical value employed is simply a quantile of a chi-square distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom.

We applied our inference approach to data on the number of stores operated by Lowe’s and Home Depot in different markets. We presented confidence sets for model parameters, and showed how these confidence sets could in turn be used to construct confidence intervals for other quantities of economic interest, such as equilibrium selection probabilities and the probability that counterfactual outcomes are equilibria jointly with observed outcomes in a given market. Our framework and results also allowed us to conduct counterfactual analysis which included collusion as well as monopolistic behavior.

Our inference approach can be applied much more generally to models that comprise conditional moment inequalities, with or without identification of a subvector of parameters. Although we focused on Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept, this was not essential to our inference method. It could alternatively be based on conditional moment inequalities implied by (mixed or pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium, or other solution concepts, such as rationalizability. To illustrate this, we described the testable implications of a behavioral model that nests Nash equilibrium as a special case but allows for incorrect beliefs.

In our application we only employed a small subset of the conditional moment inequalities comprising the identified set. In principle our approach can be applied to sharp characterizations too, but the number of inequalities these incorporate can be rather large. The shear number of conditional moment inequalities raises interesting questions regarding computational feasibility and the accuracy of asymptotic approximations in finite samples, both for our inference approach and others in the literature. Indeed, these issues may arise when considering a large number of unconditional moment inequalities, as considered in important recent work by Menzel (2014) and Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato (2013). Future research on these issues in models comprising conditional moment inequalities with continuous conditioning variables thus seems warranted.

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A Proofs of Results in Sections 3 and 4.

Proof of Theorem 1. Let $R_\pi (Y,X)$ be the rectangles described in (3.4). It follows from Theorem 1 of Chesher and Rosen (2012) that the identified set is given by

$$S^* = \{ (\pi, P_U) \in \Pi \times P_U : \forall U \in F (R^J), P_U (U) \geq P_0 |R_\pi (Y,X) \subseteq U| X = x \text{ a.e. } x \in \mathcal{X} \}$$

where $F (R^J)$ denotes all closed sets in $R^J$. This is equivalent to the characterizations of Galichon and Henry (2011, Theorem 1) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011, Theorem D.2) applicable with finite $Y$, specifically

$$S^* = \left\{ (\pi, P_U) \in \Pi \times P_U : \forall C \in 2^Y, P_U (\exists y \in C : y \in \text{PSNE}(\pi, X, U) | X = x) \geq P_0 |Y \in C| X = x \text{ a.e. } x \in \mathcal{X} \right\},$$

where PSNE $(\pi, X, U)$ denotes the set of PSNE when the payoff functions are $\pi$ for the given $(X, U)$. It follows from Chesher and Rosen (2014, Theorem 3) that (A.1) can be refined by replacing $F (R^J)$ with the sub-collection $R^J (x)$. ■

Proof of Corollary 1. This follows from the observation that for any $x \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\forall U \in R^J (x), P_U (U) \geq P_0 |R_\pi (Y,X) \subseteq U| X = x \text{ a.e. } x \in \mathcal{X}$$

implies that the same inequality holds for all $U \in R^J (x)$, and in particular for all $U \in U (x)$. ■

Proof of Theorem 2. We prove parts 1 and 2 in the statement of the Theorem in separate steps.

Step 1. Suppose that $F$ is known and define the sets

$$S^+_b = \{ z : z_1 (b_1 - \beta_1^*) > 0 \land z_2 (b_2 - \beta_2^*) \geq 0 \},$$
Note that because

Then the conclusion of the first claim of the Theorem follows letting

above reasoning implies that for each \( \lambda \) distinct from \( \beta \),

and likewise for any \( z \in S_b^- \),

The probability that \( Z \in S_b \equiv S_b^+ \cup S_b^- \) is

Both \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_1 (b_1 - \beta_1^*) > 0 \} \) and \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_1 (b_1 - \beta_1^*) < 0 \} \) are strictly positive by (i), and at least one of \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_2 (b_2 - \beta_2^*) \geq 0 \} \) \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_1 (b_1 - \beta_1^*) > 0 \} \) and \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_2 (b_2 - \beta_2^*) \leq 0 \} \) \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z_1 (b_1 - \beta_1^*) < 0 \} \) must be strictly positive by (ii). Therefore \( \mathbb{P} \{ Z \in S_b \} > 0 \), implying that with \( \lambda^* \) known \( b \) is observationally distinct from \( \beta^* \) since for each \( z \in S_b, \mathbb{P} \{ Y = (0, 0) \mid z \} \neq F(z_1 b_1, z_2 b_2) \).

If instead \( F \) is only known to belong to some class of distribution functions \( \{ F_\lambda : \lambda \in \Gamma \} \), the above reasoning implies that for each \( \lambda \in \Gamma, E [ L (b, \lambda) ] \) is uniquely maximized with respect to \( b \). Then the conclusion of the first claim of the Theorem follows letting \( b^* (\lambda) \) denote the maximizer of \( E [ L (b, \lambda) ] \) for any \( \lambda \in \Gamma \).

**Step 2.** Suppose now that \( U \) has CDF \( F(\cdot, \cdot; \lambda) \) of the form given in (4.4) for some \( \lambda \in [-1, 1] \).

To show that \( \lambda^* \) is identified, consider the expectation of the profiled log-likelihood:

\[
L_0 (\lambda) \equiv E [ L (b^* (\lambda), \lambda) ] = E [ \ell (b^* (\lambda), \lambda; Z, Y) ].
\]

Note that because \( (\beta^*, \lambda^*) \) maximizes \( E [ L (b, \lambda) ] \) with respect to \( (b, \lambda) \), it follows that \( \lambda^* \) maximizes \( L_0 (\lambda) = \max_\theta E [ L (b, \lambda) ] \). That \( \lambda^* \) is the unique maximizer of \( L_0 (\lambda) \), and thus point-identified, follows from strict concavity of \( L_0 (\lambda) \) in \( \lambda \), shown in Lemma 3 below.

A standard mean value theorem expansion for maximum likelihood estimation then gives

\[
\hat{\theta}_1 = \theta_1^* + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_M (y_i, x_i) + o_p (n^{-1/2}),
\]

where

\[
\psi_M (y_i, x_i) \equiv H_0^{-1} \frac{\partial \ell (\theta_1; z_i, y_i)}{\partial \theta_1}
\]
is the maximum likelihood influence function satisfying

\[ n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_M(y_i, x_i) \rightarrow \mathcal{N}(0, H_0^{-1}) , \]

with \( H_0 \) as defined in (4.11).

\[ \square \]

**Lemma 3** Let the conditions of Theorem 2 hold and assume that \( U \) has CDF \( F(\cdot, \cdot; \lambda^*) \) given in (4.4) for some \( \lambda^* \in [-1, 1] \). Then \( L_0(\lambda) \) defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is strictly concave in \( \lambda \).

**Proof.** By definition, for any \( \lambda \in [-1, 1] \), \( \beta^*(\lambda) \) satisfies the first and second order necessary conditions:

\[ \frac{\partial L_0(\beta^*(\lambda), \lambda)}{\partial \beta} = 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 L_0(\beta^*(\lambda), \lambda)}{\partial \beta \partial \beta'} \leq 0, \tag{A.3} \]

where \( \leq 0 \) denotes non-positive definiteness. These conditions require, respectively,

\[ g(\lambda, \beta) \equiv E \left[ m_1(\lambda, z) \frac{dF^*}{\partial \beta} \right] = 0, \tag{A.4} \]

at \( \beta = \beta^*(\lambda) \), and

\[ E \left[ m_2(\lambda, z) \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta'} + m_1(\lambda, z) \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \beta'} \right] \leq 0, \tag{A.5} \]

where for ease of notation \( p(z) \equiv \Pr(Y = (0, 0) | Z = z) \), and for any parameter \( \mu \),

\[ \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \mu} \equiv \frac{dF(z_1 \beta, z_2 \beta; \lambda)}{d\mu}, \text{ evaluated at } \beta = \beta^*(\lambda), \]

\[ m_1(\lambda, z) \equiv p(z) F(z_1 \beta^*(\lambda), z_2 \beta^*(\lambda); \lambda)^{-1} - (1 - p(z)) \left( 1 - F(z_1 \beta^*(\lambda), z_2 \beta^*(\lambda); \lambda) \right)^{-1}, \]

\[ m_2(\lambda, z) \equiv -p(z) F(z_1 \beta^*(\lambda), z_2 \beta^*(\lambda); \lambda)^{-2} - (1 - p(z)) \left( 1 - F(z_1 \beta^*(\lambda), z_2 \beta^*(\lambda); \lambda) \right)^{-2} < 0. \]

We now use these conditions to show concavity of \( L_0(\lambda) \). Using (A.4), equivalently the envelope theorem, we have that

\[ \frac{\partial L_0(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = E \left[ \frac{\partial L(\beta^*(\lambda), \lambda; z)}{\partial \lambda} \right]. \]

The second derivative with respect to \( \lambda \) is

\[ \frac{\partial^2 L_0(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda^2} = E \left[ \frac{\partial^2 L(\beta^*(\lambda), \lambda; z)}{\partial \lambda \partial \beta'} \frac{\partial \beta^*(\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} + \frac{\partial^2 L(\beta^*(\lambda), \lambda; z)}{\partial \lambda^2} \right], \tag{A.6} \]

We now proceed to solve for each term in (A.6).
To solve for $\frac{\partial \beta^* (\lambda)}{\partial \lambda}$ we apply the implicit function theorem to (A.4), obtaining
\[
\frac{\partial \beta^* (\lambda)}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{\partial g}{\partial \beta}^{-1} \frac{\partial g}{\partial \lambda} = E \left[ m_2 \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta^*} + m_1 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \beta^*} \right]^{-1} E \left[ m_2 \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \lambda} + m_1 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \lambda} \right].
\]

In addition we have
\[
\frac{\partial^2 L (\beta^* (\lambda), \lambda; z)}{\partial \lambda \partial \beta} = m_2 \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta^*} + m_1 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \beta^*} + \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \beta^*},
\]
and
\[
\frac{\partial^2 L (\beta^* (\lambda), \lambda; z)}{\partial \lambda^2} = m_2 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \lambda^2} + \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta^*} = 0.
\]
Putting these expressions together in (A.6) gives,
\[
\frac{\partial^2 L_0 (\lambda)}{\partial \lambda^2} = AB^{-1} A' + D,
\]
where
\[
A = E \left[ m_2 \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \lambda} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta^*} + m_1 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \lambda \partial \beta^*} \right], \quad B = E \left[ m_2 \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta^*} \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \beta^*} + m_1 \frac{\partial^2 F^*}{\partial \beta \partial \beta^*} \right],
\]
and
\[
D = E \left[ m_2 \left( \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \lambda} \right)^2 \right].
\]
By (A.5), $B$ is negative semi-definite so that $AB^{-1} A' \leq 0$. Then $m_2 \leq 0$ implies that
\[
\frac{\partial^2 L_0 (\lambda)}{\partial \lambda^2} \leq 0,
\]
and strictness of the inequality follows from $F (\cdot, \cdot, \lambda) \in (0, 1)$. Therefore $L_0 (\lambda)$ is strictly concave in $\lambda$ and consequently $\beta^*$ and $\lambda^*$ are point identified.

\section*{B Proofs of Results in Section 5}

We first state and prove the following Lemma, subsequently used in the proof of Theorem 3.

**Lemma 4** Let Restrictions II-I5 hold. Then for some $a > 1/2$, and for each $k = 1, \ldots, K$, uniformly in $\theta \in \Theta$,
\[
\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{t=1}^{n} v_k (w_t, w_i; \theta, h_n) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \tilde{g}_k (w_i; \theta, h_n) - E [\tilde{g}_k (W; \theta, h_n)] \right] + O_p (n^{-a}),
\]

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where

\[ v_k(w_\ell, w_i; \theta, h_n) = \left( \frac{1}{h_n^\alpha} m_k(y_\ell, y_i, x_i; \theta) \cdot K(x_i - x_\ell; h_n) - T_k(w_i, \theta) \right) 1_{X, 1 \{ T_k(w_i, \theta) \geq 0 \}} \]  \quad \text{(B.1)}

and

\[ \tilde{g}_k(w; \theta, h) \equiv \int (v_k(w, w'; \theta, h) + v_k(w', w; \theta, h)) \, dF_W (w') . \]

**Proof of Lemma 4.** We prove the lemma for \( K = 1 \) and drop the subscript \( k \) notation for convenience. This suffices for the claim of the lemma since \( K \) is finite, and a finite sum of \( O_p(n^{-a}) \) terms is \( O_p(n^{-a}) \). Define

\[
\begin{align*}
g(w_1, w_2; \theta, h) & \equiv v(w_1, w_2; \theta, h_n) + v(w_2, w_1; \theta, h_n), \\
\tilde{g}(w; \theta, h) & \equiv \int g(w, w'; \theta, h) \, dF_W (w') , \quad \mu(\theta, h) \equiv \int \tilde{g}(w; \theta, h) \, dF_W (w), \\
\tilde{v}(w_1, w_2; \theta, h) & \equiv g(w_1, w_2; \theta, h) - \tilde{g}(w_1; \theta, h) - \tilde{g}(w_2; \theta, h) + \mu(\theta, h).
\end{align*}
\]

A Hoeffding (1948) decomposition of our U-process, making use of the relation \( E[\tilde{g}(W; \theta, h)] = \mu(\theta, h) \), gives

\[
\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{\ell=1}^{n} v_k(w_\ell, w_i; \theta, h_n) = \mu(\theta, h) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} [\tilde{g}(w_i; \theta, h) - E[\tilde{g}(W; \theta, h)]] + \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{1 \leq i < \ell \leq n} \tilde{v}(w_i, w_\ell; \theta, h) + o_p(n^{-1}).
\]

The third term above is a degenerate U-process of order 2. By Corollary 4 in Sherman (1994),

\[
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta} \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{1 \leq i < \ell \leq n} \tilde{v}(w_i, w_\ell; \theta, h) = O_p(\sqrt{n}h_n^{-2}) = o_p\left(n^{-1/2-\epsilon}\right),
\]

where the last equality follows from Restriction I2. Note that securing the above rate is the sole motivation for imposing that the class \( \mathcal{V} \) be Euclidean. Any alternative restriction that could deliver this result would suffice.

Under Restriction I1, using iterated expectations and an \( M^{th} \) order approximation,

\[
\sup_{\theta \in \Theta} \vert \mu(\theta, h) \vert = Ch_n^M = O_p\left(n^{-1/2-\epsilon}\right),
\]

for some \( \epsilon > 0 \). Thus

\[
\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{\ell=1}^{n} v_k(w_\ell, w_i; \theta, h_n) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} [\tilde{g}(w_i; \theta, h) - E[\tilde{g}(W; \theta, h)]] + O_p\left(n^{1/2+\epsilon}\right).
\]

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Proof of Theorem 3. Let

\[ \Delta_{g,i}(\theta, h) \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left[ \tilde{\gamma}_k(w_i; \theta, h) - E[\tilde{\gamma}_k(W; \theta, h)] \right]. \]

Combining Lemma 2 with the definition of \( \bar{R}(\theta) \) in (5.6) we have for some \( \alpha > 1/2 \),

\[
\bar{R}(\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (T_k(w_i, \theta))_+ + \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{\ell=1}^{n} v_k(w_i, w_\ell; \theta, h_n) + O_p(n^{-\alpha})
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (T_k(w_i, \theta))_+ + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta_{g,i}(\theta, h_n) + O_p(n^{-\alpha})
\]

\[
= R(\theta) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( 1_{X_i} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (T_k(w_i, \theta))_+ - R(\theta) \right) + \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Delta_{g,i}(\theta, h_n) + O_p(n^{-\alpha})
\]

where the second line follows from Lemma 1, the third adding subtracting \( R(\theta) \), and the fourth substituting for \( R(\theta) \) using (5.3) and interchanging summation and expectation. \( \blacksquare \)

Proof of Lemma 2. As in the main text, to simplify notation let \( w \equiv (x, y) \) with support denoted \( \mathcal{W} \). We abbreviate \( \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) \) and \( T_k(w_i; \theta) \) for \( \tilde{T}_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \) and \( T_k(y_i, x_i; \theta) \), respectively, \( k = 1, \ldots, K \). Suprema with respect to \( w, \theta \) are to be understood to be taken with respect to \( \mathcal{W} \times \Theta \) unless otherwise stated. Let

\[
\xi_n(\theta) \equiv \bar{R}(\theta) - \hat{R}(\theta)
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) \cdot \left[ \left\{ \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) \geq -b_n \right\} - 1 \left\{ T_k(w_i; \theta) \geq 0 \right\} \right] \right).
\]

Note that

\[
|\xi_n(\theta)| \leq \xi^1_n(\theta) + \xi^2_n(\theta),
\]

where

\[
\xi^1_n(\theta) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left| \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) \right| \cdot \left\{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \right\} \right),
\]

\[
\xi^2_n(\theta) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left| \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) \right| \cdot \left\{ \left| \tilde{T}_k(w_i; \theta) - T_k(w_i, \theta) \right| \geq b_n \right\} \right).
\]
To complete the proof, we now show that each of these terms is $O_p(n^{-a})$ uniformly over $\theta \in \Theta$ for some $a > 1/2$.

**Step 1** (Bound on $|\xi_n^1(\theta)|$).

We have

$$
\sup_{\theta} |\xi_n^1(\theta)| \leq \sup_{\theta} \bigg\{ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} |T_k(w_i, \theta)| \cdot 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} \right) \\
+ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{X_i} \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left| \hat{T}_k(w_i, \theta) - T_k(w_i, \theta) \right| \cdot 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} \right) \\
\leq \left( 2b_n + \sup_{w, \theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w_i, \theta) - T_k(w_i, \theta) \right| \right) \times \sup_{\theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1 \left\{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \right\} \right| \\
= \left( 2b_n + O_p \left( \frac{\log n}{\sqrt{nh_n}} \right) \right) \times \sup_{k, \theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} \right| ,
$$

(B.2)

where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, the second from elementary algebra, and the third from

$$
\sup_{w, \theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w_i, \theta) - T_k(w_i, \theta) \right| = O_p \left( \frac{\log n}{\sqrt{nh_n^2}} \right)
$$

for all $k = 1, ..., K$ holding under $I_2$ and $I_4$. Now for $\tilde{b}$ and $\tilde{A}$ as defined in Restriction $I_3$ we have for all $k = 1, ..., K$ and large enough $n$, $2b_n \leq \tilde{b}$ and therefore

$$
\sup_{\theta} E \left[ 1 \left\{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w, \theta) < 0 \right\} \right] \leq 2\tilde{A}b_n, \quad (B.3)
$$

$$
\tilde{\Omega}_n \equiv \sup_{\theta} \text{Var} \left[ 1 \left\{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w, \theta) < 0 \right\} \right] \leq 2\tilde{A}b_n. \quad (B.4)
$$

It now follows from the triangle inequality and (B.3) above that for any $k = 1, ..., K$,

$$
\sup_{\theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} \right| \\
\leq \sup_{\theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} - E \left[ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \right] \right) \right| + 2\tilde{A}b_n.
$$

The manageability Restriction $I_4$ implies, using Corollary 4 in Sherman (1994),

$$
\sup_{\theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} - E \left[ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \right] \right) \right| = O_p \left( \frac{\sqrt{\Omega_n}}{n} \right),
$$
which is in fact $O_p\left(\frac{\sqrt{b_n}}{n}\right)$ by virtue of (B.4). Thus

$$\sup_{\theta} \left| \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 1 \{ -2b_n \leq T_k(w_i, \theta) < 0 \} \right| = O_p\left(\frac{\sqrt{b_n}}{n}\right) + O(b_n)$$

$$= b_n \left( O_p\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{b_n}}\right) + O(1) \right)$$

$$= b_n \left( o_p(1) + O(1) \right)$$

$$= O_p\left(b_n^2\right).$$

Plugging this into (B.2) we have

$$\sup_{\theta} \left| \xi_n^1(\theta) \right| = \left( 2b_n + O_p\left(\frac{\log n}{\sqrt{nh_n^2}}\right) \right) \cdot O_p\left(b_n\right)$$

$$= O_p\left(b_n^2\right) + O_p\left(\frac{b_n \log n}{\sqrt{nh_n^2}}\right)$$

$$= O_p\left(n^{-a}\right)$$

for some $a > 1/2$ by the bandwidth conditions in Restriction I2.

**Step 2** (Bound on $P\left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w; \theta) - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \geq c \right\}$).

From Restriction I4 and application of Theorem 3.5 and equation (7.3) of Pollard (1990), there exist positive constants $\kappa_1, \kappa_2$ such that for any $c > 0$, and any $U \in$

$$P \left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w; \theta) - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \geq c \right\} \leq \kappa_1 \exp \left( - \left( \frac{nh_n^d \kappa_2 c}{2} \right) \right).$$

(B.5)

Our smoothness restriction I1 and an $M^{th}$ order expansion imply the existence of a constant $C$ such that

$$\sup_{w,\theta} \left| E\left[ \hat{T}_k(w; \theta) \right] - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \leq C h_n^M.$$  

(B.6)

Thus

$$P \left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w; \theta) - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n \right\} \leq P \left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w; \theta, U) - E\left[ \hat{T}_k(w; \theta) \right] \right| + \sup_{w,\theta} \left| E\left[ \hat{T}_k(w; \theta, U) \right] - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n \right\}$$

$$\leq P \left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k(w; \theta, U) - T_k(w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n - C h_n^M \right\},$$

(B.7)
where the first inequality follows by the triangle inequality and the second by (B.6). Under our bandwidth restrictions I2 we have for large enough \( n \) that \( b_n > Ch_n^M \), and so application of (B.5) to (B.7) with \( c = b_n - Ch_n^M \) gives

\[
P \left\{ \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) - T_k (w; \theta) \right| \geq c \right\} \leq \kappa_1 \exp \left( - \left( nh_n^d \kappa_2 \left( b_n - Ch_n^M \right) \right)^2 \right). \tag{B.8}
\]

**Step 3 (Bound on \( \left| \xi_n^2 (\theta) \right| \)).**

We have

\[
\sup_{\theta} \left| \xi_n^2 (\theta) \right| \leq \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) \right| \cdot \sup_{w,\theta} 1 \left\{ \left| \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) - T_k (w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n \right\}.
\]

\[
= O_p (1) \times \sup_{w,\theta} 1 \left\{ \left| \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) - T_k (w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n \right\}.
\]

\[
= O_p (1) \cdot \sup_{w,\theta} 1 \left\{ \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) - T_k (w; \theta) \geq b_n \right\}.
\]

Let \( D_n = \sup_{w,\theta} \left| \hat{T}_k (w; \theta) - T_k (w; \theta) \right| \geq b_n \). Now using Chebyshev’s inequality we have

\[
|D_n - E [D_n]| = O_p \left( \sqrt{\text{var} (D_n)} \right) = O_p \left( \sqrt{E [D_n]} (1 - E [D_n]) \right) = \sqrt{E [D_n]} O_p (1).
\]

Therefore

\[
D_n \leq \sqrt{E [D_n]} : O_p (1) + E [D_n] = \sqrt{E [D_n]} (O_p (1) + \sqrt{E [D_n]}) = \sqrt{E [D_n]} O_p (1). \tag{B.9}
\]

From (B.8) in Step 2 we have

\[
E [D_n] \leq \kappa_1 \exp \left( - \left( nh_n^d \kappa_2 \left( b_n - Ch_n^M \right) \right)^2 \right),
\]

which combined with (B.9) gives

\[
D_n = O_p \left( \sqrt{\kappa_1 \exp \left( - \frac{1}{2} \left( nh_n^d \kappa_2 \left( b_n - Ch_n^M \right) \right)^2 \right)} \right),
\]

from which it follows that \( D_n = O_p (n^{-a}) \), completing the proof.

**Proof of Theorem 4.** We characterize the limiting behavior of \( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) = \hat{V} (\theta) \hat{\Sigma} (\theta)^{-1} \hat{V} (\theta) \).

From Theorems 2 and 3 we have from (5.7) that uniformly over \( \theta \in \Theta \),

\[
\hat{V} (\theta) = n^{1/2} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_1^* - \theta_1 \\ R (\theta) \end{pmatrix} + \left( n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_M (w_i) \right) + \left( n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_R (w_i; \theta, h_n) \right) + \left( o_p (1) \right) + \left( o_p (n^{-a}) \right), \tag{B.10}
\]

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where \( \epsilon > 0 \). We consider each of the three cases (i) \( \theta \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^* \), (ii) \( \theta \in \hat{\Theta}^* \), and (iii) \( \theta_n \) is a sequence of alternatives, \( \theta_n \not\in \Theta^* \) as specified in the statement of the Theorem. Cases (i) and (ii) together prove the first claim of the Theorem, while case (iii) proves the second claim.

**Case (i):** \( \theta \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^* \). Because \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), \( \theta^*_1 - \theta_1 = 0 \) and \( R(\theta) = 0 \). By definition of \( \Theta^* \), we have that

\[
\inf_{\theta \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^*} P_W \left( \max_{k=1,...,K} T_k(W, \theta) < 0 \right) = 1.
\]

It follows from the definition of \( \psi_R(w_i; \theta_n) \) that \( n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_R(w_i; \theta_n) = 0 \) \( \text{wp} \to 1 \) for all \( \theta \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^* \). Therefore

\[
\hat{Q}_n(\theta) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_M(w_i) \hat{H}_0^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_M(w_i) + o_p(1),
\]

uniformly over \( \theta \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^* \). Then by Theorem 2 (4.10), for any \( c > 0 \), and any sequence \( \theta_n \in \Theta^*/\hat{\Theta}^* \)

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P \left( \hat{Q}_n(\theta_n) \leq c \right) = P \left( \chi_r^2 \leq c \right).
\]

**Case (ii):** \( \theta \in \Theta^* \). Again, \( \theta \in \Theta^* \) so \( \theta^*_1 - \theta_1 = 0 \) and \( R(\theta) = 0 \). Let

\[
\Omega(\theta) \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \Sigma_{MM}(\theta) & \Sigma_{MR}(\theta) \\ \Sigma_{MR}(\theta) & \sigma^2(\theta) \end{pmatrix}, \quad \hat{\Omega}(\theta) \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \hat{\Sigma}_{MM}(\theta) & \hat{\Sigma}_{MR}(\theta) \\ \hat{\Sigma}_{MR}(\theta) & \hat{\sigma}^2_n(\theta) \end{pmatrix},
\]

where

\[
\sigma^2(\theta) \equiv \lim_{n \to \infty} \sigma^2_n(\theta), \quad \hat{\sigma}^2_n(\theta) \equiv n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\psi}_R(w_i; \theta, \theta_n)^2.
\]

We assume \( \Omega(\theta) \) to be well-defined and invertible at each \( \theta \in \Theta^* \). Part (i) of Restriction I5 suffices for a Lindeberg condition to hold, see Lemma 1 of Romano (2004). It allows for the limiting variance of \( \hat{\psi}_R \) to become arbitrarily close to zero on \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), but essentially dictates that its absolute expectation vanish faster. Combined with the manageability condition of Restriction I6 (ii), it follows that for any sequence \( \theta_n \in \Theta^* \) such that \( \sigma^2_n(\theta) \) has a well-defined limit,

\[
n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\hat{\psi}_R(w_i; \theta_n, h_n)}{\sigma_n(\theta_n)} \to N(0, 1).
\]

For a given \( \theta \in \Theta^* \), let

\[
\hat{Q}_n(\theta) \equiv \hat{V}(\theta) \hat{\Omega}_n(\theta)^{-1} \hat{V}(\theta).
\]

By construction \( \hat{\Omega}^{-1}(\theta) - \hat{\Sigma}^{-1}(\theta) \) is positive semidefinite and therefore \( \hat{Q}_n(\theta) \leq \hat{Q}_n(\theta) \) for all \( \theta \in \Theta^* \).

Now let \( \theta_n \) be any sequence in \( \Theta^* \). Since \( \Theta \) is compact, the sequence \( \theta_n \) is bounded and has a convergent subsequence \( \theta_{n_k} \). By the continuity conditions in Restriction I6, \( \hat{\Omega}^{-1}_{n_k}(\theta_{n_k}) \) exists and
has a well-defined limit. For any $c > 0$, parts (i) and (ii) of Restriction I6 then yield
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta_{an}) \leq c \right) = P \left( \chi_{r+1}^2 \leq c \right),
\]
and since for all $\theta \in \hat{\Theta}^*$ $\hat{Q}_n (\theta) \leq \hat{Q}_n (\theta)$,
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta_{an}) \leq c \right) \geq P \left( \chi_{r+1}^2 \leq c \right).
\]
To analyze the behavior of
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \inf_{\theta \in \Theta^*} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta_{an}) \leq c \right)
\]
now choose a sequence $\theta_n \in \Theta^*$ such that for some $\delta_n \searrow 0$,
\[
\left| P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta_n) \leq c \right) - \inf_{\theta \in \Theta^*} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \leq c \right) \right| \leq \delta_n.
\]
Note that we can always find such a sequence. Using Theorem 3, Restriction I6, and $P \left( \chi_{r}^2 \leq c \right) \geq P \left( \chi_{r+1}^2 \leq c \right)$, our previous arguments show that we can always find a subsequence $\theta_{an}$ such that
\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta_{an}) \leq c \right) \geq P \left( \chi_{r+1}^2 \leq c \right),
\]
and from here we conclude that
\[
\lim_{\theta \in \Theta^*} \inf_{\theta} P \left( \hat{Q}_n (\theta) \leq c \right) \geq P \left( \chi_{r+1}^2 \leq c \right),
\]
which proves the first assertion of the Theorem.

**Case (iii):** $\theta_{na} \notin \Theta^*$ such that either $\|\theta_{na,1} - \theta_1^*\| \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2}C$ or $R (\theta_{na}) \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2}C$ wp$\to$ 1 for some $\mu_n \to \infty$. If $\|\theta_{na,1} - \theta_1^*\| \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2}C$ then the conclusion follows from adapting standard arguments for maximum likelihood estimators under local alternatives, for example as in chapter 4 of Severini (2000). Thus suppose instead that only $R (\theta_{na}) \geq \mu_n n^{-1/2}C$. Then it follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that
\[
n^{1/2} \hat{R} (\theta_{na}) = n^{1/2} R (\theta_{na}) + \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_r (w_i; \theta_{na}, h_n) + o_p \left( n^{-r} \right),\]
for some $\epsilon > 0$. Using Restriction I6 and then collecting terms it follows that

$$
\hat{Q}_n (\theta_{na}) = \frac{\left( n^{1/2} R(\theta_{na}) + n^{-1/2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_r (w_i; \theta_{na}, h_n) + o_p(n^{-\epsilon}) \right)^2}{\Sigma_{RR}(\theta_{na})} + o_p(1)
$$

$$
= \chi^2_1 + n^{1/2} R(\theta_{na}) \left( \frac{n^{1/2} R(\theta_{na}) + O_p(1)}{\Sigma_{RR}(\theta_{na})} \right) + o_p(1).
$$

where $\chi^2_1$ is a chi-square random variable with one degree of freedom. The conclusion follows.
C Figures

Figure 1: Illustration of Restriction I3

\[ P(T(Y,X|\emptyset) \leq c) \]

Satisfies regularity condition

Satisfies regularity condition

Violates regularity condition
Figure 2: Profiled log-likelihood for each parameter in $\theta_1$
Figure 3: Joint 95% confidence regions for slopes, intercept, and $\eta$
Figure 4: Joint 95% confidence region for strategic interaction coefficients.
Figure 5: Joint 95% confidence region for strategic interaction coefficients and slope parameters.
Figure 6: Confidence sets for estimated propensities of equilibrium selection

(A) Equilibria with at most one store by each firm

(B) Equilibria with a monopolist opening multiple stores

(C) Equilibria where both firms enter with the same number of stores
Figure 7: CS for strategic coefficients (target coverage 95%). Comparison of our results with those derived from a binary-choice specification.
## D Monte Carlo Experiment Tables

Table 10: Summary statistics for our Monte Carlo designs†.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
<th>Negative correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda = 0.5 ) and ( \rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153 )</td>
<td>( \lambda = -0.5 ) and ( \rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Value of } \eta ) (concavity coefficient)</td>
<td>( \text{Value of } \eta ) (concavity coefficient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25 0.75 1.50 4.50</td>
<td>0.25 0.75 1.50 4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho(Y_1, Y_2) )</td>
<td>( \rho(Y_1, Y_2) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( -0.37 -0.23 0.63 0.74 )</td>
<td>( -0.39 -0.26 0.58 0.72 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 = 0, Y_2 = 0) )</td>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 = 0, Y_2 = 0) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4% 6% 10% 42%</td>
<td>4% 5% 9% 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 \geq 2) )</td>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 \geq 2) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51% 61% 40% 7%</td>
<td>52% 61% 40% 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(Y_2 \geq 2) )</td>
<td>( Pr(Y_2 \geq 2) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% 24% 24% 6%</td>
<td>44% 26% 25% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 \geq 4) )</td>
<td>( Pr(Y_1 \geq 4) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% 35% 10% 1%</td>
<td>46% 36% 10% 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(Y_2 \geq 4) )</td>
<td>( Pr(Y_2 \geq 4) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41% 9% 4% 1%</td>
<td>41% 11% 4% 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F_{Y_1}(0.75) )</td>
<td>( F_{Y_1}(0.75) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 5 2 1</td>
<td>9 5 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F_{Y_2}(0.75) )</td>
<td>( F_{Y_2}(0.75) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 1 1 1</td>
<td>9 2 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F_{Y_1}(0.95) )</td>
<td>( F_{Y_1}(0.95) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 11 5 2</td>
<td>24 11 5 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F_{Y_2}(0.95) )</td>
<td>( F_{Y_2}(0.95) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 4 3 2</td>
<td>24 5 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(\text{multiple eqbia}) )</td>
<td>( Pr(\text{multiple eqbia}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.69 0.21 0.17 0.03</td>
<td>0.67 0.20 0.16 0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(†) Probabilities computed from 5 million simulations.
Table 11: Approximating the outcome probabilities of an ordered-response game with a binary-choice game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive correlation in unobserved payoff shocks: ( \lambda = 0.5 ) and ( \rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153 )</th>
<th>Negative correlation in unobserved payoff shocks: ( \lambda = -0.5 ) and ( \rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binary-choice game with same parameters as the ordered-response game (( W = 5.463 ))</td>
<td>Binary-choice game with same parameters as the ordered-response game (( W = 5.463 ))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of probabilities for the ordered-response games in our Monte Carlo designs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of probabilities for the ordered-response games in our Monte Carlo designs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(duopoly)</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(monopoly)</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr(no entrant)</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(†) Probabilities computed from 5 million simulations.
(¶) Probability range taken over the corresponding range of values \( \eta \in \{0.25, 0.75, 1.5, 4.5\} \) for the concavity coefficient in our Monte Carlo designs.

Table 12: Relation between players' extensive margin decision (binary choice “entry” decision) and the opponent’s intensive margin choice in our designs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>( \eta = 0.25 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 0.75 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 1.50 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 4.50 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_1 = 1</td>
<td>Y_2 = 1, W_1 = \text{median}(W_1)) )</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_1 = 1</td>
<td>Y_2 = 2, W_1 = \text{median}(W_1)) )</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_1 = 1</td>
<td>Y_2 = 3, W_1 = \text{median}(W_1)) )</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_1 = 1</td>
<td>Y_2 \geq 4, W_1 = \text{median}(W_1)) )</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 2</th>
<th>( \eta = 0.25 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 0.75 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 1.50 )</th>
<th>( \eta = 4.50 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_2 = 1</td>
<td>Y_1 = 1, W_2 = \text{median}(W_2)) )</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_2 = 1</td>
<td>Y_1 = 2, W_2 = \text{median}(W_2)) )</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_2 = 1</td>
<td>Y_1 = 3, W_2 = \text{median}(W_2)) )</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Pr(d_2 = 1</td>
<td>Y_1 \geq 4, W_2 = \text{median}(W_2)) )</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Probabilities computed from 5 million simulations.
- Values shown correspond to \( \lambda = 0.5 \) (positive correlation in unobserved payoff shocks). The same type of monotonic pattern was observed for \( \lambda = -0.5 \).
Table 13: Results from Estimating the Misspecified Binary Choice Game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Positive Correlation in Unobserved Payoff Shocks: $\lambda = 0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153$</th>
<th>Negative Correlation in Unobserved Payoff Shocks: $\lambda = -0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of $\eta$ (Concavity Coefficient)</td>
<td>Value of $\eta$ (Concavity Coefficient)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$(\dagger)$ Let $\Delta \equiv (\Delta_1, \Delta_2)$ denote the binary-game MLE estimated strategic-interaction coefficients, and let $\Delta^0 = (\Delta^0_1, \Delta^0_2)$ denote their true values. Let $\hat{\Sigma}_\Delta$ denote the estimated MLE variance-covariance matrix of $\Delta$. The entries in the table correspond to the observed frequency (over 500 Monte Carlo simulations) with which the test-statistic $J_\Delta = n \cdot (\hat{\Delta} - \Delta^0)'\hat{\Sigma}_\Delta^{-1}(\hat{\Delta} - \Delta^0)$ was below the $\chi^2_2$ 95% critical value. This is the frequency with which the true value $\Delta^0$ of the strategic-coefficients was included in the analytical, MLE-based 95% CS in the (misspecified) binary-game.

Table 14: Results from Estimating the Misspecified Binary Choice Game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Positive Correlation in Unobserved Payoff Shocks: $\lambda = 0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153$</th>
<th>Negative Correlation in Unobserved Payoff Shocks: $\lambda = -0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of $\eta$ (Concavity Coefficient)</td>
<td>Value of $\eta$ (Concavity Coefficient)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>$[-2.82, 0.62]$</td>
<td>$[-2.40, 0.97]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>$[-1.48, 0.44]$</td>
<td>$[-1.69, 0.77]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>$[-0.91, 0.17]$</td>
<td>$[-1.26, 0.25]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$(\dagger)$ The bounds reported in the table correspond to the observed 2.5th and 97.5th quantiles of $\bar{W} = \hat{\beta}'\bar{X}$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is the binary-game MLE estimate of $\beta$ and $\bar{X}$ corresponds to the true means of our generated payoff shifters.
Table 15: Results from our methodology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Positive correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
<th>Negative correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\lambda = 0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153$</td>
<td>$\lambda = -0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of $\eta$</td>
<td>(concavity coefficient)</td>
<td>Value of $\eta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Results correspond to the projection of our CS for the subvector of parameters $(\beta, \Delta_1, \lambda_1)$. Accordingly, the table reports the observed frequency (over 500 Monte Carlo simulations) of the smallest value of $\beta^T \Delta_1 \lambda_1$ and the true means of our generated payoff shifters.

Table 16: Results from our methodology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Positive correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
<th>Negative correlation in unobserved payoff shocks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\lambda = 0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = 0.153$</td>
<td>$\lambda = -0.5$ and $\rho(U_1, U_2) = -0.153$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of $\eta$</td>
<td>(concavity coefficient)</td>
<td>Value of $\eta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>[3.63, 8.27]</td>
<td>[3.61, 8.45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>[3.88, 8.02]</td>
<td>[3.76, 8.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>[4.05, 7.86]</td>
<td>[4.00, 7.85]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(0) Results shown are based on the projection of our 95% CS for $W = \beta^T \Delta_1$. For the $s^{th}$ Monte Carlo simulation, we compute the $\overline{W}_L^s$ and $\overline{W}_U^s$ as the smallest and largest values, respectively, of $\beta^T \Delta_1$, taken over all the $\beta$’s that were included in our estimated 95% CS. The lower and upper bounds in the intervals reported in the table correspond, respectively, to the smallest value of $\overline{W}_L^s$ and the largest value of $\overline{W}_U^s$ observed in our 500 Monte Carlo simulations. As in the binary-game results reported in Table 14, the values used for $\overline{X}$ correspond to the true means of our generated payoff shifters.